Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Division purchased two office buildings from the city that included a short-term leaseback at below-market rent. Division alleged that the assessor failed to take the leaseback into account when valuing the buildings for property tax purposes and claims this violated Revenue and Taxation Code section 402.1. After failing to persuade the City’s Assessment Appeals Board, Division filed suit. The trial court dismissed, holding that the lease did not constitute an “enforceable restriction” under section 402.1.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that Division paid $53 million, a price discounted to reflect the leaseback. While a purchase price may play a significant role in the reassessment of property upon its sale, that price is only the beginning of the inquiry; one factor that may skew the purchase price and make it an unreliable indicator of fair market value is an agreement containing restrictions on the buyer’s use of the property. Such restrictions do not bind the assessor. Government-imposed land use restrictions must be taken into account when a property is valued for assessment purposes but under section 402.1 “enforceable restrictions” are land use restrictions imposed by the government under its police power, not restrictions agreed to by a public entity selling property to a private buyer in an ordinary arm’s-length transaction. View "290 Division (EAT), LLC v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the business court concluding that the sales of printed materials produced by Petitioner, which was based in Wisconsin, out of state and shipped to its North Carolina customers and their designees lacked a sufficient nexus to North Carolina for the imposition of state sales tax, holding that the business court erred.At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), remained controlling precedent or if subsequent Supreme Court decisions provided an alternative method for determining the constitutionality of North Carolina's sales tax regime. The Supreme Court held (1) the formalism doctrine established in Dilworth did not survive the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) and South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) so as to render the sales tax regime of North Carolina in violation of the Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause; and (2) North Carolina's imposition of sales tax on the transactions at issue was constitutional under Complete Auto. View "Quad Graphics, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Taxpayers, who did not dispute that they had in fact been paid substantial wages in tax years 2016-18, contended at Tax Court that they owed no Oregon income tax for those years. The Tax Court concluded their arguments in support of that contention were frivolous and therefore warranted a penalty under ORS 305.437. Accordingly, the court ordered taxpayers to pay the Department of Revenue (department) a penalty of$4,000. Taxpayers appealed, challenging only the penalty award. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment. View "Jimenez v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court concluding that with Century Aluminum of Kentucky, GP's interpretation of the statutes which categorize tangible personal property as either tax-exempt "supplies" or taxable "repair, replacement, or spare parts" was incorrect, holding that that the Kentucky Claims Commission's final order was supported by substantial evidence.In the proceedings below, the Commission agreed with Century's interpretation of the relevant statutes and rejected the interpretation of the Department of Revenue. The circuit court and court of appeals reversed, agreeing with the Department's interpretation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a tax-exempt "supply" is consumed within the manufacturing process and has a useful life of less than one year; (2) a taxable "repair, replacement, or spare part" does not necessarily have a known, limited useful life; and (3) the Commission's final order in this case was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Century Aluminum of Ky., GP v. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the Tax Commissioner's conclusion that Taxpayers failed to prove that they abandoned their domicile in Florida, holding that competent evidence supported the district court's factual findings and that its decision conformed to the law.The audit period in this case covered the calendar-year tax years from 2010 to 2014. Taxpayers, who filed income tax returns as married filing jointly, filed Nebraska income tax returns claiming status as nonresidents of Nebraska. The Department sent Taxpayers notices of proposed deficiency determinations for each tax year of the audit period, and the Commissioner denied Taxpayers' petitions for redetermination. The district court affirmed, determining that Taxpayers were residents of Nebraska during the audit period because they were domiciled in Nebraska in each of those years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's decision conformed to the law, was supported by competent evidence, and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. View "Acklie v. Neb. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Montana Department of Revenue (MDOR) denying Appellant's petition to adopt a proposed administrative rule construing Mont. Code Ann. 15-30-2605(3), holding that the MDOR correctly construed sections 15-30-2605(1) and (3) and did not capriciously, arbitrarily, or unlawfully preliminarily deny Appellant's petition for adoption of a proposed rule interpreting the section 15-30-2605(3).At issue were internal MDOR reviews initiated by clients of Appellant, a certified public accountant, regarding 2021 MDOR adjustment notices regarding their 2017 income tax returns. Appellant argued that the noticed MDOR adjustments were untimely beyond the three-year deadline set forth in section 15-30-2605(3) and petitioned MDOR to adopt a rule to clarify section 15-30-2605 based on his contrary interpretation of section 15-30-2605(3). MDOR denied the petition, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that MDOR's construction of section 15-30-2605(3) was correct and that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the denial of his rulemaking petition was arbitrary, capricious, or based on an erroneous conclusion of law. View "Wangerin v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the ruling of the bankruptcy court that the tax liabilities relevant to this appeal had not been discharged, holding that, under the subjective version of the so-called "Beard test," Appellant never filed "returns" for the tax years at issue.The IRS assessed tax believed to be due from Appellant, including penalties and interest, for tax year 1997 in the amount of $30,568 and tax year 2000 in the amount of $46,344. Appellant did not pay the overdue taxes and later filed a chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy. In 2017, Appellant received a discharge. At issue was whether Appellant's discharge covered his debts to the IRS. The bankruptcy court concluded that the tax liabilities at issue had not been discharged. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, applying the Beard test that Appellant urged the bankruptcy court to adopt, Appellant's filings did not represent "an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the Federal income tax law." View "Kriss v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court denying the City of Milwaukee's motion to dismiss this action brought by Saint John's Communities for recovery of unlawful taxes under Wis. Stat. 74.35, holding that Saint John's claim was procedurally deficient because Saint John did not pay the tax before filing its claim.Saint John's argued on appeal that section 74.35 contained no requirement that, prior to filing a claim for recovery of unlawful taxes against the City, taxpayers first pay the challenged tax. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of section 74.35 required Saint John's first to pay the challenged tax or any authorized installment payment prior to filing a claim; and (2) the circuit court erred in denying the City's motion to dismiss Saint John's section 74.35 claim because it was procedurally deficient. View "Saint John's Communities, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirming a final assessment imposed by the tax commissioner determining that NASCAR owed taxes, interest, and penalties in the amount of $549,520, holding that the bulk of the tax assessment was unlawful.The Ohio Department of Taxation conducted an audit and determining that NASCAR had improperly failed to pay Ohio's commercial-activity tax (CAT), Ohio Rev. Code 5751.91 et seq., from 2005 to 2010 and owed Ohio more than in back taxes and penalties. The BTA affirmed the assessment, determining that for the four revenue streams under review - broadcast, media, licensing, and sponsorship - the receipts were properly situated to Ohio. NASCAR appealed, arguing that its broadcast revenue, media revenue, licensing revenue, and sponsorship revenue were not subject to the CAT. The Supreme Court reversed the tax assessment as to NASCAR's broadcast revenue, media revenue, licensing fees, and sponsorship fees, holding (1) the broadcast revenue was not based on the right to use NASCAR's property in Ohio; and (2) the media revenue, licensing fees, and sponsorship fees situated to Ohio were not "based on the right to use" NASCAR's property in Ohio. View "NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. McClain" on Justia Law

The Fox and Puchlak filed purported class actions, alleging that Michigan counties seized property to satisfy property-tax delinquencies, sold the properties, and kept the difference between the sales proceeds and the tax debts.. The suits assert that the counties committed takings without just compensation or imposed excessive fines in violation of the Michigan and federal constitutions. Genesee County’s insurance, through Safety, precludes coverage for claims “[a]rising out of . . . [t]ax collection, or the improper administration of taxes or loss that reflects any tax obligation” and claims “[a]rising out of eminent domain, condemnation, inverse condemnation, temporary or permanent taking, adverse possession, or dedication by adverse use.”Safety sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend or to indemnify. The district court entered summary judgment, finding no Article III case or controversy between Safety and Fox and Puchlak. The court also held that Safety owes Genesee County no duty to defend. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Safety lacks standing to sue Fox and Puchlak over its duty to defend and its claim for the duty to indemnify lacks ripeness. Safety owes no duty to defend; the alleged tax-collection process directly caused the injuries underlying each of Fox’s and Puchlak’s claims. View "Safety Specialty Insurance Co. v. Genesee County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law