Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

A U.S.-based multinational corporation filed a consolidated federal tax return for 2006, reporting royalty income received from its Brazilian subsidiary for the use of intellectual property. Brazilian law limited the amount the subsidiary could pay in royalties to its foreign parent, so the subsidiary paid and the parent reported only the amount permitted under Brazilian law. Years later, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a Notice of Deficiency, reallocating nearly $23.7 million in additional royalty income to the parent company, arguing that this reflected what an unrelated party would have paid for the intellectual property, notwithstanding the Brazilian legal restriction.The corporation challenged the IRS’s determination in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court, in a closely divided decision, upheld the IRS’s position. A plurality of judges deferred to the IRS regulation that allowed such reallocation, finding the statute ambiguous and the regulation reasonable. Two concurring judges agreed with the result but believed the statute itself required the reallocation, regardless of the regulation. The dissenting judges argued that the statute unambiguously prohibited the IRS from reallocating income that the parent could not legally receive, and some also found the regulation procedurally invalid.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case in light of recent Supreme Court precedent clarifying that courts must independently interpret statutes without deferring to agency interpretations. The Eighth Circuit held that the relevant statute does not permit the IRS to reallocate income that the taxpayer could not legally receive due to foreign law restrictions. The court concluded that the IRS’s authority to allocate income under the statute is limited to amounts over which the taxpayer has dominion or control. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision and remanded for redetermination of the taxes owed. View "3M Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Medtronic, a medical device company, allocated profits from its class III devices and leads among its U.S. and Puerto Rico subsidiaries through intercompany licensing agreements. The dispute centers on the appropriate method for determining arm’s length royalty rates for intangible property transferred between Medtronic US and Medtronic Puerto Rico for the 2005 and 2006 tax years. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenged Medtronic’s use of the comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method and instead applied the comparable profits method, resulting in a tax deficiency. Medtronic contested the IRS’s adjustment, leading to litigation.The United States Tax Court initially rejected both parties’ proposed methods and conducted its own valuation, ultimately favoring a modified CUT method based on a patent-licensing agreement with Siemens Pacesetter, but with adjustments. The Tax Court’s decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Medtronic, Inc. & Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2018), which remanded for additional factual findings regarding the best transfer pricing method. On remand, the Tax Court abandoned the CUT method, rejected the Commissioner’s comparable profits method, and adopted a three-step unspecified method, resulting in a new profit allocation and tax deficiencies for Medtronic.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s decision, holding that the Tax Court erred in using the Pacesetter Agreement under both the CUT and unspecified methods because the intangible property involved did not have similar profit potential. The Eighth Circuit also found that the Tax Court applied incorrect legal standards and made insufficient factual findings regarding the comparable profits method, asset bases, functions, and product liability risks. The Eighth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Medtronic, Inc, etc. v. CIR" on Justia Law

Charles Sorensen, a retired airline pilot, engaged in a series of actions from 2016 to 2021 to evade federal income taxes for the years 2015 through 2019. His conduct included failing to file tax returns, submitting false returns, making fraudulent refund claims, concealing income and assets, and refusing to cooperate with the IRS. Sorensen used shell companies, such as LAWTAM and LAMP, to hide assets and income, transferred funds to avoid IRS levies, and ultimately converted assets into cryptocurrency to further shield them from collection. He also filed frivolous documents and lawsuits challenging the IRS’s authority. The total tax loss attributed to his actions was $1,861,722.A jury in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota convicted Sorensen on seven counts, including filing false tax returns, tax evasion, failing to file tax returns, and making a false claim against the United States. The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison. Sorensen appealed, arguing that the district court improperly admitted testimony from several witnesses who were not qualified as experts and erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for sophisticated means.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and the sentencing enhancement de novo. The appellate court held that the challenged witness testimony was properly admitted as lay testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, as it was based on firsthand knowledge and personal experience, not specialized expertise. The court also found that the sophisticated means enhancement was appropriately applied, given Sorensen’s use of shell companies, cryptocurrency, and other complex methods to conceal his tax evasion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

Mayo Clinic, a Minnesota nonprofit corporation and tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, sought a refund of unrelated business income tax (UBIT) imposed by the IRS for tax years 2003, 2005-2007, and 2010-2012. The IRS assessed Mayo $11,501,621 in unpaid UBIT, concluding that Mayo was not a qualified educational organization under IRC § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) because its primary function was not the presentation of formal instruction, and its noneducational activities were not merely incidental to its educational activities. Mayo paid the assessed amount and filed a refund action.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted Mayo summary judgment, holding that Mayo is an educational organization as defined in § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and invalidating Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-9(c)(1) for adding requirements not present in the statute. The United States appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed the invalidation of the regulation and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court concluded that Mayo had a substantial educational purpose and no substantial noneducational purpose, granting Mayo judgment for the full refund amount plus interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that "primary" in this context means "substantial" and that Mayo's substantial patient care activities are not noneducational due to the integration of education and clinical practice. The court concluded that Mayo qualifies as an educational organization under § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) and that its patient care function does not disqualify it from this status. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mayo Clinic v. United States" on Justia Law

