Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves God's Storehouse Topeka Church (GSH), which appealed a district court order denying its petition to quash a third-party summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to Kaw Valley Bank. The IRS sought bank records for accounts in GSH's name. GSH claimed the summons was invalid because the IRS failed to satisfy requirements applicable to church tax inquiries and examinations before issuing the summons. The district court denied GSH's petition, concluding that the provisions of § 7611, which govern church tax inquiries and examinations, do not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses.The case was initially referred to a magistrate judge who concluded that the third-party summons issued to Kaw Valley was not subject to the heightened requirements set out in § 7611. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. It ruled that the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Commissioner, who had approved the inquiry, was an appropriate high-level Treasury official for purposes of §7611(h)(7). However, it also concluded that the provisions of § 7611 do not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of § 7611 makes clear it does not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses. Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide whether the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Commissioner is an appropriate high-level Treasury official. View "God's Storehouse Topeka Church v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a converted Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed in 2017. In 2014, the debtor, All Resorts Group, Inc., paid personal tax debts of two of its principals totaling $145,138.78 to the Internal Revenue Service. Plaintiff, the United States Trustee, brought an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against the United States pursuant to Code 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) to avoid these transfers. The “applicable law” on which the Trustee relied was now-former § 25-6-6(1) of Utah’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (amended 2017) as part of Utah’s Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. The United States (Government) did not contest the substantive elements required for the actual creditor (in this case, an individual with an employment discrimination claim against the debtor) to establish a voidable transfer under § 25-6-6(1). The Government acknowledged: (1) the debtor had made the transfers; (2) an actual creditor had an unsecured claim against the debtor arising before the transfers; (3) the debtor did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfers; and (4) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfers. The Government further acknowledged that the sovereign immunity waiver contained in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1) made it amenable to the Trustee’s § 544(b)(1) action. The Government contested § 544(b)(1)’s “actual creditor requirement,” arguing the actual creditor could not avoid the debtor’s tax payments made on behalf of its principals to the IRS because sovereign immunity would bar such creditor’s action against the Government outside of bankruptcy. According to the Trustee, the waiver contained in Code § 106(a) abrogated sovereign immunity not only as to his § 544(b)(1) adversary proceeding against the Government, but also as to the underlying Utah state law cause of action he invoked under subsection (b)(1) to avoid the transfers. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Trustee and avoided the transfers. The Government appealed. Finding no reversible error in the bankruptcy court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on the denial of tax benefits relating to petitioner Preston Olsen's purchase of solar lenses. The benefits were only available if the taxpayer had a profit motive for the purchases. Olsen bought the lenses in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, through a program created by Neldon Johnson. Under the program, Johnson would use the lenses in a new system to generate electricity by heating a liquid to generate steam and drive a turbine. Johnson never finished the system; he had completed the lenses on only one tower and hadn’t decided whether those lenses would heat water, oil, or molten salt. Johnson funded the program through investors like Olsen who bought lenses from Johnson’s companies and leased the lenses to another of Johnson’s companies. Once the system began producing revenue, Johnson's company would pay Olsen’s company $150 per lens per year. But the system never generated any revenue. From 2009 to 2014, Olsen annually claimed depreciation deductions and solar energy credits on the lenses. These claims allowed the Olsens to pay little or no federal income taxes. "So the Olsens came out ahead even though they had never obtained any money from the leases." The tax court disallowed the benefits in part because it found Petitioner lacked a profit motive. Finding no reversible error in the tax court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Olsen, et al. v. CIR" on Justia Law

Reserve Mechanical Corp. appealed a Tax Court judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that it did not qualify for an exemption from income tax as a small insurance company and that the purported insurance premiums it received must therefore be taxed at a 30% rate under I.R.C. section 881(a). After review, the Tenth Circuit held that the record supported the Tax Court’s decision that the company was not engaged in the business of insurance. The court had two grounds for deciding that Reserve was not an insurance company: (1) Reserve had not adequately distributed risk among a large number of independent insureds; and (2) the policies issued by Reserve were not insurance in the commonly accepted sense. In addition, Reserve argued that if it was not an insurance company, the premiums it received should have been treated as nontaxable capital contributions. The Tenth Circuit also rejected that argument. View "Reserve Mechanical Corp. v. CIR" on Justia Law

When Seminole Nursing Home, Inc. failed to pay $61,916.19 in federal employment taxes due for 2013, the IRS provided notice to Seminole of its intent to issue a levy to collect these unpaid taxes plus penalties and interest. Seminole challenged the validity of a Tax Code regulation that restricts economic hardship to individual taxpayers who fail to pay delinquent taxes after notice and demand. Seminole contended the economic-hardship exception should be applied to all taxpayers, including corporations. The United States Tax Court rejected the contention on the ground that the regulation was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The Home appealed, but agreeing with the Tax Court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Seminole Nursing Home v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The federal government sought to encourage delinquent taxpayers to pay up: by threatening to withhold or revoke their passports until their tax delinquency was resolved. No nexus between international travel and the tax delinquency needed to be shown; the passport revocation served only to incentivize repayment of the tax debt. A challenge to the constitutionality of this approach was a matter of first impression; appellant Jeffrey Maehr was one such taxpayer whose passport was revoked for non-payment of taxes. He argued the revocation violated substantive due process, ran afoul of principles announced in the Privileges and Immunities clauses, and contradicted caselaw concerning the common law principle of ne exeat republica. The district court rejected these challenges. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on each of these arguments. View "Maehr v. U.S. Department of State" on Justia Law

