Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioner, Eddie Gomez, Jr., sought to challenge a Superior Court judge's denial of his request to disqualify another judge, Judge Kimberly Menninger, who was set to consider his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.Gomez had previously appeared before Judge Menninger for his arraignment, where he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and two enhancements. Following the plea agreement, Judge Menninger dismissed the remaining counts and enhancements, sentencing Gomez to 11 years in prison. Later, Gomez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and subsequently filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify Judge Menninger from ruling on this resentencing petition.However, Judge Jonathan S. Fish denied the peremptory challenge, stating it was untimely and that Judge Menninger, as the sentencing judge, was required to handle the resentencing under section 1172.6. Gomez then sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, but his petition was denied.Upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal held that Gomez's peremptory challenge was indeed untimely. The court reasoned that the resentencing proceeding was a continuation of the earlier criminal action, and therefore Gomez was not entitled to file a peremptory challenge at the resentencing stage. The court affirmed that when the judge assigned to examine and rule on the resentencing petition is the same judge who presided at the petitioner's earlier criminal action, the petitioner is not entitled to peremptorily challenge that judge. As a result, the court denied Gomez's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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The case in question involves Dale Edward Lehman, Jr., who was convicted for knowingly permitting a minor to ingest methamphetamine, a violation of Minnesota Statute ยง 152.137, subd. 2(b) (2022). Lehman appealed, arguing the state failed to provide evidence proving he knew the minor in question, identified as A.D., was under the age of 18. Lehman also argued the court failed to instruct the jury to evaluate whether he knew A.D. was underage. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating the statute did not necessitate proof of the defendant's awareness of the minor's age.Lehman's case reached the Supreme Court of Minnesota, where he petitioned for a review. The Supreme Court stated it did not need to resolve the statutory interpretation issue raised by Lehman, as the circumstantial evidence was inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than Lehman's guilt. The Court took into consideration Lehman's longstanding relationship with the minor's family, his frequent visits to their home, and his statements indicating he knew the minor was underage. The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that Lehman knew A.D. was under the age of 18 at the time he provided her with methamphetamine.The Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the appellate court but on different grounds, maintaining Lehman's conviction. View "State vs. Lehman" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Minnesota reviewed a case in which Robert John Kaiser had been convicted of second-degree felony murder for the death of his infant son. Kaiser sought postconviction relief, arguing that two expert witnesses for the State had presented false evidence at his trial. The district court granted a new trial, determining that the expert testimony at issue was indeed false and that the jury might have reached a different conclusion without it. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial.The Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the lower court's decision, stating that the district court had not abused its discretion. It held that the Larrison test, which is used to determine the legitimacy of claims of witness recantation or false trial testimony, was the appropriate legal standard for this case. The court found that the expert testimony presented at Kaiser's trial was factual and false, thus meeting the requirements of the Larrison test. The court further found that the jury might have returned a different verdict without the false testimony. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decision of the lower courts to grant Kaiser a new trial. View "Kaiser vs. State" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

