Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

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Payroll Management, Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and received $1,070,330.23 from British Petroleum, Inc. for economic losses due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sunz Insurance Company claimed a first-priority security interest in these funds, asserting that its security interest attached and perfected before any other creditor. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that its federal tax lien had first priority as it attached and perfected first. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS, determining that Payroll’s BP claim was a commercial tort claim when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The court found that the IRS’s tax lien attached and perfected first, while Sunz’s security interest did not attach to commercial tort claims. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Payroll’s BP claim remained a commercial tort claim in March 2017 when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The settlement agreement did not automatically convert the tort claim into a contract, as it did not create an automatic obligation for BP to pay Payroll a certain amount. Therefore, the IRS’s tax lien, which attached and perfected first, took priority over Sunz’s security interest. The court concluded that the IRS was entitled to the $1,070,330.23 payment. View "Sunz Insurance Company v. Treasury Department" on Justia Law

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Edward Bachner filed fraudulent tax returns for three years, inflating his income and tax withholdings to claim unwarranted refunds. The IRS detected the fraud and imposed civil penalties. Bachner petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination but did not attend the trial, which resulted in the Tax Court sustaining the penalties. Bachner and his wife, Rebecca, who filed joint tax returns, appealed the Tax Court’s judgment.The Tax Court rejected the Bachners' arguments that the IRS’s notice of deficiency was invalid, that the limitations period had expired, and that the IRS had ignored certain procedures. The court also dismissed their claim that they had not underpaid taxes, as well as their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Tax Court accepted the IRS’s evidence and sustained the fraud penalties against Edward.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Edward had standing to appeal but dismissed Rebecca from the appeal due to her innocent-spouse status. The court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the IRS’s determinations based on the penalties listed in the notice. The court also upheld the Tax Court’s imposition of fraud penalties, explaining that Edward’s fraudulent overstatement of withholdings constituted an underpayment of taxes under the relevant Treasury Regulations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to sustain the penalties against Edward and dismissed Rebecca from the appeal. View "Bachner v CIR" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Howard Jarvis) and the Coachella Valley Water District (Water District). Howard Jarvis challenged the Water District's replenishment charges, alleging they violated Propositions 26 and 218 and unfairly subsidized large agricultural property owners. The lawsuit named the Water District, three board members, the general manager, and three consulting firms as defendants. The complaint included causes of action for writ of mandate, conversion, aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and declaratory relief.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, finding the public interest exemption applied. The court also sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended complaint, dismissing some causes of action without leave to amend and others with leave to amend. Howard Jarvis filed a second amended complaint, which the court again dismissed, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court awarded Howard Jarvis over $180,000 in attorney's fees, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because the lawsuit improperly targeted individual board members and the general manager for actions only the Water District could perform. The court found that most of the causes of action arose from protected activity and that Howard Jarvis failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. Consequently, the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted in large part, and the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the trial court's order sustaining the demurrer, as the remaining claims against the anti-SLAPP defendants were moot or failed as a matter of law. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

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In 2020, Bryce D. Hovannisian and Lindsay E. Hovannisian purchased several tax-defaulted properties at a tax sale from the City of Fresno. Prior to the sale, the City had recorded special assessments for nuisance abatement costs and unpaid penalties against these properties. After the purchase, the County of Fresno issued tax bills to the appellants, which included these special assessments. The appellants sought to pay only the portion of the tax bills excluding the special assessments, arguing that the tax sale should have removed these liens. The County rejected their partial payments, leading the appellants to sue the City and the County to quiet title to the properties.The Superior Court of Fresno County sustained three separate demurrers filed by the City and the County, asserting that Revenue and Taxation Code section 4807 barred the suit as it impeded tax collection. The court granted leave to amend after the first two demurrers but denied it after the third. The court found that the appellants were required to pay the taxes and then seek a refund, rather than challenging the assessments prepayment.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court held that the special assessments were collected at the same time and in the same manner as county taxes, thus falling under the definition of "taxes" in section 4801. Consequently, section 4807 barred the appellants' prepayment suit. The court also found that the appellants had an adequate remedy at law through a refund action, which precluded them from seeking equitable relief. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, and the appellants were directed to pay the taxes and seek a refund if necessary. View "Hovannisian v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

