Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The case involves plaintiffs-appellees, trustees of the Peter and Elizabeth C. Tower Foundation, who brought claims against UBS Financial Services, Inc. and Jay S. Blair (collectively, the "UBS Defendants") under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and New York state law. The plaintiffs allege that the UBS Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in managing the Foundation's investment advisory accounts. Specifically, they claim that John N. Blair, the father of Jay Blair, improperly used his position to place the Foundation’s assets with his son's investment firm, which later became affiliated with UBS.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the UBS Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to question the validity of the arbitration agreement, warranting a trial on that issue. The UBS Defendants had previously moved to stay or dismiss the action under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., which held that courts may not impose a prejudice requirement when evaluating whether a party has waived enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The Second Circuit concluded that the UBS Defendants waived their right to compel arbitration by seeking a resolution of their dispute in the District Court first, thus acting inconsistently with the right to arbitrate. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of the UBS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the alternative ground of waiver. View "Doyle v. UBS Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law

Marc B. Hankin appealed a probate court order that dismissed his petition for the appointment of a probate conservator for Anne S. and imposed $5,577 in sanctions against him. Hankin, who had only met Anne once and lived nearby, filed the petition along with attorney G. Scott Sobel, who had known Anne for many years. The petition alleged that Anne was being unduly influenced and possibly mistreated by her housemate. Anne, through her attorney, objected to the conservatorship. Sobel later withdrew from the petition, leaving Hankin to maintain it on his own. Anne and other parties involved reached a settlement agreement, which Hankin opposed, arguing Anne lacked the capacity to sign it.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Anne's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that Hankin lacked standing to petition for conservatorship under Probate Code section 1820. The court also imposed sanctions on Hankin, finding his petition legally frivolous. Hankin appealed both decisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing that Hankin did not qualify as an "interested person" or "friend" under section 1820. The court noted that Hankin's brief interaction with Anne did not establish a close or intimate relationship necessary to be considered a friend. Additionally, the court found that Hankin's arguments for standing were unsupported by existing law and did not present a good faith argument for extending the law. The court also upheld the sanctions, determining that Hankin's petition was legally frivolous and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. View "Conservatorship of Anne S." on Justia Law

Ian Elliot, Cindy Elliot, and their mother, Ada Elliot, were partners in StarFire, a limited partnership owning property in Gallatin County. Cindy managed StarFire and sought to remove Ian as a general partner. Ian was appointed Ada’s guardian, and Joyce Wuertz was appointed as Ada’s conservator. Ian sued Cindy for misappropriation of funds and sought to remove Wuertz as conservator, but his motions were denied. Ada’s will divided her estate equally between Ian and Cindy, but due to their strained relationship, a special administrator was appointed instead of Ian. Ian’s subsequent motions to disqualify the special administrator were also denied.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, appointed Andrew Billstein as the special administrator of Ian’s estate. The Objectors (Jenny Jing, Alice Carpenter, and Mike Bolenbaugh) filed an untimely appeal against this appointment, which was declined. The Objectors also opposed the settlement agreements proposed by the Special Administrator, which aimed to resolve ongoing litigation involving Ian’s estate. The District Court approved the settlements, finding them reasonable under the Pallister factors, and denied the Objectors’ motion for relief under M. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decisions. The court held that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the settlement agreements and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The court found that the settlements were reasonable, considering the strength of the cases, the risk and expense of further litigation, and the views of experienced counsel. The court also upheld the District Court’s denial of the Objectors’ post-judgment relief motions. View "In re Estate of Elliot" on Justia Law

Sidney and Julian Helvik, who have lived on their family ranch since 1947, sold a portion of their ranch to Wesley and Karen Tuscano in 2018. In 2020, the Helviks agreed to sell the remainder of the ranch to the Tuscanos under an agreement that included a promissory note and provisions for the Tuscanos to assist the elderly Helviks with end-of-life issues. The Helviks signed a quitclaim deed, but the Tuscanos later had them sign a gift deed, which transferred the ranch without consideration. The Tuscanos never made any payments under the agreement and used the gift deed to obtain a mortgage on the ranch.The Helviks filed a complaint in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweet Grass County, seeking to void the agreement and the gift deed, alleging undue influence and fraud. The Tuscanos counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Jacqueline Conner, alleging tortious interference and abuse of process. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Conner on the tortious interference claim and excluded evidence of an Adult Protective Services investigation and an oral agreement to transfer land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to rescind the agreement based on its equitable powers, noting the unique fiduciary duty in grantor-support agreements. The court found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of the APS investigation and the oral agreement. The court also held that the Tuscanos waived their argument regarding jury instructions on undue influence by not objecting at trial. The summary judgment in favor of Conner was upheld due to the lack of evidence of damages. The court declined to award attorney fees to Conner under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The District Court's orders and judgments were affirmed. View "Helvik v. Tuscano" on Justia Law

In 1999, Rosemary Colver executed the Colver Land Trust agreement, naming her five children as beneficiaries and appointing Bruce and Karin as co-trustees. Rosemary and her husband, Richard, retained life estates in any real property held by the Land Trust. The Land Trust sold and purchased properties over the years, with the final property being the Sanders County Property, purchased by Rosemary and Richard in 2010. Richard quitclaimed his interest to Rosemary in 2012, and Rosemary's will devised the Sanders County Property in trust for Richard and their daughter, Gretchen, allowing them to reside there until their deaths.After Rosemary's death in 2017, Bruce and Gretchen were appointed co-personal representatives of her estate. The final accounting identified the Sanders County Property as an estate asset. In 2023, Gretchen filed a petition to correct the distribution of the Sanders County Property, claiming a life estate per the will. Bruce and the Land Trust filed a cross-motion, asserting the property belonged to the Land Trust, alleging it was purchased with Land Trust funds.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, sitting in probate, denied Bruce and the Land Trust's motion for summary judgment and granted Gretchen's motion, ruling that the Land Trust did not equitably own the Sanders County Property and that Gretchen had a valid life estate per the will.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Land Trust's claim of equitable ownership, as such claims are equitable in nature and fall outside the probate court's limited jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the probate court's decision regarding the Land Trust's claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. However, it affirmed the probate court's ruling that Gretchen had a valid life estate in the Sanders County Property as per the will. View "In re R.E. Colver" on Justia Law

