Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries
Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm. P.L.L.C. v. United States
The IRS served a John Doe summons on the Texas Law Firm, which provides tax-planning advice, seeking documents for “U.S. taxpayers," who, during specified years, used the Firm's services "to acquire, establish, maintain, operate, or control" a foreign financial account, asset, or entity or any foreign or domestic financial account or assets in the name of such foreign entity. A John Doe summons, described in 26 U.S.C. 7609(c)(1), does not identify the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued. The government made the required showings that the summons relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group or class, there is a reasonable basis for believing that such person or group or class may fail or may have failed to comply with any provision of internal revenue law, and the information sought and the identity of the person or persons is not readily available from other sources. The Firm moved to quash, claiming that, despite the general rule a lawyer’s clients’ identities are not covered by the attorney-client privilege, an exception exists where disclosure would result in the disclosure of confidential communication.The Fifth Circuit affirmed in favor of the government. Blanket assertions of privilege are disfavored. The Firm's clients’ identities are not connected inextricably with privileged communication. If the Firm wishes to assert privilege as to any responsive documents, it may do so, using a privilege log to detail the foundation for each claim. View "Taylor Lohmeyer Law Firm. P.L.L.C. v. United States" on Justia Law
Wells Fargo & Company v. United States
Wells Fargo, a U.S. corporation, entered into a structured trust advantaged repackaged securities transaction (STARS) with Barclays, a United Kingdom corporation. Wells Fargo asserts its purpose was to borrow money at a favorable interest rate, to diversify its funding sources, to reduce its liquidity risk, and to provide a stable source of funding for five years. The government claimed that STARS was an unlawful tax avoidance scheme, designed to exploit the differences between the tax laws of the two countries and generate U.S. tax credits for a foreign tax that Wells Fargo did not, in substance, pay. Wells Fargo claimed foreign-tax credits on its 2003 federal tax return arising from STARS. The IRS disallowed those credits and notified Wells Fargo that it owed additional taxes. Wells Fargo paid the resulting deficiency and sued to obtain a refund. The government sought to impose a “negligence penalty” as an offset defense because Wells Fargo underpaid its 2003 taxes after claiming this credit.The Eighth Circuit affirmed that Wells Fargo was not entitled to a tax credit and was liable for a “negligence penalty.” The "sham-transaction" or "economic-substance" doctrine allows the IRS and courts “to distinguish between structuring a real transaction in a particular way to obtain a tax benefit, which is legitimate, and creating a transaction to generate a tax benefit, which is illegitimate.” STARS’s trust component had no real potential for profit outside of its tax implications and Wells Fargo had no valid purpose other than tax considerations. View "Wells Fargo & Company v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
General Mills, Inc. v. United States
GMI is the parent corporation of several partners of General Mills, an LLC that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes (the Partnership). GMI alleges that after certain partnership-level audits of the Partnership’s returns for the 2002–2006 tax years were settled with the IRS, the IRS erroneously collected $5,958,695 in “large corporate underpayments” (LCU) interest (I.R.C. 6621(c)), by selecting incorrect “applicable dates” to start interest accrual. GMI paid the interest and filed unsuccessful administrative refund claims, then sued the government. The Claims Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that GMI failed to file its claims within the six-month limitations period, I.R.C. 6230(c). GMI argued that the general two-year tax refund limitations period (I.R.C. 6511(a)) applied. Section 6230(c) provides that “[a] partner may file a claim for refund on the grounds that . . . the [IRS] erroneously computed any computational adjustment necessary . . . to apply to the partner a settlement” and that any such claim “shall be filed within 6 months after the day on which the [IRS] mails the notice of computational adjustment to the partner.”The Federal Circuit affirmed. The essence of GMI’s challenge is to the IRS’s computation of the change in its tax liability resulting from the Partnership’s settlement of partnership items; interest was “clearly contemplated” as part of the Partnership settlement agreements. GMI received adequate notice but filed its refund claims well outside the six-month period, View "General Mills, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law, US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Hoffman Properties II, L.P. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Hoffman owns the historic Tremaine Building in Cleveland, Ohio. Over a decade ago, Hoffman donated an easement in the façade of the building and certain airspace restrictions associated with the building to the American Association of Historic Preservation (AAHP). Hoffman agreed not to alter the historic character of the façade or to build in the airspace above or next to the building—subject to certain conditions. Hoffman then sought a $15 million tax deduction for its donation of a “qualified conservation contribution,” I.R.C. 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). The IRS and Tax Court concluded that Hoffman was not entitled to a deduction because the donation was not “exclusively for conservation purposes.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To be deductible, the donation must protect the conservation purposes “in perpetuity,” I.R.C. 170(h)(5)(A) and include “legally enforceable restrictions” that will prevent the donor from using its retained interest in the property in a way “inconsistent with the [donation’s] conservation purposes.” The donation agreement gives Hoffman the right to propose changes to the facade or airspace, after which AAHP has a 45-day window in which to prevent those changes. If the organization misses that window—for whatever reason—it loses the ability to stop the change. The provision violates the “perpetuity” requirement. View "Hoffman Properties II, L.P. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law
Hamilton v. CIR
