Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

DirecTV and Dish Network (“Defendants”) provide video services in part through the Internet. The City of Creve Coeur filed this class action in Missouri state court on behalf of local government authorities, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable under the Video Services Providers Act (“VSPA”) and implementing local ordinances, plus injunctive relief, an accounting of unpaid fees, and damages. Defendants removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the state court entered an interlocutory order declaring that VSPA payments are fees, rather than taxes, DirecTV filed a second notice of removal, arguing this order established the required federal jurisdiction. The district court granted Creve Coeur’s motion to remand.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The court explained that the district court’s remand order plainly stated that the remand was based on comity principles as articulated in Levin, not on “state-tax based comity concerns.” Comity as a basis to remand was raised and fully argued in the first remand proceeding. Federal courts have long precluded two bites at this apple. Second, the Supreme Court in Levin emphatically stated that the century-old comity doctrine is not limited to the state-tax-interference concerns that later led Congress to enact the TIA. Third, the state court’s December 2020 Order addressed, preliminarily, only the VSPA fee-or-tax issue under state law. It did not address the broader considerations comity addresses. The state court order in no way overruled or undermined the basis for the district court’s first remand order. Therefore, DirecTV failed to establish the essential basis for a second removal. View "City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner made an offer in compromise (OIC) to settle his outstanding tax liability. Under the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act (TIPRA), Petitioner submitted a payment of twenty percent of the value of his OIC, acknowledging that this TIPRA payment would not be refunded if the OIC was not accepted. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not accept the OIC because the Commissioner concluded that ongoing audits of Petitioner's businesses made the overall amount of his tax liability uncertain. Petitioner then sought a refund of his TIPRA payment.   In a previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Internal Revenue Service did not abuse its discretion by returning the OIC, but vacated the Tax Court’s determination that the IRS had not abused its discretion in refusing to return the TIPRA payment. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the Tax Court to consider its refund jurisdiction in the first instance. On remand, the Tax Court held that it did not have jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision because there is no specific statutory grant conferring jurisdiction to refund TIPRA payments. The panel explained that, as the Tax Court correctly noted, it is a court of limited jurisdiction, specifically granted by statute, with no authority to expand upon that statutory grant. View "MICHAEL BROWN V. CIR" on Justia Law

Mississippi Hub, LLC ("MS HUB") operated an underground natural gas storage facility mostly located in Simpson County. In 2007, MS HUB and Simpson County entered into a fee-in-lieu agreement regarding ad valorem taxes on the first phase of the facility. It was agreed that, in exchange for locating the facility in Simpson County, for ten years MS HUB would pay a third of what its taxes would have otherwise been. It was also agreed that the facility was industrial personal property for taxation purposes, that the value of the property would be determined in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 27-35-50 (Supp. 2021), and that economic obsolescence would be considered by the tax assessor at the request of the company. In 2017, MS HUB contacted the Simpson County Tax Assessor regarding market changes in the natural gas storage industry and how those changes affected the value of the MS HUB facility. The assessor ultimately concluded that a reduction of 20 percent for economic obsolescence should be applied for the 2019 tax year. The Simpson County Board of Supervisors, however, assessed the property at $56,527,560—which would correspond to a true value of $376,850,400, the assessed true value without the adjustment for economic obsolescence. MS HUB objected to the assessment at the board’s August 5, 2019 equalization meeting. The board dismissed the objections made by MS HUB without giving a written explanation. MS HUB thereafter filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment and, in the alternative, Petition for Appeal from Determination of Ad Valorem Tax Assessment.” Simpson County and its tax assessor, Charles Baldwin, were named as defendants. Simpson County argued that the appeal by MS HUB was untimely and its expert based his opinion on the wrong approach to valuation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, finding there were no grounds upon which summary judgment should have been granted. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Hub, LLC v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

When the ACA’s mandate and SRP were still in effect, a husband and wife (“Taxpayers”) did not maintain the minimum insurance coverage required by the ACA. The taxpayers did not include their $2409 SRP when they filed their 2018 federal tax return. The Taxpayers filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The IRS filed a proof of claim for the unpaid SRP and asserted that its claim was entitled to priority as an income or excise tax under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Taxpayers objected to the government’s claim of priority. The bankruptcy court granted the objection, concluding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the SRP is a penalty, not a tax, and therefore is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(8). The government appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that even if the SRP was generally a tax, it did not qualify as a tax measured by income or an excise tax and thus was not entitled to priority. The government thereafter appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that that the SRP qualifies as a tax under the functional approach that has consistently been applied in bankruptcy cases and that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB requires the court to abandon that functional approach. Because the SRP is a tax that is measured by income, the government’s claim is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(8)(A). View "US v. Fabio Alicea" on Justia Law

