Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Several individuals who allegedly owed debts to Kentucky public institutions—either for medical services at the University of Kentucky or for educational services at the University of Kentucky, Morehead State University, or the Kentucky Community & Technical College System—challenged the referral of their debts to the Kentucky Department of Revenue for collection. The plaintiffs argued that the statutes used to justify these referrals did not apply to their debts and that the Department unlawfully collected the debts, sometimes without prior court judgments or adequate notice. The Department used its tax collection powers, including garnishments and liens, to recover these debts, and in some cases, added interest and collection fees.In the Franklin Circuit Court, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and monetary relief, including refunds of funds collected. The Circuit Court ruled that the Department was not authorized by statute to collect these debts and held that sovereign immunity did not protect the defendants from the plaintiffs’ claims. The court also certified the medical debt case as a class action. The Court of Appeals reviewed these interlocutory appeals and held that while sovereign immunity did not bar claims for purely declaratory relief, it did bar all claims for monetary relief, including those disguised as declaratory relief.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that sovereign immunity does not bar claims for purely declaratory relief or for a refund of funds that were never due to the state, nor does it bar constitutional takings claims. However, the court held that sovereign immunity does bar claims for a refund of funds that were actually due to the state, even if those funds were unlawfully or improperly collected. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings to determine which funds, if any, were never due to the state and thus subject to refund. The court also found that statutory changes rendered prospective declaratory relief in the medical debt case moot, but not retrospective relief. View "LONG V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

After Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, which capped the federal deduction for state and local taxes (SALT) at $10,000, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and the Village of Scarsdale created or planned programs allowing residents to make contributions to state-administered charitable funds in exchange for significant state or local tax credits. These programs were designed to help residents recover some of the lost federal tax benefit by allowing them to claim a federal charitable deduction for the full amount contributed, despite receiving a state or local tax credit in return. In response, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury Department issued a regulation (the “Final Rule”) requiring taxpayers to reduce their federal charitable deduction by the amount of any state or local tax credit received for the contribution.The States and Scarsdale sued the IRS and Treasury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing that the Final Rule exceeded the IRS’s statutory authority under 26 U.S.C. § 170 and was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding the IRS’s interpretation reasonable under Chevron deference and holding the rule was not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that New York and Scarsdale had Article III standing, and that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit because there was no alternative procedure for the plaintiffs to challenge the rule. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron, the Second Circuit independently interpreted § 170 and concluded that the IRS’s rule was consistent with the statute’s quid pro quo principle. The court also found the rule was not arbitrary or capricious. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "New Jersey v. Bessent" on Justia Law

A limited partnership operating a timber farm in Monroe County, Ohio, purchased a Mercedes-Benz Geländewagen in 2018 for use on its rugged, 1,100-acre property, which is primarily forested. The farm, with a history dating back to 1902, had transitioned from fruit and dairy to timber production. The vehicle was acquired to facilitate forest management activities, including traversing difficult terrain to apply chemicals and equipment for the removal of invasive species, inspect timber, and support sustainable harvesting practices. The farm had not reported timber sales or income since 2011, but had invested in forest management and hired consultants to implement long-term plans for sustainable timber production.The Ohio Tax Commissioner issued a use-tax assessment on the vehicle, finding that the farm was not actively engaged in the business of farming due to the absence of recent sales or income, and that the vehicle was not used directly or primarily in farming activities. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the assessment, concluding that the vehicle was used mainly for transportation around the property rather than for direct farming purposes, and that the farm had not demonstrated the vehicle’s primary use was for farming.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Board of Tax Appeals’ decision. The court held that the statutory exemption for use tax on items used in farming does not require “direct” use, and that the farm’s activities—including forest management and preparation for future timber sales—constituted engagement in the business of farming. The court found that the vehicle was used in farming and primarily for that purpose, based on uncontradicted testimony. The case was remanded for cancellation of the tax assessment. View "Claugus Family Farm, L.P. v. Harris" on Justia Law

