Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Four individuals established two illegal gambling businesses in northern Ohio, operating gaming rooms that paid out winnings in cash. To avoid detection, the true owners concealed their involvement by using nominal owners and destroyed financial records. The businesses operated almost entirely in cash, allowing the owners to hide profits and evade taxes. One of the defendants, an accountant, played a central role in managing finances and preparing false tax returns for the group. The scheme also involved efforts to launder money and shield assets from IRS collection, including the use of shell companies and deceptive real estate transactions.After law enforcement executed multiple search warrants in 2018, a grand jury indicted several participants on conspiracy, illegal gambling, tax evasion, and related charges. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied motions to dismiss and to sever the trials. At trial, a jury convicted two defendants on nearly all counts. At sentencing, the court calculated tax losses exceeding $3.5 million for each defendant, resulting in lengthy prison terms and substantial restitution orders. Both defendants challenged the loss calculations, the denial of severance, jury instructions, and other procedural aspects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, as no compelling prejudice was shown. The court found no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss the tax evasion count, concluding that affirmative acts of evasion within the limitations period were sufficiently alleged. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s tax loss calculations, the application of the sophisticated means enhancement, and the handling of jury instructions. The sentences were affirmed, but the case was remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the judgment regarding restitution interest. View "United States v. DiPietro" on Justia Law

A partnership purchased a historic eleven-story building in downtown Cleveland for $6 million in 2015 and later redeveloped it into residential apartments, utilizing state and federal historic preservation tax credits. In 2016, the partnership donated a conservation easement on the building’s façade and development rights to a local charity, claiming a $22 million charitable deduction—substantially more than the purchase price. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed the deduction, citing that it was claimed in the wrong tax year, was grossly overvalued, and lacked proper documentation for related expenses. The IRS also imposed significant penalties for negligence and overvaluation.The partnership and its tax matters partner challenged the IRS’s determinations in the United States Tax Court. After a trial, the Tax Court found that the deduction was improperly claimed by the partnership for a period when it was not a taxable entity, as it had only one partner at the time of the donation. The court also concluded that the easement’s valuation was speculative and unsupported, rejecting the $22 million figure in favor of the IRS’s much lower estimate. Additionally, the Tax Court determined that the partnership failed to adequately document its claimed expenses and upheld the IRS’s penalties.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the partnership could not claim the deduction for a period when it was not a taxable partnership, that the valuation of the easement was grossly overstated and speculative, and that the partnership failed to substantiate its claimed expenses. The court also upheld the imposition of negligence and gross valuation misstatement penalties, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s factual determinations. View "Corning Place Ohio, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a taxpayer, received a notice of deficiency from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding her 2022 tax return. The IRS determined that she was not entitled to certain tax credits and imposed penalties. The notice, dated May 30, 2023, was sent to her former address, and she did not become aware of it until after the deadline to contest the deficiency had passed. She filed a petition for redetermination with the United States Tax Court on November 1, 2023, well after the ninety-day deadline specified in the Internal Revenue Code. In her petition, she argued that she was entitled to the disputed credits and status, and requested equitable tolling of the filing deadline due to her lack of timely notice.The United States Tax Court dismissed her petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the ninety-day deadline in I.R.C. § 6213(a) was a strict jurisdictional requirement that could not be extended or tolled, regardless of the circumstances. The court relied on prior Sixth Circuit precedent that had characterized the deadline as jurisdictional and rejected the petitioner’s arguments for equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s dismissal de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that, in light of recent Supreme Court guidance, the ninety-day deadline in § 6213(a) is not a jurisdictional rule but rather a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling. The court reversed the Tax Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for the Tax Court to consider, in the first instance, whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline based on the specific facts of her case. View "Oquendo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Peter McGowan, a dentist, and his solely owned dental practice, Peter E. McGowan DDS, Inc., engaged in a complex life insurance arrangement involving two subtrusts. The dental practice contributed $50,000 annually to these subtrusts, one of which owned a life insurance policy covering McGowan. The policy's death benefit would go to McGowan's wife, while the cash value could potentially be donated to a charity, the Toledo Zoo, if premiums were not paid. McGowan reported only a portion of these contributions as taxable income, and the dental practice deducted the full amount of the premiums.The IRS audited McGowan and the dental practice, concluding that McGowan should have included the full value of the policy's economic benefits in his gross income and that the dental practice could not deduct the premiums. The IRS assessed over $100,000 in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for the tax years 2014 and 2015. McGowan and the dental practice paid these amounts and then sued for a refund in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, upholding the IRS's assessments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the split-dollar regulation applied to McGowan's arrangement, requiring him to include the full value of the policy's economic benefits in his gross income and prohibiting the dental practice from deducting the premiums. The court also found that the regulation was consistent with the Internal Revenue Code. Additionally, the court noted that McGowan's income from the arrangement should be treated as a shareholder distribution rather than services-based compensation, entitling him to a refund due to the lower tax rate on dividends. View "McGowan v. United States" on Justia Law

From 2016 to 2021, Irene Michelle Fike worked at an accounting firm and later as an independent contractor for a client, J.M., and J.M.'s family. Fike used her access to J.M.'s financial accounts to pay her personal credit card bills and make purchases from online retailers. She concealed her fraud by misrepresenting J.M.'s expenditures in financial reports. Fike defrauded J.M. of $363,657.67 between April 2018 and September 2022.Fike pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in 2024. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sentenced her to thirty-six months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court also ordered her to pay $405,867.08 in restitution, which included the principal amount stolen and $42,209.41 in prejudgment interest. Fike appealed, arguing that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) does not authorize prejudgment interest and that the interest calculation was speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the MVRA allows for prejudgment interest to ensure full compensation for the victim's losses. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest, as it was necessary to make J.M. whole. The court also determined that the district court had a sufficient basis for calculating the interest, relying on J.M.'s declaration of losses, which was submitted under penalty of perjury and provided a reliable basis for the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fike" on Justia Law

In 2017, Gratiot County foreclosed on Donald Freed’s home due to unpaid taxes. Freed’s property, valued at $98,800, was sold for $42,000, although he owed just under $1,110. The county kept all proceeds from the sale, as Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (GPTA) did not require returning surplus proceeds to the property owner. Freed sued Gratiot County and its treasurer, Michelle Thomas, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Michigan intervened to defend the GPTA’s constitutionality.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Freed’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Wayside Church v. Van Buren County. Freed appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knick v. Township of Scott partially abrogated Wayside Church. On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment to Freed, affirming that the county had to pay Freed the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, but dismissed claims against Thomas due to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Freed’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees from Gratiot County and Michigan. However, the court vacated the district court’s fee calculation and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit held that Freed prevailed against both Gratiot County and Michigan, and Michigan’s intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) subjected it to attorneys’ fee liability. The court found the district court’s explanation for reducing Freed’s hours and rate by 35% insufficient and required a more detailed justification for the fee award calculation. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Truck Parts & Sales, LLC built and sold highway tractors by installing old engines and transmissions from salvage yards into new tractor kits. The IRS assessed unpaid excise taxes, penalties, and interest totaling $268 million, arguing that Fitzgerald's sales were subject to a 12% excise tax under 26 U.S.C. §§ 4051(a)(1) and 4052(a)(1). Fitzgerald claimed an exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 4052(f)(1), which provides a safe harbor if the cost of repairs or modifications does not exceed 75% of the retail price of a comparable new tractor. Fitzgerald won before a jury, and the government appealed.