Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

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Alameda County Waste Management Authority sought records from three out-of-county landfills (Waste Connections) that disposed of waste originating in Alameda County. The Integrated Waste Management Act, Public Resources Code sections 40000-49260, permits local government entities to inspect and copy specified records kept by landfills concerning waste received at such landfills originating in the government’s geographic jurisdiction “for the purposes of” verifying reports made by the landfills on “disposal tonnages by jurisdiction of origin” and “as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees.” Waste Connections refused to permit the inspections, contending that the Authority had not shown inspection of the records was “necessary” to enforce its fee ordinance. The Authority attached a copy of its fee ordinance and explained that the fee depends on where tonnage originated, the type and amount of waste, and the party responsible for transporting the waste to the landfill, facts that are documented in landfill weight tags of the kind the statute allows government entities to inspect.The superior court compelled Waste Connections to allow the inspection. The court of appeal affirmed. The “as necessary” language of section 41821.5(g)(2)'s inspection provision requires neither a factual showing nor a factual determination. View "Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc." on Justia Law

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Married since 1967, John and Frances Rogers filed joint federal income tax returns for many years. They underreported their tax obligations many times; the misreporting was the product of a fraudulent tax scheme designed by John, a Harvard‐trained tax attorney. The Seventh Circuit has affirmed the Tax Court’s rulings in favor of the IRS every time.Frances challenged two Tax Court decisions denying her “innocent spouse relief,” 26 U.S.C. 6015. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, having previously affirmed the denial of Frances’s request for innocent spouse relief for the 2004 tax year. The Tax Court took considerable care assessing Frances’s claims, denying them largely on the basis that she was aware of too many facts and too many warning signs during the relevant tax years to escape financial responsibility for the clear fraud perpetrated on the U.S. Treasury. The Tax Court applied the correct standard, with the possible exception of one factual error in its 2018 opinion regarding the couple’s lavish lifestyle but any error was harmless. Frances holds a master’s degree in biochemistry, a law degree, an M.B.A., and a doctorate in education. She assisted in managing her husband’s law firm while he sought treatment for alcoholism; she fired the office manager, maintained accounting records, endorsed and deposited checks, and paid expenses. View "Rogers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals ruling that an assessment that Mecklenburg County made of the business personal property owned by Harris Teeter, LLC at six grocery stores reflected the "true value" of that property, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-283, holding that none of Harris Teeter's challenges to the order of the North Carolina Property Tax Commission had merit.In rejecting Harris Teeter's challenge to the Commission's order, the court of appeals held that the Commission's findings had sufficient evidentiary support and that those findings had satisfied the County's obligation to prove that the methods it used in valuing Harris Teeter's property produced the true value of that property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the manner in which the Commission resolved the issues in this case had ample record support. View "In re Harris Teeter, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) upholding county appraisers' application of the Kansas Oil and Gas Appraisal Guide developed by the Kansas Department of Revenue's Property Valuation Division for valuations given for the 2016 tax year to the working interest of River Rock Energy Co. in 203 gas wells and related equipment, holding that the BOTA did not err.In its dispute, River Rock argued that the Guide produced inflated values for its working gas leases by capping operating expense allowances to arrived at a "working interest minimum lease value." The BOTA upheld the county appraisers' application of the Guide. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Guide overvalued River Rock's wells. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the county appraisers correctly applied the Guide; and (2) the court of appeals correctly decided that it had jurisdiction to entertain River Rock's challenge to BOTA's order refusing to abate filing fees. View "In re Tax Appeal of River Rock Energy Co." on Justia Law