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Prospect Crozer, LLC owned and developed 57.7 acres of real property in Upland Borough, Delaware County, assessed at $80,166,493 for tax years 2017-2019. Prospect appealed the assessment, but the Delaware County Board of Assessment Appeals denied it. Prospect then appealed to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, where the Chester Upland School District intervened. Senior Judge John L. Braxton, assigned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, presided over the de novo tax assessment proceedings. During this time, Judge Braxton was appointed to the Philadelphia Board of Revision of Taxes and received his first payment from the Board on June 16, 2019. He continued to preside over the tax appeals and issued orders in October 2019.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas conducted a hearing to determine the timeline of Judge Braxton's dual service and found that he began receiving compensation from the Board on June 16, 2019. The Commonwealth Court then vacated the orders issued by Judge Braxton, concluding that his simultaneous service on the Board and as a judge violated Article V, Section 17(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits judges from holding an office or position of profit in the government. The court held that this violation resulted in the automatic forfeiture of his judicial office, rendering the orders legal nullities.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and agreed that Judge Braxton violated Section 17(a) by holding a position of profit with a municipal corporation while serving as a judge. However, the court rejected the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that this violation resulted in the automatic forfeiture of his judicial office. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the violation created a constitutionally impermissible conflict of duties, requiring the vacatur of the orders entered in the tax appeals. The case was remanded to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas for reassignment to a new judge. View "In re: Appeal of Prospect Crozer LLC From the Decision of the Board of Assessment Appeals of Delaware County, PA" on Justia Law

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Philip Morris USA, Inc. (Philip Morris) disputed with the North Carolina Department of Revenue (Department) over tax credits for manufacturing cigarettes for exportation (Export Credits). The issue was whether the "credit allowed" in N.C.G.S. § 105-130.45(b) (2003) limited the Export Credits such that they could not be carried forward to future years.The Department audited Philip Morris' tax returns for 2012-2014 and disallowed the Export Credits claimed, arguing that the statute capped the credits generated each year at six million dollars, thus no credits were available to carry forward. Philip Morris objected and requested a review, but the Department upheld the disallowance. Philip Morris then petitioned the Office of Administrative Hearings, where the administrative law judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. Philip Morris appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the ALJ's decision, stating that the statute limited credit generation to six million dollars per year.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and found the statute ambiguous. The Court held that the term "credit allowed" in subsection (b) should be interpreted as "credit generated," allowing any generated Export Credit in excess of the annual cap to be carried forward for the next ten years. The Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Department and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Centene Corporation’s subsidiaries, Envolve Pharmacy Solutions and Coordinated Care, administer health insurance benefits in Washington under a state contract. Coordinated Care collects premiums from consumers and forwards payments to Envolve for administering the benefits. Coordinated Care pays a premiums tax instead of a business and occupation (B&O) tax. The issue is whether Coordinated Care’s payment of the premiums tax exempts Envolve from paying the B&O tax under RCW 82.04.320.The Department of Revenue historically exempted secondary corporate affiliates from the B&O tax if the primary affiliate paid the premiums tax. Envolve sought a refund based on this precedent, but the Department denied it, audited Envolve, and assessed over $3 million in back taxes, arguing that Envolve’s services were not all functionally related to insurance business.Envolve appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, which partially upheld the Department’s decision, finding some of Envolve’s services were not functionally related to insurance. The King County Superior Court reversed, ruling that Envolve’s activities were exempt under RCW 82.04.320. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Envolve’s services were functionally related to insurance business and thus exempt from B&O tax.The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that RCW 82.04.320 exempts Envolve from B&O taxation because Coordinated Care paid the premiums tax on Envolve’s work related to insurance business. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language exempts any person engaged in insurance business upon which a premiums tax is paid, without specifying who must pay the tax. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Envolve Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

