Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries
United States v. Witkemper
Witkemper was the president and sole shareholder of Maximum, which had employees, but in 2004-2006 never withheld and remitted federal income and insurance contribution taxes (FICA taxes). Maximum went bankrupt. Unable to fully collect the unpaid taxes during the bankruptcy proceedings, the IRS lodged an assessment totaling $385,705.54 and recorded a notice of a federal tax lien against Witkemper, who sent the IRS a signed Offer in Compromise. The IRS accepted the Offer. Witkemper began making the required monthly minimum payments, $500. Witkemper successfully sought to rescind the settlement after it had been in effect only 205 days. Witkemper then began making property transfers to his wife and children without any consideration.The IRS viewed the transactions as fraudulent conveyances and filed suit. The Witkempers had no response to the merits of the government’s position but argued that the government could not prove that its initial assessment of the FICA tax penalties fell within the statutory deadline, citing “unreliable government records” containing clerical errors. They claimed that because the government filed its complaint more than 10 years after it assessed the FICA recovery penalties the lawsuit was outside the limitations period, which was not tolled by the Offer, which had “forged signatures.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed a $385,705.54 judgment in the government’s favor, finding the case “not close," the Witkempers’ counsel never should have pressed the appeal. View "United States v. Witkemper" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Buck v. Utah State Tax Commission
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tax Commission determining that John and Brooke Buck were domiciled in Utah for the 2012 tax year and therefore owed nearly $400,000 in back taxes and interest, holding that the court erred interpreting Utah Code 59-10-136 to effectively preclude the Bucks from being able to overcome the rebuttal presumption of domicile.On appeal, the Bucks maintained that they were domiciled in Florida in 2012 and that the Commission's decision suffered several constitutional and interpretive deficiencies. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the Tax Commission erred as a matter of law in interpreting section 136, and the plain language of the domicile provision supported the Bucks; and (2) the stipulated facts decisively demonstrated that the Bucks were not domiciled in Utah in 2012 for income tax purposes. View "Buck v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, Utah Supreme Court
Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United States
In 2007, CalBio acquired two facilities and began upgrading them to biomass facilities. CalBio secured Authority to Construct permits that allowed construction and allowed the facilities to generate and sell electricity. The permits could be converted into Permits to Operate after the facilities met conditions, including emissions tests. CalBio labeled the facilities “in operation” in 2008. The facilities passed pre-parallel testing under PG&E interconnection agreements and began selling electricity on the spot market and later to PG&E. The facilities operated fairly continuously throughout 2009, occasionally noncompliant with emissions regulations.The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 123 Stat. 115, allowed entities to receive federal grants if they “placed in service” a renewable energy facility during 2009-2010 or began constructing property in 2009-2010. CalBio was experiencing financial difficulties but did not seek grants because its facilities had been placed in service in 2008. CalBio suspended operations in 2010 and sold the facilities. Akeida spent $15 million improving the facilities, which passed emissions tests in 2011. Akeida applied for grants, claiming that the facilities were placed in service when Akeida’s emissions improvements were certified.The Treasury Department largely rejected Akeida’s claims, reasoning that most of the property had been placed in service in 2008. The Claims Court and Federal Circuit agreed, applying Treasury’s regulatory definition of “placed in service,” which required it to determine the “taxable year in which the property is . . . availabil[e] for a specifically assigned function.” View "Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law
Lodge Properties v. Eagle County
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the valuation for real property tax purposes of the Lodge at Vail (“the Lodge”), a luxury resort property that included a hotel, privately owned condominiums, and amenities. The Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) fees paid by the condominium owners to a third-party company that managed the rental of their condominiums to overnight guests was intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the actual value of the Lodge under the income approach to valuation; and (2) the net income generated from such fees should have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach. The Supreme Court concluded the net income generated from rentals of the individually and separately owned condominium units was not income generated by the Lodge and therefore should not have been included in the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the division below, and did not consider whether the contractual right to net rental management income generated from the condominiums constituted intangible personal property that had to be excluded from the Lodge’s actual value under the income approach to valuation. View "Lodge Properties v. Eagle County" on Justia Law
Karr v. McClain
The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) abating a tax penalty imposed against Appellee by the Tax Commissioner of Ohio, holding that the BTA's abatement of the penalty was clearly erroneous.The tax commissioner assessed unpaid tax in the amount of $4,821 as against Appellee and exercised his statutory discretion to impose a fifteen percent penalty amounting to $723. The BTA upheld the tax assessment against Appellee but found that the tax commissioner had abused his discretion in assessing a penalty. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the BTA's holding that the tax commissioner abused his discretion and that the BTA's order abating the penalty were clearly erroneous. View "Karr v. McClain" on Justia Law
