Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the tax court's decision granting summary judgment to taxpayer, holding that 26 U.S.C. 6751(b) requires written supervisory approval before the assessment of the penalty or, if earlier, before the relevant supervisor loses discretion whether to approve the penalty assessment. In this case, because the supervisor gave written approval of the initial penalty determination before the penalty was assessed and while she had discretion to withhold approval, the IRS satisfied 6751(b)(1). View "Laidlaw's Harley Davison Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit held that 26 U.S.C. 4611(b) imposes a tax on exports in violation of the Export Clause. In this case, the United States contends that Trafigura must pay a tax on domestic crude oil that it exports from the United States. Applying Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1876), and United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998), the court first considered whether the charge under section 4611(b) is based on the quantity or value of the exported oil—if so, then it is more likely a tax. Then the court considered the connection between the Fund’s services to exporters, if any, and what exporters pay for those services under section 4611(b). Finally, the court applied heightened scrutiny and strictly enforced the Export Clause's ban on taxes by guarding against the imposition of a tax under the pretext of fixing a fee.The court affirmed the district court's judgment and concluded that the United States may not enforce section 4611(b) on crude oil "exported from the United States." The court stated that Congress has crafted a scheme in which crude oil exporters are forced to subsidize activities that are not "services used or usable by the exporter." Section 4611(b) saddles exporters with the cost of anti-pollution measures that generally benefit society at large, and not specifically the exporter who pays the charge. View "Trafigura Trading LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

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On February 15, 2018, GAN filed a petition for a tax deed to acquire property it purchased at Cook County’s 2016 annual tax sale for the tax year 2014. On April 24, 2018, GAN assigned its interest in the property to Blossom63. On May 6, 2018, Longmeadow, the owner of the property, transferred its interest in the property to Devonshire. On May 17, Devonshire sought to intervene in the tax deed proceedings and moved to vacate Blossom63’s tax deed on the ground Blossom63 failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of the Property Tax Code, 35 ILCS 200/22-5.On May 18, the circuit court granted the petition for a tax deed. The county clerk issued Blossom63 a tax deed. On June 19, 2019, the circuit court granted Devonshire’s motion to vacate the order issuing a tax deed to Blossom63. The appellate court reversed, finding Blossom63’s notice strictly complied with the Tax Code. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Blossom63 strictly complied with section 22-5 by listing the delinquent tax year for which the sale was held without listing the additional delinquent tax years for which it paid taxes to complete the sale. View "In re Application of the County Collector" on Justia Law

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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of partial summary judgment in an action brought by Vitol against the United States, seeking an $8.8 million tax refund. The court concluded that the plain language of the statute, taken in context, excludes butane from the definition of a liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) under 26 U.S.C. 6426(d)(2).In this case, the court applied the standard tools of statutory interpretation in their proper order, and the court need not consider legislative history or abstract congressional purpose. The court explained that, although the common meaning of LPG includes butane, section 6426(d)(2) is a subsidiary part of a broader statutory framework that treats a given fuel as either a taxable fuel or an alternative fuel, but not both. Therefore, the statutory context of section 6426 provides sound reason to depart from butane's common meaning. Furthermore, section 4083 defines butane as a taxable fuel for purposes of the excise tax imposed at section 4081. The court reasoned that, if butane is a taxable fuel, it cannot be an alternative fuel and thus it is not an LPG under section 6426(d)(2). View "Vitol, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Under the “individual mandate” within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, non-exempt individuals must either maintain a minimum level of health insurance or pay a “penalty,” 26 U.S.C. 5000A, the “shared responsibility payment” (SRP). The McPhersons did not maintain health insurance for part of 2017, and Juntoff did not maintain health insurance in any month in 2018. They did not pay their SRP obligations. In each of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, the IRS filed proofs of claim and sought priority treatment as an “excise/income tax”: for Juntoff, $1,042.39, and for the McPhersons, $1,564.The bankruptcy court confirmed their plans, declining to give the IRS claims priority as a tax measured by income. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed. DIstinguishing the Sebelius decision in which the Supreme Court determined that the SRP constituted a “penalty” for purposes of an Anti-Injunction Act analysis and a “tax” under a constitutionality analysis, the Panel concluded that the SRP is not a penalty but a tax measured by income. It is “calculated as a percentage of household income, subject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.” View "In re: Juntoff" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Continental Resources in this quiet title action against Kevin and Terry Fair, holding that the district court did not err in granting Continental's summary judgment motion to quiet title.At issue on appeal was the constitutionality of the statute that authorize the process allowing the county in which a property is located to sell a tax certificate for the property to a private party if the property owner fails to pay property taxes. If the owner fails to pay the taxes owed after a period of time and the tax certificate purchaser complies with certain requirements, the purchaser can obtain a deed to the property free of encumbrances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nebraska's tax certificate sale statutes are not unconstitutional in the manner assigned by Fair. View "Continental Resources v. Fair" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upholding the tax commissioners denial of Appellant's claim for a sales tax refund, holding that the BTA erred in part.Appellant Cincinnati Federal Savings & Loan Co. filed a refund claim seeking recovery of $57,412.58, claiming that it purchased nontaxable accounting services or, alternatively, nonntaxable customized software. The tax commissioner denied the claim. The BTA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the BTA's decision, holding (1) with respect to the customization of software, the BTA erred by failing to apply the true-object test to the charges at issue; and (2) Appellant's remaining propositions of law were without merit. View "Cincinnati Federal Savings & Loan Co. v. McClain" on Justia Law

