Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a consolidated cases filed by plaintiff Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications-NNE (FairPoint), against several New Hampshire towns and cities, asserting claims of ultra vires taxation and disproportionate taxation. As “representative municipalities” in the “test cases” established for this litigation, defendants, the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover (Towns), appealed two superior court orders challenging: (1) the grant of summary judgment on the ultra vires ruling because they contended the agreements authorizing such use or occupation did not satisfy the requirements of RSA 72:23, I(b) (2012) (amended 2017, 2018, 2020); and (2) the superior court’s decision after trial, arguing that the court committed several errors in concluding that FairPoint was entitled to abatements of its tax assessments from the Town of Durham and the Town of Hanover for tax years 2013 and 2011 respectively. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the Towns that the superior court erred with respect to the tax on the value of FairPoint's use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was ultra vires. FairPoint’s use or occupation of municipal rights-of-way was not pursuant to a perpetual lease that gave rise to an independently taxable property interest; FairPoint met its burden to prove it was taxed disproportionately by the Towns. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and consequently abating the two tax assessments at issue. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE v. Town of Acworth" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TriNet in an action brought by TriNet, as the successor-in-interest of Gevity, a professional employer organization (PEO). Gevity claimed tax credits from 2004 to 2009 based on its payment of FICA taxes on the tip income of its client companies' employees. The IRS asserts that such credits were not allowed because Gevity was not the "employer" entitled to claim the credits as that term is defined in 26 U.S.C. 3401(d). The court concluded that, under the statutes applicable to the period at issue, Gevity was the statutory employer entitled to claim the FICA tip credit because it—not its client companies—controlled the payment of the wages subject to withholding. View "TriNet Group, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In this tax refund case centering on Arkansas's excise tax on tobacco products other than cigarettes the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment for the Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) and dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for refund, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting DF&A's cross-motion for summary judgment.Plaintiff, seven companies that alleged that they overpaid Other Tobacco Products (OTP) taxes from 2011 through 2013, filed suit under the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act, Ark. Code Ann. 27-18-406, seeking declaratory relief in the form of a judgment that they overpaid OTP taxes. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a full or partial refund of the $3,223,200 they paid in excise taxes to the state during the time period in question. View "Douglas Companies, Inc. v. Walther" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the court of appeals' judgment upholding the General Assembly's enactment of laws that centralize the collection and administration of net-profits taxes but reversed the portion of the judgment upholding the portion of the legislation allowing the state to retain .5 percent of the collected taxes, holding that the retention provision exceeds the General Assembly's authority.Appellants, several cities and villages, all impose a net-profits tax, which is a tax on income earned within their boundaries. After the General Assembly passed laws imposing centralized administration of those taxes Appellants brought this lawsuit arguing that the legislation violates their home-rule authority and exceeds the General Assembly's constitutional power to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes. The Supreme Court held (1) the laws imposing centralized administration constitute an act of limitation within the General Assembly's explicit constitutional authority; and (2) the law providing for the state's retention of .5 percent of municipal net-profits taxes a fee or a tax for the state's centralized administration is unconstitutional. View "Athens v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing K&J Investments, LLC's petition and complaint for judicial review, rescission, and unjust enrichment against the Flathead County Board of Commissioners and Flathead County Treasurer, holding that the district court properly dismissed all claims for want of jurisdiction.K&J, an investment company, purchased a tax sale certificate from Flathead County for the property at issue for $1,512. K&J later filed an application for refund and abatement due to alleged erroneous property assessments. The Flathead County Board of Commissioners denied the application. K&J filed a petition for judicial review seeking to reverse the Commissioners' denial of tax refund and abatement and including a complaint for rescission of the tax sale certificate and seeking relief for all taxes paid under a theory of unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the petition and complaint, ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because K&J did not follow the required process for seeking reassessment and exhausting administrative remedies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 15-16-604 did not grant the district court authority to consider K&J's claims. View "K & J Investments, LLC v. Flathead County" on Justia Law

Manson owns heavy marine construction and dredging equipment, including 60 specialized vessels and over 50 barges. After the Contra Costa County Assessor’s Office assessed property taxes on the value of Manson’s vessels for tax years 2013 and 2014, Manson filed administrative appeals, claiming some of its vessels were exempt from taxation under the Vessel Use Exemption, which provides that “[v]essels of more than 50 tons burden in this State and engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers” “are exempt from property taxation,” Cal. Const. art. XIII, section 3(l). The Board denied Manson’s appeals.The trial court and court of appeal affirmed. Manson did not establish that anyone owned or controlled the sludge it dredged, or that the dredged material could be considered goods, delivered from a consignor to a consignee. The dump scows and barges were moved from the harbor to disposal sites for the purpose of being emptied out so that they could return to the harbor and continue to perform the work for which they were hired; the carrying of the dredged material from the harbor to the disposal sites was merely a necessary byproduct of, and incidental to, that dredging work. Manson’s vessels were engaged in dredging, not in the transportation of goods for hire. View "Manson Construction Co. v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) and dismissing American Honda Motor Company's challenge to the DFA's denial of its request for a corporate tax refund, holding that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DFA.American Honda filed an action for judicial relief under the Arkansas Tax Procedure Act, Ark. Code Ann. 26-18-101 et seq., challenging DFA's decision to deny its request for a corporate tax refund. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of DFA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) judicial review of DFA's statutory interpretation of the Tax Procedure Act is de novo; and (2) while the circuit court improperly gave great deference to DFA's interpretation of the Tax Procedure Act, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of DFA. View "American Honda Motor Co. v. Walther" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Indiana Land Trust's motion to set aside a tax deed, holding that the LaPorte County Auditor gave adequate notice reasonably calculated to inform Indiana Land Trust Company of the impending tax sale of the property.From 2009 to 2015, the owner of vacant property did not pay property taxes. Through a third-party service, the county auditor sent simultaneous notice of an impending tax sale by way of certified letter and first-class mail to the address listed on the deed for the property. The owner, however, had moved and had not updated its address. Later, notice was published in the local newspaper. The property eventually sold and a tax deed was issued to the purchaser. The original owner moved to set aside the tax deed due to insufficient notice. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Indiana Land Trust Company's motion to set aside the tax deed, holding that the county auditor provided notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise the owner of the pendency of the action and afforded them an opportunity to present their objections. View "Indiana Land Trust Co. v. XL Investment Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Cayuga Indian Nation of New York and the district court's permanent injunction enjoining the County from foreclosing on the Cayuga Indian Nation's real property for nonpayment of taxes. The court agreed with the district court that tribal sovereign immunity from suit bars the County from pursuing tax enforcement actions under Article 11 of the New York Real Property Tax Law against the Cayuga Indian Nation. The court explained that the County's foreclosure proceedings are not permitted by the traditional common law exception to sovereign immunity that covers certain actions related to immovable property. In this case, the foreclosure actions fall outside the purview of the common law version of the immovable-property exception. The court also rejected the County's reading of City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), as abrogating a tribe's immunity from suit. View "Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County" on Justia Law

The Jefferson County, Alabama Board of Education ("the Board") and several of its employees sought to avoid the application of an occupational tax imposed by the City of Irondale ("City"). The Board and its employees argued that public-school employees were exempt from the occupational tax because, they contended they provided an essential government service. "But the importance of a state employee's role, even a role as important as a public-school employee, does not remove that employee's obligation to pay a duly owed occupational tax." The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the City. View "Blankenship et al. v. City of Irondale" on Justia Law