A company constructed and operated a large interstate natural gas pipeline running through Ohio, which was completed in late 2018. The project’s actual construction costs significantly exceeded initial estimates due to unusually heavy rainfall causing delays and an environmental incident that led to regulatory actions and further delays. During construction, an investment firm acquired a substantial indirect ownership interest in the pipeline’s parent company, paying a price that implied a high valuation for the pipeline.For the 2019 tax year, the Ohio Tax Commissioner assessed the taxable value of the Ohio portion of the pipeline using a statutory cost-based method, resulting in a valuation that the company believed was excessive. The company challenged the assessment, arguing that the pipeline’s true value was much lower, citing alternative appraisal methods and the impact of construction delays and overruns. The Tax Commissioner rejected these arguments, maintaining that the statutory method produced the correct value.The company appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, where both parties presented expert appraisals. The company’s appraiser used a unit appraisal approach and arrived at a lower value, while the Tax Commissioner’s appraiser, using both cost and income approaches, opined a higher value. The Board found the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal more credible, especially in light of the investment firm’s transaction and the actual construction costs, and ordered the pipeline to be valued according to that appraisal.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the Board’s decision was reasonable and lawful. The court held that the Board has broad discretion in weighing competing appraisals and evidence, and that its adoption of the Tax Commissioner’s appraisal was supported by the record. The court affirmed the Board’s decision, upholding the higher valuation for tax purposes. View "Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Harris" on Justia Law

In this case, an individual provided the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with information about tax-avoidance schemes involving two corporations, based on his work at a foreign bank. The information included credit applications that indicated the bank had made loans, not factoring transactions, to the corporations, which was relevant to whether the companies could claim certain tax deductions. The IRS used this information to issue a summons to the bank, gather further evidence, and ultimately settle with both corporations for underpaid taxes. The whistleblower sought an award for his contribution under the statutory whistleblower program.The United States Tax Court reviewed the whistleblower’s appeal after the IRS Whistleblower Office denied his claim. The Tax Court granted summary judgment to the IRS, holding that the administrative record was sufficient and that the Whistleblower Office had not applied the wrong legal standard. The Tax Court also found that the whistleblower’s information did not substantially contribute to the IRS’s actions against the corporations, relying on the record as designated by the Whistleblower Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Tax Court erred by applying the correct legal standard itself, rather than remanding the case to the Whistleblower Office after finding that the Office had applied an incorrect, overly restrictive standard. The court also found that the Tax Court abused its discretion by refusing to supplement the administrative record with relevant documents that were omitted but material to the whistleblower’s claim. The case was remanded to the Whistleblower Office to apply the correct “substantial contribution” standard to a complete administrative record. View "Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

An American accountant and financial executive, who worked extensively in Russia, was investigated for failing to timely file U.S. tax returns and for concealing substantial assets in Swiss bank accounts. He received millions of dollars in compensation, which he deposited in Swiss accounts held under nominee names. After being notified by Swiss banks of compliance requirements, he transferred accounts and listed his then-wife as the beneficial owner. He did not file timely tax returns or required Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBARs) for several years, later attempting to participate in the IRS’s Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures by certifying his failures were non-willful. However, he omitted at least one account from his 2014 FBAR.A grand jury in the Middle District of Florida indicted him on multiple tax-related charges. At trial, the jury convicted him on four counts: failure to file income tax returns for 2013 and 2014, making false statements on his Streamlined certification, and failure to file a compliant 2014 FBAR. The district court sentenced him to 86 months’ imprisonment and ordered over $4 million in restitution to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in tolling the statute of limitations for the 2013 and 2014 failure-to-file tax return charges because the government’s application for tolling did not specifically identify those offenses, nor did the court make the required findings. As a result, the convictions on those counts were reversed as time-barred. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the email search, finding no abuse of discretion in deeming the motion untimely. The court also found no constructive amendment or material variance regarding the FBAR charge. The sentence and restitution order were vacated and remanded for resentencing and further findings on restitution. View "United States v. Gyetvay" on Justia Law

A couple divorced, and the superior court awarded them joint legal custody of their minor child, with primary physical custody to the mother. The court also divided the couple’s marital estate. The father, representing himself, appealed, arguing that the division of the marital estate was inequitable. He claimed errors in the court’s determinations, including not crediting him for post-separation payments, not allowing him to apply for the child’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), not allowing him to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, and its custody decision.The superior court held a one-day trial by videoconference, where both parties testified. The court issued a decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical custody to the mother. The court divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, taking into account the father’s child support arrearage and an escrow shortage. The court also divided the couple’s vehicles and assigned debts based on testimony and the mother’s spreadsheet. The court ordered that the mother would be responsible for the child’s PFD and could claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The court ordered that the father’s 401(k) be divided equitably according to the mother’s spreadsheet.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It vacated the superior court’s division of the marital estate, finding that the court’s treatment of the father’s 401(k) was unclear and lacked clarifying findings. It also found legal error in the court’s failure to address post-separation payments when dividing the marital estate. The court remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s decisions, including the custody award and the decisions regarding the child’s PFD and tax dependency. View "Wolffe v. Wolffe" on Justia Law