Amazon fulfills orders for products sold by third-party merchants through a program it calls “Fulfillment by Amazon” (FBA). According to the First Amended Complaint (FAC), the state agency responsible for collecting sales and use tax is the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (DTFA) has historically not collected from Amazon sales and use taxes for products sold through the FBA program.   Plaintiff filed a taxpayer action under section 526a seeking a declaration that the DTFA “has a mandatory duty to assess and collect” sales and use tax specifically from Amazon for products sold through the FBA program. The DTFA and its Director and the Amazon entities that Plaintiff named in his FAC as Real Parties in Interest all demurred to the FAC. The trial court sustained Respondents’ demurrers without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining Respondents’ demurrers. The court explained that no statute or regulation conclusively establishes that the DTFA must pursue Amazon for sales and use taxes related to FBA transactions. The language of Revenue and Taxation Code section 6015, subdivision (a) makes it clear that there may be multiple “persons” who the DTFA may regard as “retailers” for the purposes of a single transaction. The statutory framework of the Sales and Use Tax Law and the statutes vesting the DTFA with authority to administer that statutory framework led the court to conclude that whether a taxpayer is a retailer for purposes of the Sales and Use Tax Law is a discretionary determination and not a ministerial task. View "Grosz v. Cal. Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration" on Justia Law

In three related actions, privately held public utilities sued for property tax refunds for fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, following the County’s denial of refund claims submitted under Revenue and Taxation Code section 5097. Section 100(b) establishes formulas for calculating the debt-service component of certain property taxes. Pursuant to that statute, Santa Clara County imposed taxes on the utilities’ properties at rates higher than those imposed on non-utility properties. Although section 100(b) was enacted in 1986, the utilities argued that imposition of a higher debt-service tax rate on their property, under the statutory formulas, violated California Constitution article XIII, section 19, which provides that the state-assessed property of certain regulated utility companies “shall be subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.”The trial court denied motions to dismiss, holding that the County had not carried its burden of establishing that the utilities cannot state a claim. The court of appeal reversed. Article XIII, section 19, does not mandate that utility property be taxed at the same rate as other property. Instead, it provides that, after utility property is assessed by the State Board of Equalization, it shall be subject to ad valorem taxation at its full market value by local jurisdictions. View "County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County" on Justia Law

The Oregon Department of Revenue assessed taxpayers $5,595 for deficient taxes, plus additional penalties and interest, for tax year 2013. Taxpayers first appealed that determination to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court. While the case was pending there, the parties jointly moved to hold the proceedings in abeyance pending the outcome of an Internal Revenue Service audit reconsideration. The parties also entered into an agreement extending the limitation period for the department to make “any adjustment necessary to arrive at the correct amount of Oregon taxable income and Oregon tax liability.” The limitation period expired April 30, 2019, and no new or modified assessment was sent. After the Magistrate Division proceedings were reinstated, taxpayers contended that the extension agreement voided the original assessment, and so the absence of a new assessment meant the court should grant summary judgment in their favor. The department countered that the original assessment remained valid and in effect. The magistrate agreed with the department and denied taxpayers’ motion, and later denied taxpayers’ two motions for reconsideration. After taxpayers repeatedly refused to comply with the department’s request for production of documents, the department moved to dismiss. The magistrate granted that motion, and taxpayers appealed that decision by filing a complaint with the Tax Court Regular Division. Taxpayers’ complaint sought relief from the 2013 assessment of deficient income taxes, and included a motion by taxpayers to stay the statutory requirement to pay the deficiency, together with an affidavit regarding their finances to support their claim that payment would impose an undue hardship. The Tax Court ultimately dismissed taxpayers' appeal for failing to either pay the assessed income tax or show that doing so would constitute an undue hardship. Finding no error in that judgment, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed dismissal. View "Picker v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relators' petition for a writ of mandamus and their accompanying motion for temporary relief against the Comptroller, holding that Relators failed to establish that they were entitled to relief.At issue were Relators timely applications for participation in the Texas Economic Development Act, which allows allows school districts to offer ten years of considerable property-tax incentives. Under Tex. Tax Code 313.007, access to the statutory program expires on December 31, 2022. The Comptroller asserted that the a lack of available resources meant that December 31 would pass before he could complete the necessary evaluation for Relators' applications. Relators sought temporary and mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Relators did not have a judicially-enforceable right to compel the Comptroller to act on their applications or to extend the statutory deadline to account for the processing delays. View "In re Stetson Renewable Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court granting the City of Austin's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing this case brought by Plaintiff alleging that the City provided taxpayer money to abortion-assistance organizations in violation of Texas law, holding that the case must be remanded.The trial court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction without explaining its reasons and dismissed with prejudice Petitioner's claim that the City's budget violated Texas law and dismissed with prejudice Petitioner's claim that the City's 2019 budget violated the Gift Clause. The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Roe to conclude that Petitioner's claim could not proceed. Petitioner petitioned for review. After briefing was complete, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review without regard to the merits and vacated the judgments below, holding that, because Dobbs overruled Roe, remand was required for consideration of the effect this change in the law and any intervening factual developments on Petitioner's claims. View "Zimmerman v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that International Paper Co. had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the County of Isle of Wight's tax scheme violated the requirement of the Virginia Constitution that taxation be uniform, holding that the circuit court did not err.In 2017, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution authorizing an "economic development retention grant program" that would benefit certain taxpayers. International Paper filed a refund action alleging that the County's tax and retention grant scheme violated the uniformity requirement of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of International Paper, concluding that the County's tax scheme created an unconstitutional non-uniform tax. View "County of Isle of Wight v. International Paper Co." on Justia Law