Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Paramount Pictures Corporation (Paramount) sought a refund of taxes paid on its personal property for the 2011 tax year. Paramount first appealed to the Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board (the Board). The property was assessed a final value of $137,397,278. Following a hearing, the Board agreed with the valuation proposed by the Assessor and found that Paramount failed to carry its burden of demonstrating additional obsolescence. Paramount appealed the Board’s decision to the trial court. The trial court found: (1) the Board committed a methodological error in excluding Paramount’s initial income approach valuation and (2) the Board issued inadequate findings regarding the significance of Paramount’s pre-lien and post-lien sales of personal property. In a separate ruling, the trial court awarded Paramount attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code Section 1611.6, which allows a taxpayer to recover fees for services necessary to obtain proper findings from a county board. The County timely appealed both orders.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding the Board committed neither methodological error nor issued findings that were less than adequate within the meaning of section 1611.5. First, Paramount did not challenge the validity of the cost approach relied upon by the Assessor and Board, and it did not otherwise identify any legal error in the Board’s rejection of its income approach valuation. Second, the hearing transcripts adequately disclose its rulings and findings on the pre-lien and post-sales data. The court remanded so the trial court may consider the question of whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Paramount failed to establish additional obsolescence. View "Paramount Pictures Corp. v. County of L.A." on Justia Law

In 2005, Joliet filed a complaint seeking to acquire, by eminent domain, a low-income apartment complex that was owned and managed by the plaintiffs. Following almost 12 years of litigation, Joliet acquired fee simple title to the property in 2017. During the litigation, the apartment complex remained in operation; the plaintiffs paid the property taxes without filing any protest. In 2018, the plaintiffs filed a tax objection complaint, seeking the refund of over $6 million in property taxes paid between the date Joliet filed its condemnation complaint and the date it acquired the property. The plaintiffs maintained that “once title to property acquired by condemnation vests with the condemning authority, it vests retroactively to the date of filing the condemnation petition,” so the landowner is entitled to a refund for any taxes paid after the date of filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a refund.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, overruling the precedent on which the appellate court relied. The legal premises on which that case rested—that a taking occurs at the time a condemnation action is filed and that the valuation of the property is fixed at that point—no longer exists. The court rejected an argument that the act of filing a condemnation complaint burdened the property and it would be unfair to require the plaintiffs to pay the property taxes that accrued during the condemnation proceeding. View "MB Financial Bank, N.A. v. Brophy" on Justia Law

GSS is the managing member and owner of Liberty. In 2006, Liberty purchased a note issued by Aaardvark and entered into a liquidity asset purchase agreement (LAPA) for that Note. BNS was Liberty’s counterparty for the Aaardvark LAPA, requiring BNS to purchase the Aaardvark Note at par value if Liberty exercised the LAPA. Months later, Liberty entered into a note purchase agreement with an unrelated investor, Scotiabank’s predecessor, and issued the First Loss Note; Scotiabank’s predecessor funded the “First Loss Note Account” to cover some of the risk of Liberty’s assets. That Account would compensate BNS for a loss in value of Liberty’s assets. For tax purposes, Scotiabank’s investment in the Note was treated as a partnership interest in Liberty. In 2011, Liberty exercised the Aaardvark LAPA; BNS purchased the Aaardvark Note at a loss. BNS certified this loss to Scotiabank, causing Liberty to pay $24 million to BNS from the Account. Liberty’s loss was allocated to GSS.GSS filed an amended return for the 2009 tax year, requesting to carry back the allocated 2011 loss, 26 U.S.C. 165. The IRS disallowed the deduction under section 707(b)(1), focusing on Liberty’s Aaardvark Note sale to BNS and the $24 million payment to BNS to conclude that these transactions should be treated as a single transaction. The Claims Court rejected GSS’s appeal. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Claims Court erred by applying a hybrid legal standard that improperly conflated the step transaction doctrine and the economic substance doctrine. Under the end result test, the Claims Court must “examine[] whether it appears that separate transactions were really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result.” View "GSS Holdings (Liberty) Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Walter Woodland appealed the Oregon Department of Revenue’s assessment of $116 in interest for unpaid estimated taxes in 2019. During the pendency of that appeal, the department invalidated the assessment and agreed that taxpayer did not owe that interest. The Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court accordingly dismissed taxpayer’s appeal as moot. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Woodland v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether revenue generated from the lease of a bona fide coin operated amusement machine (“COAM”) qualified as “gross revenues” exempt from taxation under OCGA § 48-8-3 (43). Funvestment Group, LLC, the lessee of the COAMs at issue and the owner of the location where the COAMs were available for play, argued that revenues generated from the lease of COAMs were considered “gross revenues” exempt from sales and use tax. The Court of Appeals concluded that the subject lease revenues were not “gross revenues” and that the exemption only applied to money inserted into COAMs for play. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in reaching this conclusion, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "Funvestment Group, LLC v. Crittenden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by the Board of Education of the Ottawa Hills Local School District ordering the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a tax levy on the November 7, 2023 general election ballot, holding that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions when it refused to place the levy on the ballot.On August 28, 2023, the Board of Education brought this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Elections to certify the levy at issue and place it on the November 2023 general election ballot. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the Board of Education failed to certify an accurate resolution to proceed to the Board of Elections "not later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the election," as required by Ohio Rev. Code 35.01.02(F); and (2) the Board of Education's error was not a technical violation that did not affect the public interest. View "State ex rel. Ottawa Hills Local School District Bd. of Education v. Lucas County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the tax court sustaining a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) to TBL Licensing LLC for the 2011 tax year, holding that the Tax Commissioner properly determined that TBL's transfer of its intangible property was followed by a disposition of that property, requiring TBL to pay the tax due in a lump sum.In 2011, TBL transferred the intangible property at issue, which was worth approximately $1.5 billion, to an affiliated foreign corporation. TBL argued that the tax attributable to the transfer, which occurred in the context of a corporate reorganization involving an exchange as described in section 26 U.S.C. 361, could be paid on an annual basis by one of TBL's affiliates. The IRS disagreed and assessed a deficiency based on its position that TBL was required to pay tax on the entire gain and to do so in its 2011 tax return. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was nothing in 26 U.S.C. 367(d) that would absolve TBL of its responsibility under the disposition-payment rule. View "TBL Licensing LLC v. Werfel" on Justia Law

