Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petitions for redetermination of federal income tax deficiencies for a partnership. Appellants argue that their petition was timely because I.R.C. 6223(f) barred the Commissioner from issuing more than one notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) pertaining to a partnership's taxable year, and the FPAA issued by the Commissioner on March 6, 2018 was the only valid FPAA.The panel concluded that the FPAA issued on November 1, 2017, was the only valid FPAA, and therefore appellants' petition was untimely. Because the Commissioner sent the November 1, 2017 FPAAs addressed to SNJ's TMP to the address given by appellants, the tax court properly held that the November 2017 FPAAs were not invalid by reason of being improperly addressed. The panel stated that there is no evidence that any other information that the Commissioner had or should have had according to appellants was furnished to the Commissioner according to the applicable regulations. Even though the Commissioner may have had access to the other address information presented by appellants, the Commissioner was not required to use it. Because the August 1, 2017 letter is not a notification of the beginning of an administrative proceeding, the November 1, 2017 FPAAs did not violate I.R.C. 6223(d)(1). Furthermore, the FPAAs issued on November 1, 2017 were valid and the 2018 FPAAs were invalid. Because June 7, 2018 is more than 150 days after November 1, 2017, the tax court properly dismissed appellants' petition. Finally, the panel concluded that the filing deadline in I.R.C. 6226 is jurisdictional and, because the filing deadline is jurisdictional, equitable tolling is unavailable. View "SNJ Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit concluded on the merits that, under the Bankruptcy Code and the applicable state fraudulent transfer statutes, tax penalty obligations are not voidable, and relatedly, tax penalty payments are not recoverable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the trustee's claims seeking to void tax penalty obligations owed by the debtor to the IRS and to recover prior payments made by the debtor to the IRS upon such obligations.The court found the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Southeast Waffles, LLC, 702 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2012), persuasive and concluded that tax penalties do not fit within the obligations contemplated in the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. Because tax penalties are not obligations incurred as contemplated by the Act, it cannot be the "applicable law" required for the trustee to bring this action under 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). If there is no applicable law for the trustee's section 544(b)(1) claim, the court concluded that the claim must be dismissed. The court noted that its conclusion about the tax penalty payments turns on the legitimacy of the underlying tax penalty obligation; not the fact that the payments reduced the amount of the tax penalty obligations dollar for dollar. Since the underlying tax penalty obligation is not voidable, neither are Yahweh Center’s payments on that obligation. View "Cook v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Pinal County Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) and the Penal County Board of Supervisors (Board) acted unlawfully when they adopted a two-tiered retail transaction privilege tax (TPT) on tangible personal property as part of a transportation excise tax.At issue was (1) Pinal County's adoption of Proposition 416, a regional transportation plan, and Proposition 417, a transportation excise tax; and (2) a two-tiered TPT structure whereby the first $10,000 of any single item was taxed at one rate and any amount in excess was taxed at a rate of zero percent adopted as part of a transportation excise tax in Pinal County. The Supreme Court held (1) Pinal County complied with state law in adopting the transportation excise tax; but (2) the County's two-tiered retail transaction privilege tax was invalid. View "Vangilder v. Arizona Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

In Case No. S21A0899, Lynnette Riley, the former State Revenue Commissioner, appealed the partial grant of summary judgment in favor of petitioner Georgia Association of Club Executives (“GACE”), contending that the trial court erred by permanently enjoining the enforcement of OCGA 15-21-201(1)(B) – one of the definitions of “adult entertainment establishment” – based on the court’s ruling that the provision was unconstitutionally vague. In Case No. S21X0900, GACE cross-appealed, contending the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in Riley’s favor on the remaining claims of GACE’s petition, arguing that OCGA 15-21-209, by imposing an annual assessment on adult entertainment establishments, violated constitutional due process and free speech protections. Although these appeals presented challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes, the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the merits of the appellant’s or the cross-appellant’s claims of error. Instead, the Court vacated the trial court’s summary judgment order and subsequent final judgment because the Court determined GACE’s action against Riley was moot when the trial court ruled. "Because Riley was no longer Revenue Commissioner at the time the trial court entered its summary judgment order and subsequent final judgment, an injunction against her in her individual capacity could not give GACE the relief it seeks. ... A court may not address the constitutionality of the tax at issue absent the presence of a proper defendant in the action." View "Riley v. Georgia Assn. of Club Executives., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2002-2004, Mohamad was an Atek shareholder with no direct role in its operations. Mohamad timely 2002 and 2003 tax returns, paying the taxes due on shareholder income of $85,010 and $77,813 respectively. In 2007, Mohamad sought a refund for overpaid taxes, claiming he did not receive the full amount of reported shareholder income on which he paid taxes but received only $20,000 before Atek was shut down. He filed amended tax returns deducting the unpaid income as bad debt. The IRS maintains that it never received an amended tax return for 2003 and, consequently, there is no record of the IRS disallowing the 2003 refund claim. In 2018, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the 2002 and 2004 refund claims but vacated the dismissal of the 2003 claim and remanded to the Claims Court the questions: whether Mohamad filed a timely 2003 claim, and, if so, whether it was timely, and whether the IRS disallowed that claim.The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s holding that IRC 7502, as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 301.7502–1(e)(2)(i), displaced the common-law mailbox rule for determining IRS filing dates and, alternatively, that dismissal was appropriate for failure to show that the tax refund claim was filed within the three-year limitations period, IRC 6511. The issue was not “business debt” so Mohamad was not entitled to a seven-year limitations period. View "Taha v. United States" on Justia Law