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In this case, Albert Jackson was alone in a parked car when two officers approached him. The officers boxed him in, shined flashlights on him, and questioned him, while observing that he was wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night and seemed nervous. The officers did not have any reason to suspect criminal activity, but they stopped and detained Jackson due to his behavior. The officers found a gun in Jackson's possession, leading to his arrest. Jackson challenged his arrest, arguing that his detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion to suppress the evidence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight held that the officers' actions amounted to an unjustified detention. The court found that a reasonable person in Jackson's position would not feel free to leave due to the officers' display of authority. The court noted that the officers did not have any specific and articulable facts suggesting that criminal activity was afoot. Wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night, appearing surprised and nervous, and sitting awkwardly in a car do not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court also rejected the prosecution's argument that the area was a high-crime area, stating that the officer's words did not suggest this.The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its order denying Jacksonโ€™s motion to suppress the evidence and to enter a new order granting that motion. The court concluded that Jackson's detention was invalid and violated the Fourth Amendment. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit examined a case where the defendant, Derek Gerrish, challenged the constitutionality of a search of his vehicle during his pretrial release on several state criminal charges. During this period, Gerrish was subjected to at least six different bail conditions, five of which allowed for searches of his person, vehicle, or residence at any time without reasonable suspicion. The search in question led to the discovery of fentanyl and other contraband, resulting in Gerrish pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl.Gerrish argued that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional, despite the terms of his bail conditions. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, citing two reasons: the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and Gerrish's bail conditions permitted such a search.On appeal, the defendant argued that both of the district court's reasons were incorrect. The appeals court, however, only focused on the bail condition rationale, as it found it conclusive. The court noted that Gerrish knowingly agreed to bail conditions authorizing searches without suspicion and did not challenge the reasonableness of these conditions. Furthermore, it emphasized that the issue at hand was not the search itself, but the bail conditions that authorized it.The court rejected Gerrish's argument that such bail conditions could not be imposed pre-trial or pre-guilty plea, referring to precedent which stated that acceptance of such conditions significantly diminishes a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. It also dismissed Gerrish's claim of a conflict with a Ninth Circuit decision, stating that Maine law requires "least restrictive" bail conditions tailored to the defendant's individual circumstances, thereby eliminating the Ninth Circuit's concerns about mandatory waiver of rights.The judgment of the district court was thus affirmed. View "United States v. Gerrish" on Justia Law

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The case involves a defendant, Kevin MacVicar, who pled guilty to a single count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced by the district court to a seven-year term, which was below the guidelines sentencing range. The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing it was both procedurally flawed and substantively unreasonable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected these claims and affirmed the district court's sentence.The defendant contended that the district court failed to consider his significant mental health treatment efforts and his need for continued treatment when determining the appropriate sentence. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the record clearly showed the sentencing court had adequately considered all relevant factors, including the mitigating factors that the defendant claimed were overlooked.The defendant also argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court placed too much weight on the severity of the offense and not enough on other sentencing factors. The appellate court rejected this argument as well, stating that the sentencing court had provided a plausible sentencing rationale and reached a defensible result. It was not the court's role to adjust the weight given to individual sentencing factors according to the defendant's preferences. Therefore, the defendant's sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. MacVicar" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant, Danybelkis Vasquez-Rodrigue, appealed her jury conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess over 400 grams of fentanyl. Vasquez-Rodrigue argued that the district court erred in denying her requested jury instruction on duress, claiming she was threatened into participating in the drug conspiracy. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Vasquez-Rodrigue's argument, concluding that she had failed to show she either intentionally or recklessly placed herself in a situation where it was probable she would be subjected to duress.The court noted that by the time Vasquez-Rodrigue alleges she was threatened, she had already completed the crime of conspiracy by agreeing to collect a drug debt, coordinating the collection with the debtor, collecting the money, and remitting thousands of dollars to individuals in Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The court also noted that a reasonable person in Vasquez-Rodrigue's position would have understood the danger of getting involved with a drug conspiracy, especially one selling kilogram amounts of drugs and exporting tens of thousands of dollars out of the country.The court also rejected Vasquez-Rodrigue's separate argument that a different duress test, imposing fewer burdens on the defendant, should apply in cases in which the sole charged offense is conspiracy. The court noted that the First Circuit has routinely applied the conventional duress test in conspiracy cases. Thus, the court affirmed Vasquez-Rodrigue's conviction. View "United States v. Vasquez-Rodrigue" on Justia Law

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The defendant, Roy Sastrom, was serving a term of supervised release, a condition of which was modified by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court directed Sastrom, upon his release from federal custody, to report directly to a psychiatric hospital in Connecticut, as per his civil commitment order. This case was later transferred to the District of Connecticut. Sastrom appealed, arguing the Massachusetts district court abused its discretion by modifying his supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that despite the transfer, it retained jurisdiction to review the pre-transfer order. However, the court recognized that Sastrom's case had already proceeded in Connecticut and that the Massachusetts court no longer had authority over his supervised release. Consequently, the court asserted it could not simply remand the case for reassessment of the supervised release conditions.The court concluded that although it had the power to grant relief, the controversy was so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counseled the court to withhold relief. The only possible remedy would require significant judicial resources and provide only a remote benefit to Sastrom. Therefore, the court declined to grant this remedy and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Sastrom" on Justia Law