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The legislature has not enacted any statute that exempts fraternal benefit societies from paying sales and use tax. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, a Nebraska fraternal benefit society, requested an exemption from sales and use taxes from the Nebraska Department of Revenue (NDOR) and sought a refund of more than $2 million in sales and use taxes previously paid. NDOR denied Woodmen’s application. The Tax Commissioner upheld the determination. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2704.12(1) nor Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-1095 exempted Woodmen from sales and use tax; (2) Woodmen was not denied due process before the Tax Commissioner; and (3) the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in excluding certain expert testimony. View "Woodmen of the World v. Nebraska Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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A taxpayer that contracts to sell property used in its trade or business is not entitled to treat as capital gain an advance deposit that it rightfully retains when its would-be buyer defaults and cancels the deal. In this partnership tax case, CRI-Leslie filed a petition for readjustment in the tax court, asserting that the Internal Revenue Code was meant to prescribe the same tax treatment for gains related to the disposition of "trade or business" property regardless of whether the property was successfully sold or the sale agreement was canceled. The Eleventh Circuit held that I.R.C. 1234A provides for capital-gains treatment of income resulting from canceled sales only where the underlying property constitutes a "capital asset," and I.R.C. 1221 defines "capital asset" in a way that all agree excludes the property at issue here. Therefore, CRI-Leslie was not entitled to treat its $9.7 million deposit as capital gain. View "Cri-Leslie, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s notice of deficiency against Transupport, Inc. The notice of deficiency reduced Transport’s cost of goods sold, reduced deductions it took for compensation paid to four employee-shareholders, and assessed a twenty percent accuracy-related penalty for tax years 2006 through 2008. This was the Tax Court’s second opinion in this case, the first of which addressed whether Transupport committed fraud. The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision in Transupport II, as to which this appeal was taken, holding that the Tax Court (1) did not make errors of law or err in its findings of fact when upholding the notice of deficiency’s adjustment to deductions Transupport took for compensation paid to the employee-shareholders; (2) did not clearly err in determining Transupport’s gross profit percentage with regard to the cost of goods sold; and (3) did not clearly err in applying the accuracy-related penalty. View "Transupport, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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At issue on certiorari was what evidence a tax court may rely upon in deciding whether the taxpayer has overcome the presumptive validity of the county’s assessment. Here, Taxpayer contested the County’s assessment of the fair market value of Taxpayer’s parking ramp. The tax court denied the County’s motion to dismiss, basing its decision on evidence presented in the County’s case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court erred in considering the County’s evidence to decide the motion to dismiss because the relevant law permits only the Taxpayer’s evidence to be considered; but (2) the tax court did not abuse its discretion by holding, in the alternative, that Taxpayer’s evidence overcame the presumptive validity of the assessment. View "Court Park Co. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether the Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust, Inc. ("Crane Trust") was a charitable organization within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-202(1)(d). The Crane Trust sought a property tax exemption for six parcels of land ("subject properties") for tax year 2015. The Hall County Board of Equalization denied the application for a property tax exemption for the subject properties without giving an explanation. The Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("TERC") affirmed the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the subject properties met the requirements for a charitable tax exemption under section 77-202(1)(d). View "Platte River Crane Trust v. Hall County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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Tenn. Code Ann. 67-1-901, et seq., rather than Tenn. Code Ann. 67-1-1801, et seq., apply to a suit to recover municipal taxes, and under section 67-1-901(a) the alcoholic beverage retailers in this case were required to have paid under protest the disputed taxes before filing suit. From 2011-2014, the City of Morristown charged alcoholic beverage retailers higher inspection fees than was authorized by the city ordinance. Plaintiffs, a group of alcoholic beverage retailers, paid the excess fees but not under protest. Plaintiffs requested refunds, but the city denied the requests. Plaintiffs then sued for recovery of the excess collections and other damages. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs a judgment for the overpayments. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs did not pay the taxes under protest, they were not entitled to refunds. View "Chuck's Package Store v. City of Morristown" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the decision of the Custer County Assessor regarding the 2012 taxable value of Donald V. Cain, Jr.’s agricultural property. On appeal, Cain argued, among other things, that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. The court held (1) Cain waived the due process rights applicable in Liljestrand v. Dell Enterprises, 842 N.W.2d 575 (2014); and (2) TERC erred in affirming the Assessor’s valuations of Cain’s property for the 2012 tax year. View "Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) affirming the decision of the Custer County Assessor regarding the 2012 taxable value of Donald V. Cain, Jr.’s agricultural property. On appeal, Cain argued, among other things, that the TERC violated his due process rights by not permitting him to argue how the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applied to the adduced evidence. The court held (1) Cain waived the due process rights applicable in Liljestrand v. Dell Enterprises, 842 N.W.2d 575 (2014); and (2) TERC erred in affirming the Assessor’s valuations of Cain’s property for the 2012 tax year. View "Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs formed the Fredericksburg partnership to search for oil and contracted with Kraft for management services. The IRS began a criminal investigation of the partnership, Kraft, and Kraft principals Valeri and Blum. In 2003, the plaintiffs and the IRS settled allegations against the partnership in exchange for the payment of taxes for the tax year 1994. The statute of limitations for 1994 tax liability had expired, but the IRS had obtained a waiver from Valeri. The plaintiffs allege that the IRS did not sign the agreement and Valeri could not waive the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ behalf, 26 U.S.C. 6229(a)–(b); that the IRS never sent the plaintiffs required notices that the IRS had begun an administrative proceeding, 26 U.S.C. 6223(a); and that plaintiffs did not discover these alleged violations until 2009. The plaintiffs never sent formal refund claims but filed suit in 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the refund claims for lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and claims for damages because they alleged IRS errors only in assessing taxes, not in collecting them, and were outside the scope of section 7433. The court rejected claims to exceptions under the “informal claim doctrine,” noting that the plaintiffs never perfected their claims. View "Goldberg v. United States" on Justia Law

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A 2004 IRS regulation excluded medical residents from the FICA tax student exception for services provided after April 1, 2005. In 2010, the IRS decided that residents could qualify for the exception for tax periods ending before April 1, 2005, such that “hospitals and [medical] residents who had filed protective refund claims for tax periods before April 1, 2005[,] would be able to obtain refunds of the FICA taxes.” Former residents sued, alleging that the Hospital had not filed protective refund claims 1995-2001. The Hospital and residents entered into a settlement: the Hospital agreed to pay the residents $6,632,000, stating that the payment “can be appropriately characterized as a refund for the amount of FICA taxes previously withheld.” The Hospital then sued the United States, alleging that Internal Revenue Code 3102(b) entitled it to indemnification for the settlement. The Claims Court dismissed, holding that section 3102(b) is not a money-mandating source of substantive law, as required for Tucker Act jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 3102(b), which states “[e]very employer required so to deduct the tax shall be liable for the payment of such tax, and shall be indemnified against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any such payment made by such employer,” is reasonably amenable to an interpretation that mandates the government to reimburse FICA taxes paid by an employer. View "New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. United States" on Justia Law