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee ruled in favor of Fitzgerald, rejecting the government's arguments that Fitzgerald's operations did not qualify for the safe harbor and that the tractors were not taxable when new under 26 U.S.C. § 4052(f)(2). The government then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Sixth Circuit agreed with Fitzgerald that § 4052(f)(1) poses a bright-line, 75% test without any further qualitative inquiry, meaning Fitzgerald's vehicles constructed with used engines and transmissions could qualify for the safe harbor. However, the court found that § 4052(f)(2) forecloses this exemption for tractors that never triggered the excise tax when they were new. The court noted that Fitzgerald had not met its burden of proving that the tractors were taxable when new, as evidence suggested that some vehicles were first sold in tax-exempt transactions to entities abroad or state or local governments.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether each refurbished tractor, when new, incurred the excise tax under § 4051. View "Fitzgerald Truck Parts & Sales LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Lonnie Hubbard, a pharmacist, was convicted of operating an illegal "pill mill" and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The government confiscated his assets, including over $400,000 from his individual retirement account (IRA), as part of the criminal forfeiture. The IRS later claimed that this seizure constituted taxable income for Hubbard, resulting in a tax deficiency notice for over $180,000 in taxes and penalties.The United States Tax Court agreed with the IRS, ruling that the transfer of the IRA funds to the IRS was a taxable event for Hubbard. The court held that the funds qualified as Hubbard's income because they discharged an obligation he owed. Consequently, the court ordered Hubbard to pay the taxes and penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the Tax Court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the forfeiture order granted the IRS ownership of the IRA, meaning the IRS, not Hubbard, was the payee or distributee of the funds. The court concluded that the withdrawal of the IRA funds by the IRS did not constitute taxable income for Hubbard, as he no longer owned or controlled the IRA at the time of the withdrawal. The court emphasized that the tax code requires the payee or distributee of withdrawn IRA funds to pay the taxes, and in this case, the IRS was the payee or distributee. Therefore, Hubbard was not liable for the taxes on the forfeited IRA funds. The court reversed the Tax Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hubbard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Owners, having relied on an external audit, did not “willfully” fail to pay trust fund taxes.Four investors bought Eagle Trim, which produced automobile interior-trim parts. Byrne (president) and Kus (CEO) were responsible for Eagle’s income tax returns, but Fuller, as controller, had wide discretion over financial activities. Eventually, Byrne signed Eagle's bankruptcy petition. Eagle liquidated. The IRS assessed against Byrne and Kus $855,668.35 in penalties under 26 U.S.C. 6672 for Eagle’s outstanding trust-fund tax (taxes withheld from employees’ wages) liability. Byrne paid $1,000 and then unsuccessfully sought a refund and an abatement of the penalty and of the entire assessment. Byrne filed suit. On remand, the district court found that Byrne and Kus willfully failed to pay and were liable under section 6672. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Byrne and Kus did not have actual knowledge that the taxes were not being paid until after a Forbearance Agreement was executed with a creditor. The issue of recklessness was a “close call,” but the men directed their independent accounting firm to instruct Fuller on how to timely deposit trust-fund taxes, added an assistant controller to help Fuller in his duties, created a new management spot to review Fuller’s financial management, and relied on a professional clean audit report. View "Byrne v. United States" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service classified Ballard, a securities broker, as a non-filer in 2008 and investigated. Ballard lied about his income, hid money in family members’ bank accounts, and filed then dismissed several Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, attempting to avoid paying $848,798 in taxes arising from his income between 2000 and 2008. He eventually pled guilty to violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] . . . administration of [the tax laws].” Ballard urged the court to use the U.S.S.G. for obstruction of justice. The district court rejected Ballard’s argument that he never intended to evade paying his taxes but was merely delaying the payments and used the tax evasion guideline to calculate a higher offense level and an increase in the sentencing range from eight–14 months to 24–30 months. Ballard was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. What matters in the choice between guidelines sections is which section is more precisely tailored to reflect offense characteristics—like tax evasion and tax loss—and which section covers a more closely related group of crimes. What Ballard did, and what the government charged, was a lie to the tax collector about his earnings. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law