Freed fell behind approximately $1,100 on his property taxes. Thomas, Gratiot County’s treasurer, foreclosed on Freed’s property and sold it at a public auction for $42,000. The County retained the entire proceeds. Freed sued the County and Thomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an unconstitutional excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.Following a remand, the district court granted Freed summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim, rejecting Freed’s argument that he was entitled to the fair market value of his property, minus his debt, and holding that Freed was owed just compensation in the amount of the difference between the foreclosure sale and his debt, plus interest from the date of the foreclosure sale. Freed was owed about $40,900 plus interest, $56,800 less than he was seeking. The court also held that Freed’s claims against Thomas were barred by qualified immunity and denied Freed’s subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a public sale, a debtor is entitled to any surplus proceeds from the sale, which represent the value of the equitable title extinguished. Thomas did not violate a right that was clearly established at the time of her alleged misconduct. View "Freed v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court in this tax appeal, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119, the NOL statute, operates as a dollar-for-dollar offset provision that indirectly taxes out-of-state income.At issue was the decision of the Department of Revenue to deny nonresident taxpayers Franklin and Janet Tiegs a carryover net operating loss (NOL) deduction on their 2014 and 2015 Montana income tax returns. The Montana Tax Appeal Board upheld the Department's decision, but the district court reversed, concluding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2119 was unconstitutional because it authorized taxation of non-Montana income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by holding that the general use of out-of-state income within the Montana income tax framework violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2102 and federal constitutional principles; and (2) erred by concluding that section 15-30-2119 constitutes impermissible taxation of income outside of Montana's jurisdictional reach. View "Tiegs v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the order of the trial court dismissing Duncan House Charitable Corporation's application for a charitable organization exemption, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for later exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for an earlier exemption.For the 2017 tax year, Duncan applied for a charitable tax exemption covering its fifty percent ownership interest in a Houston historic home. The appraisal district denied the exemption, and the review board denied Duncan's ensuing protest. Duncan filed for judicial review. Thereafter, although Duncan House never applied for the charitable exemption for the 2018 tax year, it protested the district's 2018 appraisal on the grounds that the district court to apply the charitable exemption. The review board denied the protest. Duncan then amended its trial court petition to challenge the denial of the 2018 exemption. The trial court dismissed the 2018 claim for want of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Duncan's failure to timely apply for the 2018 exemption precluded it from receiving that exemption even if it ultimately qualified for the 2017 exemption. View "Duncan House Charitable Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal District" on Justia Law