Kenin Edwards was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment for tax fraud after a series of procedural complications. Edwards, who was represented by four different attorneys throughout the process, delayed his trial multiple times before pleading guilty. After his guilty plea, he fired his final attorney, decided to represent himself, recanted his admission of guilt, sought to vacate his plea, and filed numerous frivolous motions. The government, which had initially agreed to recommend a five-month split sentence, sought a 21-month sentence due to Edwards's conduct.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois handled the case. Edwards's initial attorneys withdrew due to a breakdown in strategy, and his subsequent attorney was disqualified due to a conflict of interest. Edwards then retained a fourth attorney, with whom he eventually reached a plea agreement. However, Edwards later discharged this attorney as well and chose to represent himself. The district court conducted a Faretta hearing to ensure Edwards's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent. Despite Edwards's numerous pro se filings and attempts to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court denied his motions and sentenced him to 21 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Edwards argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the district court disqualified his attorney and allegedly forced him to proceed pro se at sentencing. He also claimed the government breached the plea agreement by recommending a higher sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Edwards's appeal, finding that he had waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement. The court held that Edwards's claims did not fall within the exceptions to the appeal waiver and that the government did not breach the plea agreement. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a radio talk show host and church founder, began selling bitcoin in 2014. The government investigated his bitcoin sales and charged him with conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, operation of an unlicensed money transmitting business, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, and tax evasion. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court acquitted him of the substantive money laundering count due to insufficient evidence but upheld the other convictions.The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should not have allowed the money-transmitting-business charges to proceed to trial, citing the "major questions doctrine" which he claimed should exempt virtual currencies like bitcoin from regulatory statutes. He also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support his tax evasion conviction and that he should be granted a new trial on the money laundering conspiracy count due to prejudicial evidentiary spillover. Additionally, he argued that his 96-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the defendant's major questions doctrine argument, holding that the statutory definition of "money transmitting business" under 31 U.S.C. § 5330 includes businesses dealing in virtual currencies like bitcoin. The court found that the plain meaning of "funds" encompasses virtual currencies and that the legislative history and subsequent congressional actions supported this interpretation.The court also found sufficient evidence to support the tax evasion conviction, noting that the defendant had substantial unreported income and engaged in conduct suggesting willful evasion of taxes. The court rejected the claim of prejudicial spillover, concluding that the evidence related to the money laundering conspiracy was admissible and relevant.Finally, the court upheld the 96-month sentence, finding it substantively reasonable given the defendant's conduct and the factors considered by the district court. The court affirmed the district court's rulings and the defendant's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Bank of America Corporation, after merging with Merrill Lynch in 2013, sought to recover interest on its pre-merger tax underpayments by netting them against pre-merger overpayments made by Merrill Lynch. The bank argued that the post-merger integration rendered it the "same taxpayer" as Merrill Lynch for purposes of the interest netting provision under 26 U.S.C. § 6621(d) of the Internal Revenue Code.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially held jurisdiction over all of the Bank's claims. However, the Federal Circuit determined that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over claims for overpayment interest exceeding $10,000, leading to the severance and transfer of those claims. The district court then addressed the remaining claims, granting partial summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the "same taxpayer" requirement applies at the time the payments were made, and since Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were distinct entities when the payments were made, the interest netting provision did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the interest netting provision under § 6621(d) requires that the same taxpayer must have made the underpayments and overpayments at the time they were made. Since Bank of America and Merrill Lynch were separate entities when the relevant payments were made, they could not be considered the "same taxpayer" for the purposes of interest netting. The court also rejected the Bank's arguments based on state merger law and legislative history, emphasizing that the statutory text was clear and did not support the Bank's interpretation. View "Bank of America Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law