Pro se petitioner-appellant John Minemyer appealed two orders from the United States Tax Court. The first order granted the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s (“Commissioner’s”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denied Minemyer’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The second order denied Minemyer’s Motion for Reconsideration. Neither order, however, was a final decision by the Tax Court. Further, Minemyer’s appeal of those orders did not ripen after the Tax Court issued an opinion, without a “decision,” addressing the only remaining claim. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Minemyer’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Minemyer v. CIR" on Justia Law

The Appellants objected to the IRS’s attempts to collect and audit information about their marijuana-related business practices, arguing: (1) the IRS investigation was quasi-criminal, exceeded the Agency’s authority, and was being conducted for an illegitimate purpose; (2) even if the investigation had a legitimate purpose, the information sought was irrelevant; and (3) the investigation was in bad faith and constituted an abuse of process because (a) the IRS may share the information collected with federal law enforcement agents, (b) the IRS summonses are overly broad and require the creation of new reports, (c) the dispensaries had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data they tender to state regulatory authorities, and (d) those state authorities could not provide the requested information without violating Colorado law. The Appellants further contended the district court applied the wrong standard of review when it denied motions to quash and granted motions to enforce the summonses. Relying on the reasoning outlined in Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 955 F.3d 1146, 1150–69 (10th Cir. 2020), the Tenth Circuit rejected Appellants' arguments and affirmed the district court's rulings in favor of the IRS. View "Speidell v. United States" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, a district court decided that Defendants RaPower-3, LLC, International Automated Systems, Inc. (IAS), LTB1, LLC, Neldon Johnson, and R. Gregory Shepard had promoted an unlawful tax scheme. Defendants’ scheme was based on a supposed project to utilize a purportedly new, commercially viable way of converting solar radiation into electricity. There was no “third party verification of any of Johnson’s designs.” Nor did he have any “record that his system ha[d] produced energy,” and “[t]here [were] no witnesses to his production of a useful product from solar energy,” a fact that he attributed to his decision to do his testing “on the weekends when no one was around because he didn’t want people to see what he was doing.” Defendants never secured a purchase agreement for the sale of electricity to an end user. The district court found that Johnson’s purported solar energy technology was not a commercial-grade solar energy system that converts sunlight into electrical power or other useful energy. Despite this, Defendants’ project generated tens of millions of dollars between 2005 and 2018. Beginning in 2006, buyers would purchase lenses from IAS or RaPower-3 for a down payment of about one-third of the purchase price. The entity would “finance” the remaining two-thirds of the purchase price with a zero- or nominal- interest, nonrecourse loan. No further payments would be due from the customer until the system had been generating revenue from electricity sales for five years. The customer would agree to lease the lens back to LTB1 for installation at a “Power Plant”; but LTB1 would not be obligated to make any rental payments until the system had begun generating revenue. The district court found that each plastic sheet for the lenses was sold to Defendants for between $52 and $70, yet the purchase price of a lens was between $3,500 and $30,000. Although Defendants sold between 45,000 and 50,000 lenses, fewer than 5% of them were ever installed. Customers were told that buying a lens would have very favorable income-tax consequences. Johnson and Shepard sold the lenses by advertising that customers could “zero out” federal income-tax liability by taking advantage of depreciation deductions and solar-energy tax credits. To remedy Defendants' misconduct, the district court enjoined Defendants from continuing to promote their scheme and ordered disgorgement of their gross receipts from the scheme. Defendants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. RaPower-3" on Justia Law

Claiming insolvency, taxpayer Vincent Hamilton sought to exclude nearly $160,000 in student loans that were forgiven from his taxable income. During the same tax year, however, he had received a non-taxable partnership distribution worth more than $300,000. His wife transferred those funds into a previously-unused savings account held nominally by their adult son. Using login credentials provided by their son, Mrs. Hamilton incrementally transferred almost $120,000 back to the joint checking account she shared with her husband. The Hamiltons used these funds to support their living expenses. In a late-filed joint tax return, they excluded the discharged student-loan debt on the theory that Mr. Hamilton was insolvent. In calculating his assets and liabilities, however, the Hamiltons did not include the funds transferred into the savings account. Had they done so, Mr. Hamilton would not have met the criteria for insolvency; and the couple would have owed federal income tax on the student-loan discharge. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue eventually filed a Notice of Deficiency, reasoning that the partnership distribution rendered Mr. Hamilton solvent, such that the Hamiltons were required to pay income tax on the cancelled student loan debt. debt. The Hamiltons petitioned for review from the Tax Court, which sustained both the deficiency and a significant late-filing penalty. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Hamilton v. CIR" on Justia Law