Claiming insolvency, taxpayer Vincent Hamilton sought to exclude nearly $160,000 in student loans that were forgiven from his taxable income. During the same tax year, however, he had received a non-taxable partnership distribution worth more than $300,000. His wife transferred those funds into a previously-unused savings account held nominally by their adult son. Using login credentials provided by their son, Mrs. Hamilton incrementally transferred almost $120,000 back to the joint checking account she shared with her husband. The Hamiltons used these funds to support their living expenses. In a late-filed joint tax return, they excluded the discharged student-loan debt on the theory that Mr. Hamilton was insolvent. In calculating his assets and liabilities, however, the Hamiltons did not include the funds transferred into the savings account. Had they done so, Mr. Hamilton would not have met the criteria for insolvency; and the couple would have owed federal income tax on the student-loan discharge. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue eventually filed a Notice of Deficiency, reasoning that the partnership distribution rendered Mr. Hamilton solvent, such that the Hamiltons were required to pay income tax on the cancelled student loan debt. debt. The Hamiltons petitioned for review from the Tax Court, which sustained both the deficiency and a significant late-filing penalty. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Hamilton v. CIR" on Justia Law
Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States
The IRS conducted a civil audit of Peter Hermes, Kevin Desilet, Samantha Murphy, and John Murphy (collectively, the “Taxpayers”) to verify their tax liabilities for their medical- marijuana dispensary, Standing Akimbo, LLC. The IRS was investigating whether the Taxpayers had taken improper deductions for business expenses arising from a “trade or business” that “consists of trafficking in controlled substances.” Claiming to fear criminal prosecution, the Taxpayers declined to provide the audit information to the IRS. This left the IRS to seek the information elsewhere—it issued four summonses for plant reports, gross-sales reports and license information to the Colorado Department of Revenue’s Marijuana Enforcement Division (the “Enforcement Division”), which is the state entity responsible for regulating licensed marijuana sales. In Colorado federal district court, the Taxpayers filed a petition to quash the summonses. The government moved to dismiss the petition and to enforce the summonses. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and ordered the summonses enforced. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Taxpayers failed to overcome the IRS' showing of good faith, and failed to establish that enforcing the summonses would constitute an abuse of process. View "Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law
Hegar v. Gulf Copper & Manufacturing Corp.
In this dispute over the amount of franchise tax owed by a taxpayer the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's judgment for the taxpayer, holding that, with respect to the taxpayer's inclusion of certain costs in its "cost of goods sold" (COGS) subtraction, the calculation method accepted by the trial court was improper, and the taxpayer was not entitled to include the costs in calculating its COGS subtraction.The Comptroller concluded that Gulf Copper and Manufacturing Corporation paid an insufficient amount of franchise taxes for the 2009 year. At issue was whether Gulf Copper could exclude certain payments from its revenue under Texas Tax Code 171.1011(g)(3) and include certain costs in its COGS subtraction under Texas Tax Code 171.1012. Gulf Copper paid additional taxes and sued to recover the disputed amount. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gulf Copper. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Comptroller incorrectly disallowed the revenue exclusion; (2) with regard to the COGS subtraction, the calculation method accepted by the trial court was improper; and (3) the taxpayer was not entitled to include costs under subsection 171.1012(i) in calculating its COGS subtraction. View "Hegar v. Gulf Copper & Manufacturing Corp." on Justia Law
Hegar v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that Tex. Tax Code 171.1012 permitted a movie theater to subtract exhibition costs as cost of goods sold, holding that film exhibitions are not tangible personal property that is sold, and therefore, the theater was not entitled to include exhibition-related costs in its cost of goods sold.The Comptroller disallowed the movie theater's subtraction of exhibition costs in calculating its franchise tax liability for 2008 and 2009. The theater paid the additional franchise taxes requested by the Comptroller and sued to recover the disputed amount, arguing that its exhibition costs were property subtracted as cost of goods sold (COGS). The trial court concluded that the theater's film exhibitions were tangible personal property and thus goods for sale in the ordinary course of the theater's business under section 171.1012. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 171.1012 did not permit the movie theater to subtract is exhibition costs as COGS because no tangible personal property was transferred through the film exhibitions. View "Hegar v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc." on Justia Law
Sunstate Equipment Co. v. Hegar
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the Texas Comptroller's audit of Sunstate Equipment, a heavy construction equipment renal company, on the grounds that Sunstate was not entitled to subtract certain delivery and pick-up costs as cost of goods sold (COGS) under Tex. Tax Code 171.1012, holding that Sunstate was not entitled to the subtraction it claimed under either section 171.1012(k-1) nor section 171.1012(i).After the Comptroller assessed deficiencies, penalties and interest totaling $140,495 Sunstate brought suit for a refund. The district court ordered a full refund of the amount paid, including interest. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Sunstate was not entitled to subtract costs under section 171.1012(k-1) and that section 171.1012(i) did not independently authorize the cost subtractions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither statutory provision authorized Sunstate to subtract its delivery and pick-up costs as COGS. View "Sunstate Equipment Co. v. Hegar" on Justia Law
Medline Industries, Inc. v. County of Hennepin
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the tax court concluding that the market value of a distribution-warehouse property in Rogers, Minnesota was $15,638,000 as of January 2, 2014 and $15,597,000 as of January 2, 2015, holding that the tax court did not err in any of the ways asserted by Medline Industries.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the tax court (1) did not err by crediting some of the county appraiser's opinions despite rejecting his opinion about the highest and best use of the property as a multi-tenant facility; (2) did not clearly err in the sales-comparison approach by relying on four comparable sales other than the May 2017 of a former Walgreens distribution center; (3) did not err in its income approach analysis; and (4) did not err in relying on the cost approach. View "Medline Industries, Inc. v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law