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Under 26 U.S.C. 170(h), taxpayers who donate an easement to a land conservation organization may be eligible to claim a charitable deduction on their federal income tax returns if the easement’s conservation purpose is guaranteed to extend in perpetuity. A Department of Treasury rule, 26 C.F.R. 1.170A-14(g)(6), provides that if unforeseen changes to the surrounding land make it “impossible or impractical” for an easement to fulfill its conservation purpose; the conservation purpose may still be protected in perpetuity “if the restrictions are extinguished by judicial proceeding and all of the donee’s proceeds . . . from a subsequent sale or exchange of the property are used by the donee” to further the original conservation purpose. Proceeds are calculated by a formula in 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), the “proceeds regulation.”After the IRS denied its charitable deduction, Oakbrook challenged the proceeds regulation, arguing that, in promulgating this rule, Treasury violated the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act; that Treasury’s interpretation of section 170(h) is unreasonable; and that the proceeds regulation is arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in rejecting those arguments. Oakbrook’s deed to the conservation trust violated the proceeds regulation by ascribing a fixed rather than proportionate value upon judicial extinguishment, and by subtracting from this amount any post-donation improvements that Oakbrook made to the land. View "Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the tax court ruling on certain motions filed by Taxpayer and rejecting Taxpayer's statutory claim that its property was unequally assessed, holding that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the motions, and Taxpayer failed to present evidence to support the unequal assessment claim.On appeal, Taxpayer challenged the tax court's denial of its motion to compel Washington County to produce information about other similar properties, its motion to amend the pleadings to add unequal assessment and disparate treatment claims, and its motion to compel the county assessor to testify. Taxpayer further appealed the tax court's rejection of Taxpayer's unequal assessment claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court's denial of Taxpayer's motions was not an abuse of discretion; and (2) the tax court did not err in rejecting the unequal assessment claim. View "Chambers Self-Storage Oakdale, LLC v. County of Washington" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petitions for redetermination of federal income tax deficiencies for a partnership. Appellants argue that their petition was timely because I.R.C. 6223(f) barred the Commissioner from issuing more than one notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) pertaining to a partnership's taxable year, and the FPAA issued by the Commissioner on March 6, 2018 was the only valid FPAA.The panel concluded that the FPAA issued on November 1, 2017, was the only valid FPAA, and therefore appellants' petition was untimely. Because the Commissioner sent the November 1, 2017 FPAAs addressed to SNJ's TMP to the address given by appellants, the tax court properly held that the November 2017 FPAAs were not invalid by reason of being improperly addressed. The panel stated that there is no evidence that any other information that the Commissioner had or should have had according to appellants was furnished to the Commissioner according to the applicable regulations. Even though the Commissioner may have had access to the other address information presented by appellants, the Commissioner was not required to use it. Because the August 1, 2017 letter is not a notification of the beginning of an administrative proceeding, the November 1, 2017 FPAAs did not violate I.R.C. 6223(d)(1). Furthermore, the FPAAs issued on November 1, 2017 were valid and the 2018 FPAAs were invalid. Because June 7, 2018 is more than 150 days after November 1, 2017, the tax court properly dismissed appellants' petition. Finally, the panel concluded that the filing deadline in I.R.C. 6226 is jurisdictional and, because the filing deadline is jurisdictional, equitable tolling is unavailable. View "SNJ Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law