The Town of Sheldon appealed a hearing officer’s valuation of the subject property, a hydroelectric generating facility, as of April 1, 2019. It challenged the hearing officer’s application of the Income Approach to determine the property’s fair market value and his rejection of the Town’s Direct Sale Comparison approach. The Town essentially argued that the hearing officer’s findings were insufficient to support his conclusions. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the valuation. View "Missisquoi Assoc. Hydro c/o Enel Green Power v. Town of Sheldon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Brown County's sales and use tax ordinance was consistent with Wis. Stat. 77.70 and therefore lawful and that there was no error in the proceedings below.Brown County Taxpayers Association (BCTA) argued that Brown County's sales and use tax was invalid because it did not dollar-for-dollar directly reduce the County's property tax levy, in violation of section 77.70, but instead was impermissibly used to fund new capital projects. The circuit court granted Brown County's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in section 77.70 requires the dollar-for-dollar offset sought by BCTA; and (2) because the Brown County sales and use tax ordinance does, in fact, directly reduce the property tax levy, the ordinance is permissible. View "Brown County v. Brown County Taxpayers Ass'n" on Justia Law

Property owners (Appellants) paid nearly $12 million in transfer taxes, penalties, and interest based on a 2014 merger that changed their parent companies. Both before and after the merger, Appellants directly owned two properties; only indirect ownership changed. They sought a refund of the sums paid under the San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations Code (SFBTRC).The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting arguments that the tax exceeded San Francisco's authority under Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911 because it uses a higher tax rate and an expanded tax base. San Francisco, as a charter city and a “city and county,” is not bound by the limitations of section 11911. The purported failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements does not entitle Appellants to a refund. At the time of the merger, SFBTRC was triggered as to Appellants’ real property by the transfer of ownership interests in Appellants’ parent entity, consistent with Revenue and Taxation Code section 64(c)(1). SFBTRC 1108 applied due to the termination of Appellants’ parent, a partnership. Appellants are not entitled to a refund based on their argument that San Francisco assessed the wrong entities View "CIM Urban REIT 211 Main Street (SF), L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

IRS Notice 2007-83, entitled “Abusive Trust Arrangements Utilizing Cash Value Life Insurance Policies Purportedly to Provide Welfare Benefits” designates certain employee-benefit plans featuring cash-value life insurance policies as listed “tax avoidance" transactions. A cash-value life insurance policy combines life insurance coverage with a cash-value investment account. The IRS believes these transactions run the risk of allowing small business owners to receive cash and other property from the business “on a tax-favored basis.” The regulation requires reporting of transactions involving cash-value life insurance policies connected to employee-benefit plans.Taxpayers claimed that the IRS skipped the notice-and-comment process before promulgating this legislative rule as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551, 553–59, 701–06. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and found the regulation invalid. The Notice was a “legislative rule,” with the “force and effect of law,” not a policy statement or interpretation. Congress did not expressly exempt the IRS from the APA’s requirements. View "Mann Construction, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in a tax refund action in which they sought to deduct mortgage interest that their lender received at the short sale of taxpayer's home. The panel held that, on the facts as pleaded, plaintiffs are entitled to deduct the mortgage interest paid in connection with the short sale of their home in 2011. In this case, the district court erred in applying Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), to the very different circumstances presented here. The panel also rejected the IRS's alternative argument that I.R.C. 265(a)(1) precludes plaintiffs' home mortgage interest deduction.Under the settled rules for a short sale involving the extinguishment of nonrecourse debt, the panel stated that the Tufts approach applies, and plaintiffs were entitled to take the corresponding mortgage interest deduction for the interest paid and received at the short sale. The panel explained that the fact that, during an earlier bankruptcy, plaintiffs' mortgage had been converted, through their bankruptcy discharge, from recourse to nonrecourse, provides no basis for declining to apply those rules. View "Milkovich v. United States" on Justia Law