Conmac Investments, Inc., an Arkansas company, owns, leases, and manages farms. Between 2004 and 2013, Conmac purchased farmland and negotiated to receive rights to "base acres," which entitle the owner to subsidy payments from the USDA. Initially, Conmac did not claim deductions for amortization of these base acres on its tax returns from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, Conmac began amortizing its base acres without filing an "Application for Change of Accounting Method" and claimed amortization deductions for the years 2009 through 2014. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading Conmac to petition the Tax Court.The United States Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, determining that Conmac's decision to amortize base acres constituted a change in the method of accounting, which required IRS approval. Conmac appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Conmac's initiation of amortization for base acres in 2009 was indeed a change in the method of accounting. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2), changing the treatment of an asset from nonamortizable to amortizable is a change in the method of accounting. The court rejected Conmac's argument that the change was due to a change in underlying facts, noting that Conmac's realization about the amortization of base acres did not constitute a change in underlying facts but rather a change in the timing of cost recovery.The court also addressed the Section 481 adjustment, concluding that the "year of the change" was 2013, when the Commissioner changed Conmac's method of accounting, thus triggering the adjustment to prevent duplicated deductions or omitted income. The judgment of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Ronald E. Byers owes the United States for unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties. The government filed a suit to enforce its federal tax liens through the judicial sale of Ronald’s home, which he solely owns but shares with his wife, Deanna L. Byers. The Byerses agreed to the sale but argued that Deanna is entitled to half of the proceeds because the property is their marital homestead. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Deanna lacked a property interest in the home and was not entitled to any sale proceeds.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that Deanna did not have a property interest in the home under Minnesota law, which only provides a contingent interest that vests upon the owner's death. The court concluded that Deanna’s interest did not rise to the level of a property right requiring compensation under federal law. The court ordered that Ronald is liable for the tax debt, the government’s liens are valid, and the property can be sold with proceeds applied to Ronald’s tax liabilities.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Minnesota’s homestead laws do not provide Deanna with a vested property interest in the home that would entitle her to compensation from the sale proceeds. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Rodgers, noting that Minnesota law does not afford the same level of property rights to a non-owner spouse as Texas law does. Therefore, the court upheld the summary judgment in favor of the government, allowing the sale of the property to satisfy Ronald’s tax debt. View "United States v. Byers" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the disqualification of tax-exempt status of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) because it exceeded the I.R.C. 415 contribution limit. In this case, the Tax Court did not clearly err in basing its findings of fact on the IRS's uncontested Explanation of Items, which established that DNA Pro Ventures' 2008 contribution to Dr. Daniel Prohaska's ESOP account substantially exceeded the section 415 contribution limit for that year. View "DNA Pro Ventures v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Taxpayer appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in this action to reduce a tax lien to judgment and foreclose upon real property. The court concluded that an underlying Tax Court appeal taxpayer filed in March 2006 served to toll the limitations period applicable to the government's current collection efforts. The court explained that, in the unique circumstances of this extremely tardy challenge, taxpayer cannot rely upon the absence of evidence of a date of mailing to carry her own heavy burden to disprove the Tax Court's jurisdiction over her 2006 appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Giaimo" on Justia Law

Diversified filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Interstate Income Act (IIA), 15 U.S.C. 381, deprives Ohio of jurisdiction to assess and collect the Commercial Activity Tax (CAT) on Diversified's sales of goods manufactured and shipped from outside Ohio to locations in Ohio, and an order enjoining the State Tax Commissioner from asserting that jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit as barred by the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. 1341, and by long-standing principles of comity. The court held that the TIA applies to a suit in federal court seeking to enjoin assessment, levy or collection of a state tax “where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” Here, Diversified's argument that the Ohio CAT does not provide a "plain" state court remedy is without merit. In this case, the Ohio Revenue Code provides taxpayers an appeal of right to an Ohio appellate court which will “hear and decide” a claim that a state tax has been invalidly assessed or collected. The court explained that this obviously includes authority to decide that imposing the CAT on Diversified’s out-of-state transactions violates the IIA, regardless of the Ohio Legislature’s contrary intention. The court further concluded that its decision that the TIA effectively transferred jurisdiction over Diversified’s equitable claims to the Ohio state courts is not at odds with comity principles. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Diversified Ingredients v. Testa" on Justia Law

After Little Salt failed to pay its taxes, the Commissioner issued notices of transferee liability to the former shareholders. The tax court concluded that the former shareholders are liable for a portion of Little Salt's tax deficiency and the IRS appealed. The court agreed with the IRS that the Tax Court should have considered whether the stock sale should be recharacterized as a liquidating distribution to the shareholders under Nebraska law. However, the court declined to resolve the issue in the first instance. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the tax court to consider whether the IRS is entitled to a full recovery from the former shareholders as transferees under Nebraska law. View "Stuart, Jr. v. CIR" on Justia Law