Tyler v. Minnesota
Tyler owned a Minneapolis condominium. She stopped paying her property taxes and accumulated a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000. The county retained the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the county, alleging that its retention of the surplus equity—the value of the condominium in excess of her $15,000 tax debt—constituted an unconstitutional taking, an unconstitutionally excessive fine, a violation of substantive due process, and unjust enrichment under state law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. Minnesota’s statutory tax-forfeiture plan allocates the entire surplus to various entities with no distribution of net proceeds to the former landowner; the statute abrogates any common-law rule that gave a former landowner a property right to surplus equity. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the government from retaining the surplus where the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the charges due and the foreclosure proceedings. View "Tyler v. Minnesota" on Justia Law
Virginia Department of Taxation v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that the Virginia Department of Taxation's corporation income tax assessments for the years in issue were erroneous and ordering the Department to refund Lorillard Tobacco Company the amount of its overpayments on the assessments for the years in issue, holding that there was no error.Lorillard filed an application for correction of erroneous assessment of corporation income taxes challenging the denial of its refund claims for certain assessments. The circuit court held that the Department's assessments were erroneous and ordered the Department to correct the assessments by refunding Lorillard the amount of its overpayments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. View "Virginia Department of Taxation v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco" on Justia Law
Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Movants' motions to intervene in an action commenced by Verizon New England Inc. by way of appeal from a decision of the Tax Administrator for the State of Rhode Island, holding that the trial judge did not err.This appeal arose from Verizon's challenge to a final decision of the tax administrator that upheld an assessment of Verizon's tangible personal property (TPP) tax and denied Verizon's request for a lower assessment and a partial refund. Verizon appealed to the district court. The City of Pawtucket and the City of Cranston (collectively, Movants) moved to intervene as of right, claiming an interest in the TPP tax. The district court denied the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err or abuse his discretion in concluding that Movants failed to demonstrate that their interests were not adequately represented. View "Verizon New England Inc. v. Savage" on Justia Law
JetPay Corp. v. United States
JetPay is a national company offering credit card processing services to merchants and banks. JetPay processed credit card payments for customers purchasing tickets from Direct Air, placing the funds in Direct Air's escrow account until the passengers took the flights. After Direct Air ended its operations and filed for bankruptcy, JetPay asserts that it was contractually obligated to use its own funds to reimburse thwarted passengers. JetPay timely filed with the IRS for a refund of the excise taxes it repaid to the consumers, but the IRS denied the claim.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against JetPay, agreeing with the district court that the company was not a proper party to seek a refund from the IRS. JetPay did not pay the tax to the Secretary, and thus the court did not consider whether the company qualifies as "the person who collected the tax" under 26 U.S.C. 6415(a). In this case, JetPay is neither a customer required to pay the tax before taking a flight nor an airline required to collect it. The court also concluded that the economic burden test does not apply to JetPay's case. Finally, the court rejected JetPay's equitable subrogation claim. View "JetPay Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
United States v. Barringer
Barringer was the Executive Vice President and a Board member of J&R, a Virginia manufacturing company. By 2014, J&R was delinquent on filing and paying its 941 (employee withholding) taxes. Fearing personal liability, Barringer submitted a Hardship Withdrawal Form requesting $311,859.04 from her 401(k) account “[t]o prevent eviction or ... foreclosure of the mortgage on [her] principal residence.” Barringer deposited the funds into J&R's account to pay the delinquent taxes. Barringer’s mortgage balance was approximately $200,000 at the time; her payments were not delinquent. In 2016, J&R was again behind on its 941 taxes. Barringer requested a final distribution from her 401(k) account, falsely citing the end of her employment with J&R. Barringer again deposited the funds, plus some of her personal savings, into the J&R account. Instead of paying delinquent taxes, Barringer paid herself and vendors. After providing misinformation to federal agents, Barringer was convicted of willfully failing to collect and truthfully account for and pay taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202, and making materially false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 36-month sentence. Any error in the denial of Barringer’s pretrial motion to dismiss the wire fraud counts was harmless because the court subsequently granted her motion for a judgment of acquittal on those charges. Barringer’s false statements to investigators were “material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.” The court upheld an abuse-of-trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1. View "United States v. Barringer" on Justia Law