Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the tax appeals commission concluding that the sales tax exemption in Wisconsin Act 185, which expanded an existing sales tax exemption to include the sale of aircraft parts or maintenance, did not apply to Lessees' payments for aircraft repairs and engine maintenance, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Citation Partners, LLC owned an aircraft that it leased to Lessees. Citation Partners charged per-flight-hour rates for aircraft repairs and maintenance as part of the total amount Lessees paid to lease the aircraft, which rates corresponded to the amount Citation Partners spent on repairs and maintenance. Citation Partners argued that this portion of the lease payment was tax exempt because it was a sale of aircraft parts or maintenance. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the court of appeals correctly found that the payments were not exempt from sales tax under the plain language of the statutes. View "Citation Partners, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. persons with financial interests in foreign accounts to file an “FBAR” annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts; 31 U.S.C. 5314 delineates legal duties while section 5321 outlines the penalties, with a maximum $10,000 penalty for non-willful violations. Bittner—a dual citizen of Romania and the U.S.—learned of his reporting obligations in 2011 and subsequently submitted reports covering 2007-2011. The government deemed Bittner’s late reports deficient because they did not address all accounts as to which Bittner had either signatory authority or a qualifying interest. Bittner filed corrected FBARs providing information for 61 accounts in 2007, 51 in 2008, 53 in 2009 and 2010, and 54 in 2011. The government asserted that non-willful penalties apply to each account not accurately or timely reported. Bittner’s reports collectively involved 272 accounts; the government calculated a $2.72 million penalty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. The $10,000 maximum penalty for non-willful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Section 5314 does not address accounts or their number. An individual files a compliant report or does not. For cases involving willful violations, the statute tailors penalties to accounts. When one section of a statute includes language omitted from a neighboring section, the difference normally conveys a different meaning. The Act's implementing regulations require individuals with fewer than 25 accounts to provide details about each account while individuals with 25 or more accounts do not need to list each account or provide account-specific details unless requested by the Secretary. View "Bittner v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Department of Revenue (ADOR) is not required to assess the money collected from a taxpayer-business's customers to cover transaction privilege taxes against the responsible person pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-1104(A) before filing a collection lawsuit.ADOR brought suit against Peter Tunkey and his wife (together, Tunkey) to recover unpaid transaction privilege taxes (TPTs) pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 42-5028, which imposes liability on a "person" for failing to remit to ADOR any "additional charge" made to cover the tax. The tax court granted Summary judgment for ADOR and entered judgment against Tunkey for $26,000 in unpaid TPTs. Tunkey appealed, arguing that the tax court erred in ruling that ADOR was not required to timely assess the $26,000 amount against him personally before filing suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 42-1104(A) did not require ADOR to notify Tunkey of "additional taxes due" because the unpaid TPT charges did not constitute an "additional tax due" triggering section 42-1104(A)'s notice requirement. View "State v. Tunkey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court concluding that Pleasant Grover (City) had the power to enact a three-tiered "transportation utility fee" (TUF) but reversed the court's ruling that the TUF was actually a tax, holding that remand was required.The subject TUF charged local property owners a monthly fee corresponding to the "intensity" with which they used City roads, as determined by a study of user demand on the City's roadways, and the generated funds were to be used to repair and maintain city roadways only. At issue was whether the City had the authority to enact the TUF and whether the City properly characterized the TUF as a fee or if it was in fact a tax requiring the City to follow specific enactment procedures. The district court held that the TUF was actually a tax based on its purpose. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the City acted within its discretion in enacting the TUF; but (2) the purpose of the TUF was characteristic of a fee because it was a specific charge for a specific purpose. View "Larson v. Pleasant Grove City" on Justia Law

The Washington Department of Revenue issued instructions to Lakeside Industries Inc. regarding the valuation of Lakeside’s self-manufactured asphalt products. This valuation determined the amount of use tax that Lakeside had to pay to use its asphalt in public road construction projects. Lakeside did not follow DOR’s instructions and, instead, petitioned for judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW. The Washington Supreme Court held that the APA’s general review provisions did not apply to Lakeside’s nonconstitutional tax challenge. To obtain judicial review of DOR’s tax reporting instructions, Lakeside had to follow the specific procedures for tax challenges set forth in Title 82 RCW (Title 82). Therefore, Lakeside’s APA petition for judicial review was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lakeside Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case centered upon how Appellee Synthes USA HQ, Inc. should apportion its income between Pennsylvania and other states in order to calculate its Pennsylvania corporate net income tax. The two issues presented were: (1) does the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) have the authority to represent the Commonwealth in this litigation, where it asserted an interpretation of the relevant tax provision contrary to the reading forwarded by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (“Department”); and (2) whether the allocation of a corporation's sales of services between Pennsylvania and other states for purposes of calculating the corporation’s income that was taxable in Pennsylvania. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Attorneys Act permitted the OAG to take a position on behalf of the Commonwealth that was inconsistent with the position adopted by the Department, but the Court ultimately rejected the OAG’s reading of the relevant tax provision in favor of the interpretation presented by the Department. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court remanding this case to the Board of Finance and Revenue for calculation and issuance of a tax refund by the Department to Synthes for the 2011 tax year. View "Synthes USA HQ v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

This direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on the efforts of Appellee John Myers to obtain a refund of 38 cents in sales tax he paid on purchases he made with redeemed coupons at BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (BJ’s). The parties petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to interpret Section 33.2(b) of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Code, which excluded “from the taxable portion of the purchase price, if separately stated and identified." A vendor owes the state sales tax on the full price of the item unless it can establish a “new purchase price” of the item, which may be established where “both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue Board of Appeals (BOA) relied on Section 33.2, which permitted amounts represented by coupons to establish a new purchase price “if both the item and the coupon are described on the invoice or cash register tape.” The BOA concluded that the coupons were not adequately described on the receipts, and nothing indicated which items the coupons were related. A unanimous three-judge panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s order and found Appellee was entitled to a refund of overpaid sales tax. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, finding none of the receipts at issue here satisfied subsection 33.2(b)(2)’s description requirement. Because it was Appellee’s burden to prove that he was entitled to a refund of sales tax, he did not meet his burden. View "Myers v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Defendant, in her capacity as the Town of Lincoln's tax assessor, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its claims of error.Plaintiff brought this action arguing that Defendant (1) illegally increased the value of Plaintiff's property in light of a solar energy development on a portion of Plaintiff's property for tax years 2019 and 2020, and (2) improperly created a new tax classification not recognized by R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-11.8(b). The superior court granted judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in including the presence of a solar energy development as an element of value assessed to real property; and (2) Plaintiff's claim that the tax assessor effectively created a new tax classification for property upon which a solar energy development is located, in contravention of R.I. Gen. Laws 44-5-11.8(b), was unpersuasive. View "Polseno Properties Management, LLC v. Keeble" on Justia Law

The Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) investigates allegations of practitioner misconduct before the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Appellant sued the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), seeking disclosure of documents relating to the OPR’s investigation of a misconduct report on him. The district court ruled that the four documents were protected from disclosure by FOIA Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege and granted summary judgment to the IRS. Appellant contends that the withheld documents are nondeliberative and, therefore, unprotected by Exemption 5.   The DC Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the IRS and reversed in part as to the Marchetti Memo and the Kelly Memo. The court explained that withholding the contested documents, with the exception of the Kelly Memo and the unprotected portion of the Marchetti Memo, is consonant with Exemption 5’s purposes. At least some of the recommendations in the contested documents were not adopted in the OPR’s ultimate determination, so disclosure of the authors’ potentially mistaken recommendations might have a chilling effect on their willingness to make such recommendations. Further, the court wrote that insofar as the OPR’s ultimate determination departs from the course of action proposed by at least some of the contested documents or from their reasoning, the release of those predecisional documents might well mislead the public about the OPR’s view of Appellant’s conduct. View "Bradley Waterman v. IRS" on Justia Law

Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ARRA) to stabilize the U.S. economy following the 2008 financial crisis, 123 Stat. 115, creating two types of government-subsidized Build America Bonds (BABs). “Direct Payment BABs,” entitled bond issuers to a tax refund from the Treasury Department equal to 35 percent of the interest paid on their BABs. Treasury pays issuers of BABs annually. The payments are funded by the permanent, indefinite appropriation for refunds of internal revenue collections. 31 U.S.C. 1324. Local power agencies (Appellants) collectively issued over four billion dollars in qualifying Direct Payment BABs before 2011. Through 2012, Treasury paid the full 35 percent.In 2011 and 2013, Congress passed legislation reviving sequestration: “[T]he cancellation of budgetary resources provided by discretionary appropriations or direct spending law,” 2 U.S.C. 900(c)(2), 901(a). Treasury stopped making payments to Appellants at 35 percent. Since 2013, Appellants have been paid reduced rates as determined by the Office of Management and Budget’s calculations; for example, 2013 payments were reduced to 8.7 percent.Appellants sued, arguing a statutory theory that the government violates ARRA section 1531 by not making the full 35 percent payments and that the government breached a contract that arises out of section 1531. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the suit. No statutory claim existed because sequestration applied to these payments. No contractual claim existed because the ARRA did not create a contract between the government and Appellants. View "Indiana Municipal Power Agency v. United States" on Justia Law