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In this dispute between a municipality seeking tax setoffs and a county that refused to grant them, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion of the court of special appeals that Md. Code Tax-Prop. ** 6-305 and 6-306 do not fall within a category of constitutionally prohibited legislation, holding that the provisions are permissible within the scope of article XI-E, 1 of the Maryland Constitution.Ocean City, the second largest municipality in Worcester County, repeatedly requested tax setoffs for the money that the city spent on governmental services, such as fire, police, and ambulance services. In lieu of granting Ocean City's requested tax setoffs, Worcester County provided discretionary funding to the city in the form of annual grants. Ocean City then filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that TP 6-305 and 6-305, which granted the county the ability to deny municipal tax setoff requests, were unconstitutional as violating Md. Const. Art. XI-E, 1. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Worcester County. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that TP 6-305 and 6-306 are constitutional within the language of Article XI-E, Section 1. View "Ocean City v. Worcester County" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction in favor of BNSF in an action brought by BNSF, alleging that several California counties are taxing railroad property at a higher rate than the rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction, in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(3).As a preliminary matter, the panel held that the district court had jurisdiction over the action under section 11501(c), and the panel has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a). The panel concluded that the district court applied the correct preliminary injunction standard under section 11501, which does not require courts to consider traditional equitable factors. Rather, binding circuit precedent establishes that a railroad is entitled to a preliminary injunction if its evidence demonstrates reasonable cause to believe that a violation of section 11501 has been, or is about to be committed. The panel also concluded that the district court properly analyzed BNSF's tax rate under the Trailer Train framework, and concluded that the counties were overtaxing BNSF's property in violation of section 11501(b)(3). The court suggested, as proceedings continue, that the district court consider in the first instance whether the State or the county is the proper assessment jurisdiction. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tax Commission affirming the deficiency assessment imposed by the Nebraska Department of Revenue upon a Nebraska corporation, which purchased an interest in an airplane from a Kansas seller without paying Nebraska sales or use taxes, holding that there was no error.The Department issued a notice of deficiency determination to the corporation in the total amount of $161,373. The corporation appealed, claiming that no taxes were owed because the airplane purchase was a "sale for resale." The Tax Commission found that the purchase was not a sale for resale and affirmed the Department's deficiency assessment. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding that the corporation's airplane purchase did not qualify as a nontaxable sale for resale was supported by sufficient competent evidence and was not contrary to law. View "Big Blue Express v. Nebraska Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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The estate of Helene Evans, a deceased Oregon resident, challenged the Oregon Tax Court’s determination that the Department of Revenue lawfully included in Evans’s taxable Oregon estate the principal assets of a Montana trust, of which Evans had been the income beneficiary. Although Evans had a right to receive income generated by those assets during her lifetime and potentially had the right to tap the assets themselves, the estate claimed she had not owned, and did not have control over the assets. Under those circumstances, plaintiff argued, Oregon did not have the kind of connection to the trust assets that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required for a state to impose a tax on a person, property, or transaction. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Oregon’s imposition of its estate tax on the trust assets in this case comported with the requirements of due process. It, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. View "Estate of Evans v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

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Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Government and several individuals brought an original action to the Court of Appeals against the state of Michigan; the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget; and the Office of the Auditor General to enforce section 30 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, which prohibited the state from reducing its budget for total state spending paid to all units of local government, taken as a group, below that proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978–1979. Plaintiffs: (Count I) alleged the state violated section 30 by classifying as state spending paid to local government monies paid to school districts pursuant to Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, section 11; (Count II) alleged the same assertion as to monies paid to public school academies (PSAs) pursuant to Proposal A and MCL 380.501(1); (Count III) alleged the state improperly classified as section 30 state spending those funds paid to maintain trunk-line roads; and (Count IV) sought a determination that state funds directed to local governments for new state mandates could not be counted toward the proportion of state funds required by section 30. The Court of Appeal dismissed Count III without prejudice upon stipulation of the parties; all parties moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The appellate court granted the state defendants motion on Counts I and II; plaintiffs' motion was granted as to Count IV. Finally, the court granted plaintiffs mandamus relief and directed the state to comply with reporting requirements found in MCL 21.235(3) and MCL 21.241. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred when it held that PSAs were “school districts” as the term was used in the Headlee Amendment. Further, the Court held PSAs were themselves not a “political subdivision of the state” as voters would have understood the term when the Headlee Amendment was ratified. The Court thus reversed the conclusion reached in Part III(C) of the Court of Appeals opinion that PSAs were “school districts” and remanded to the Court of Appeals for its reconsideration of this issue. The Supreme Court vacated the panel’s grant of mandamus in Part III(E), and directed the Court of Appeals to provide further explanation of its decision to grant this extraordinary remedy. View "Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Govt. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

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Joseph Wilson, the sole owner and beneficiary of a foreign trust, filed his returns for tax year 2007 late, the IRS assessed a 35% penalty that applies to beneficiaries of foreign trusts, and Wilson paid the penalty. After his death, plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of Wilson's estate for a refund, arguing that the IRS should have imposed only a 5% penalty that applies to owners of foreign trusts. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that when an individual is both the sole owner and beneficiary of a foreign trust and fails to timely report distributions she received from the trust, the government has the authority under the Internal Revenue Code to impose a 35% penalty. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court denied motions for leave to file a supplemental appendix that includes documents outside the record on appeal and for leave to file a sur-reply brief as moot. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law