Tammy Livingston, individually and as a beneficiary and co-trustee of the Livingston Music Interest Trust, sued her mother, Travilyn Livingston, over the termination of copyright assignments and associated royalties for songs authored by Jay Livingston. Jay had assigned his copyright interests in several songs to a music publishing company owned by Travilyn. Travilyn later invoked her statutory right to terminate these copyright grants and filed termination notices with the U.S. Copyright Office. Tammy challenged these terminations, claiming her rights as a beneficiary were affected.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee dismissed Tammy's complaint, holding that it failed to state a claim. Tammy appealed the decision, arguing that the termination notices were ineffective, defective, or invalid, and that she retained a state law right to receive royalties from the songs covered by the terminated agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the 2003 California probate court order, which declared that the Family Trust held no ownership interests in Jay's copyrights, precluded Tammy's claims. The court also found that Jay had validly executed the copyright grants as an individual, not as a trustee, and that Travilyn owned Jay Livingston Music at the time of the assignments. Additionally, the court rejected Tammy's arguments regarding the termination notices' compliance with federal requirements, noting that she failed to plead specific factual allegations for most of the notices. Finally, the court held that Tammy did not identify a state law basis for her claim to royalties, thus failing to meet the pleading standards under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). View "Livingston v. Jay Livingston Music, Inc." on Justia Law

Lester Warren Martin, a renowned pediatric surgeon and successful investor, passed away in 2020, leaving behind a substantial estate. He had created a revocable trust in 1990, which was to be distributed equally among his five children. After one of his daughters, Sarah Stewart, passed away, her share was to be divided between her two children, Daniel Stewart and Rachel Kosoff. In 2018, Lester gave his son, David Martin, power of attorney and made him the trustee of the revocable trust. David distributed $13,930,000 from the trust, mostly to Lester’s four living children, with a smaller portion to Daniel and Rachel.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that David breached his fiduciary duties by making distributions without specific written authorization from Lester, as required by the trust. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on liability and dismissed their remaining claims. A jury trial determined that David owed Daniel and Rachel $2,086,000 in damages. David later filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not have a legal right to sue under Ohio law. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Daniel and Rachel had Article III standing, as they alleged a concrete monetary injury traceable to David’s actions and redressable by the court. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order granting relief from judgment and remanded the case for the district court to rule on David’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the necessity of expert testimony to prove damages. The appellate court affirmed the denial of David’s motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs’ damages testimony. View "Stewart v. Martin" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Sanda and Derek Sanda were married in 2016, having started dating in 2014. Elizabeth brought significant assets into the marriage, including trusts and future inheritances protected by a premarital agreement, while Derek had a negative net worth. During the marriage, Elizabeth used her inheritance to fund various expenses, including a home down payment, mortgage payments, and Derek's business operations. Derek contributed through home renovations and his carpentry business, which was not highly profitable. The couple lived beyond their means, relying heavily on Elizabeth's inheritance.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over by Judge Jackson J. Lofgren, handled the divorce proceedings. The court issued an interim order in February 2024, granting Elizabeth exclusive use of the marital home and her vehicle, while Derek was awarded his vehicle. During the trial, disputes arose over the classification of certain assets and debts, including a vehicle trade and attorney's fees. The court found that Derek improperly dissipated marital property by trading a vehicle without approval and determined that Elizabeth's inheritance, though used during the marriage, should be considered in the property division.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the property division was equitable. The court emphasized the origin of Elizabeth's inheritance and the couple's financial conduct during the marriage. The court also upheld the district court's decisions regarding the valuation date, classification of assets, and responsibility for attorney's fees. The judgment awarded Elizabeth a larger share of the marital estate, with an additional payment to Derek to achieve equity. View "Sanda v. Sanda" on Justia Law

Timothy Brian Johnson and Phillip Barnes, nephews of the deceased Samuel D. Johnson, appealed a judgment from the Lamar Circuit Court. The court declared that Alabama's antilapse statute, § 43-8-224, Ala. Code 1975, did not apply to Johnson's will, making Judith Mayers the sole beneficiary. Johnson's will, executed in October 1990, left his entire estate to his father, Coy D. Johnson. If Coy predeceased him, the estate would be divided equally among his siblings, Roger D. Johnson, Denny R. Johnson, Judith A. Mayers, and Janice M. Barnes. If none of these individuals survived him, the estate would pass to his nearest living heirs. At Johnson's death in July 2022, Mayers was the only surviving named beneficiary.The Lamar Probate Court admitted the will to probate and issued letters of administration to Mayers. The administration was then moved to the Lamar Circuit Court. Mayers petitioned the circuit court to declare that the antilapse statute did not apply, asserting she was the sole beneficiary. The circuit court agreed, finding the will unambiguous and ruling that the antilapse statute did not apply, making Mayers the sole beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the antilapse statute, which prevents a devise from lapsing if a beneficiary predeceases the testator, did not apply because the will included survivorship language and an alternative devise provision. The will clearly indicated that only the named beneficiaries who survived the testator would inherit, and if none survived, the estate would pass to the nearest living heirs. Since Mayers was the only surviving named beneficiary, she was entitled to the entire estate. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Mayers" on Justia Law