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Murphy Oil USA (Murphy) and the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) disputed the categorization of interest expenses related to a corporate spin-off. Murphy, a retail motor-fuel and convenience-store operator, spun off from its parent company in 2013, resulting in interest expenses from issuing senior notes and borrowing funds. Initially, Murphy apportioned these expenses among all states where it conducted business. In 2018, Murphy amended its Arkansas tax returns for 2014 and 2015 to allocate all interest expenses to Arkansas, seeking a tax refund of nearly $4 million.The Union County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Murphy, allowing the amended tax returns and the allocation of 100% of the interest expenses to Arkansas. DFA appealed, arguing that the interest expenses were business-income expenses under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) and should be apportioned among all states, that a state statute made the expenses non-deductible if allocable to Arkansas, and that it was unfair to allow Murphy a tax refund in Arkansas without amending returns in other states.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Murphy's spin-off was an extraordinary, nonrecurring event, classifying the interest expenses as nonbusiness income under UDITPA, thus allocable entirely to Arkansas. The court also found that Arkansas Code Annotated section 26-51-431(c) did not prohibit the deduction of these expenses, as the statute was intended to prevent deductions for expenses related to tax-exempt income, which was not applicable in this case. Finally, the court rejected DFA's fairness argument, stating that it was not the court's role to adjust Arkansas tax returns based on potential unfairness to other states. View "Hudson v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Lonnie Hollis and Mason’s World Bar & Grill, LLC, filed a putative class action against the City of LaGrange, alleging that the City imposed excessive mandatory charges for utilities services, which they argued constituted an unauthorized tax under the Georgia Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the charges generated profits exceeding the actual cost of providing the services and were used to raise general revenues for the City, effectively making them illegal taxes. They sought a refund of these alleged illegal taxes, a declaration that the charges were illegal, and an injunction to prevent the City from continuing to impose such charges.The trial court granted the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the Georgia Constitution prohibited the court from regulating the utilities charges. The court concluded that because the Georgia Constitution prevents the General Assembly from regulating or fixing charges of public utilities owned or operated by municipalities, the court similarly lacked the authority to review the plaintiffs’ claims.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision in question, which restricts the General Assembly from regulating or fixing municipal utility charges, does not apply to the judicial branch. The plaintiffs’ claims required the court to exercise its judicial authority to determine whether the charges constituted illegal taxes, not to regulate or fix the charges. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court must address the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without misinterpreting the constitutional limitations on its authority. View "Hollis v. City of LaGrange" on Justia Law

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Total Renal Care, Inc. (TRC) provides dialysis services to patients in Ohio. TRC filed quarterly commercial-activity tax (CAT) returns and made corresponding payments for the period from April 1, 2012, to December 31, 2014. Later, TRC sought refunds, arguing that some of its gross receipts should be sitused outside Ohio because certain supporting services, such as laboratory and administrative functions, were performed outside the state.The Tax Commissioner denied TRC's refund claims, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed this decision. The Board determined that TRC's laboratory and administrative services were part of the healthcare services provided in Ohio. It concluded that the gross receipts from these services should be sitused to Ohio because the benefit of the services was received in Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Board of Tax Appeals' decision. The court held that under R.C. 5751.033(I), gross receipts from services should be sitused to the location where the purchaser receives the benefit of the service. Since TRC's dialysis services were provided entirely in Ohio, the gross receipts from these services were correctly sitused to Ohio. The court found no conflict between the statute and the administrative rule, which also emphasizes the location where the purchaser benefits from the service. Therefore, TRC's gross receipts for the relevant period should be sitused to Ohio, and the Board's decision was neither unreasonable nor unlawful. View "Total Renal Care, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law