Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Minnesota Tax Court affirming the assessment of the Commissioner of Revenue assessing tax on an apportioned share of Cities Management, Inc.'s (CMI) income from the sale of the S corporation, holding that the income from the corporation's sale was apportionable business income.CMI, which did business in Minnesota and Wisconsin, and its nonresidential partial owner filed Minnesota tax returns characterizing the sale of CMI's goodwill as income that was not subject to apportionment by the State under Minn. Stat. Ann. 290.17. The Commissioner disagreed and assessed tax on an apportioned share of the corporation's income from the sale. The tax court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CMI's income did not constitute "nonbusiness" income under section 290.17, subd. 6 and may be constitutionally apportioned as business income. View "Cities Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

The IRS may penalize taxpayers who fail to report a “listed transaction” that the agency determines is similar to one already identified as a tax-avoidance scheme, 26 U.S.C. 6707A(a), (c)(2). IRS Notice 2007-83 listed employee-benefit plans with cash-value life insurance policies. In 2013, Mann created trusts for its co-owners that paid the premiums on their cash-value life insurance policies. Mann deducted the expenses on its tax forms, and the owners counted the death benefits as income. None of them reported the trusts as a listed transaction.In 2019, the IRS determined that the trusts failed to comply with Notice 2007-83 and imposed penalties, which were paid. After the IRS refused requests for refunds, the taxpayers filed suit. The district court granted the IRS summary judgment on a claim that the Notice violated the Administrative Procedures Act’s notice-and-comment requirements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that Notice 2007- 83 was a legislative rule that lacked exemption from the requirements; “we must set [Notice 2007-83] aside” and “need not address the taxpayers’ remaining claims.”Before the district court ruled on remand, the IRS refunded the past penalties with interest and agreed not to apply the Notice to anyone within the Sixth Circuit. The district court concluded that it retained jurisdiction to set aside and vacate the Notice nationwide. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The taxpayers sought a refund of past tax penalties and prospective relief against Notice 2007-83; the IRS’s actions mooted their claim and left nothing more for the court to do. View "Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division in this action, holding that substantial evidence supported the determination of the Tax Appeals Tribunal that Petitioner willfully failed to pay employee withholding taxes on behalf of New England Construction Company, Inc. (NECC) in violation of N.Y. Tax Law 685(g).At issue in this case was whether the Tribunal employed an incorrect legal test in determining that Petitioner was a "responsible person" under section 685 for the collection and payment of employee withholding taxes on behalf of NECC. Petitioner was president and the primary shareholder of NECC and had repeatedly held himself out as being responsible for payment of taxes on behalf of the corporation. The Tribunal determined that Petitioner willfully failed to pay the withholding taxes. The appellate division confirmed the Tribunal's determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Tribunal employed the proper legal standard in this case; and (2) substantial evidence supported the Tribunal's determination that Petitioner had actual authority over NECC's finances and the ability to remit the overdue withholding tax during the time period in question. View "Black v. New York State Tax Appeals Tribunal" on Justia Law

Four inmates at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Dillwyn, Virginia, commenced this action pro se against agents of the IRS, alleging that the IRS unlawfully denied them all or part of their COVID-19 stimulus payments. The complaint alleged that the IRS was categorically denying payments to inmates on account of their incarcerated status. The four inmates contended that the IRS had “violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law,” and they sought an injunction requiring the IRS to disburse the proper payments to them. The four inmates filed a motion to amend it by adding five additional inmates with the same claims. The three inmates whose claims were severed from the original action filed these appeals, challenging the legal and factual underpinnings of the district court’s order. They contend that the district court erred both in applying Section 1915(b)(1) as they were not proceeding in forma pauperis and in making factual findings that were not supported by the record.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the court’s order severing Plaintiffs’ claims and its order denying amendment and remanded. The court explained that Section 1915(b)(1), by its explicit terms, is restricted to in forma pauperis actions. The court wrote that because Plaintiffs here did not proceed in forma pauperis, the court should not have construed Section 1915(b)(1) and applied it to them, and it was an error to have done so. View "Aaron Ellis v. Daniel I. Werfel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Michael Cathey and Vonderosa Properties, LLC (collectively "Vonderosa") filed suit seeking declaratory relief against Defendant-Appellee Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County (Board) and moved for a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin the Board from enforcing and collecting a lodging tax increase passed at a special election held in McCurtain County on November 8, 2022, in conjunction with the general election. The district court denied Vonderosa's request for a temporary injunction and Vonderosa appealed, seeking emergency relief from the Oklahoma Supreme Court. On March 28, 2023, the Supreme Court entered an Order temporarily enjoining enforcement of the 2% increase to the lodging tax until the special election was fully and finally litigated. The Court expressed no opinion concerning the validity of the special election in its emergency Order. While Appellee's petition for rehearing was still pending before the Supreme Court and before the mandate issued, the district court granted Appellee-Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment and held the special election was valid. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this specific case the district court was without jurisdiction to enter summary judgment for Appellee while the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court and before mandate had issued. The District Court's Order of June 20, 2023 was void for lack of jurisdiction and the Order was vacated. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions. View "Cathey v. McCurtain County Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Cajun Industries LLC (“Cajun”) claimed tax credits for the 2013 tax year pursuant to § 41 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 41. First, the Code provision at issue in this case, Section 41 offers a tax credit for “qualified research expenses” including wages and expenditures incurred in pursuit of qualified research.1 The Internal Revenue Code provides a tax credit for qualified research activities, as defined by the Code. Appellants appealed the district court’s judgment which ejected research and development tax credits claimed by Cajun Industries LLC and upheld the resulting tax deficiency.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants’ argument that all contracts “for the product or result” are not funded improperly conflates “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research” with contracts for products or services. This argument ignores the operative portion of the sentence: “amounts payable under any agreement that are contingent on the success of the research.” Structurally, the phrase “and thus considered to be paid for the product or result of the research” merely describes or modifies “amounts payable . . . contingent on the success of the research.” It does not, as Appellants urge, stand on its own to establish an additional type of contract “not treated as funding.” Further, the court explained that Appellants are not entitled to the research credit merely because SWBNO could not claim the credit. The Regulations do not require that a tax credit be allocated in every contract. View "USA v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Utah State Tax Commission that the Property Tax Division correctly followed the requirements of the Aircraft Valuation Law, Utah Code 59-2-201 subsection 4, in determining the 2017 value of Delta Air Lines' aircraft, holding that Salt Lake County failed to demonstrate that the Law, as applied to Delta's 2017 assessment, violated the fair market value provision of the Utah Constitution.For tax year 2017, the Division valued Delta's aircraft according to section 59-2-201's preferred methodology. The County appealed, arguing that the valuation did not reflect the fair market value of Delta's aircraft, in violation of the Utah Constitution. The Commission upheld the assessment, concluding that the County did not establish that the Legislature's preferred method of valuation did not reasonably reflect fair market value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Aircraft Valuation Law was not unconstitutional as applied by the Commission to assess the value of Delta's aircraft for tax year 2017. View "Salt Lake County v. Utah State Tax Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court determining that the Aroostook County Commissioners had jurisdiction over an appeal of a municipality's denial of a tax abatement application by Cassidy Holdings, LLC, holding that there was no error.Cassidy, which owned nonresidential property with an equalized municipal valuation of $1 million or greater, requested a partial abatement of its 2021 property taxes. The City of Caribou's Board of Assessors denied the request. The Commissioners declined to hear Cassidy's ensuing appeal on the grounds that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The superior court remanded the case for the Commissioners to proceed on the merits, concluding that the Commissioners erred in determining that they lacked jurisdiction over the abatement appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of 36 Me. Rev. Stat. 844 provides for concurrent jurisdiction before either the Commissioners or the State Board. View "Cassidy Holdings, LLC v. Aroostook County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant Barbara Lembo in this action brought by beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust and their mother alleging that Defendant breached her fiduciary duty as trustee, holding that the allegations in the complaint stated a legally sufficient claim for breach of a trustee's fiduciary duties under Connecticut law.The will of the decedent bequeathed the residue of his estate to an amended and restated revocable trust benefitting his three children. At issue was the proper administration of a portion of the decedent's residuary estate that had not yet been distributed to the trust. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendant, among other things, breached her fiduciary duty by failing to protect and collect trust property. The trial court concluded that Defendant, as a trustee, had no duty to take any action prior to the distribution of the residuary assets. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Defendant owed the trust beneficiaries a duty to collect and protect the prospective trust property in the residuary estate; and (2) the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Defendant for breach of her fiduciary duty as trustee. View "Barash v. Lembo" on Justia Law