Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

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Walter F. Scott III filed an appeal against the Alabama Department of Revenue, challenging the Jefferson County Board of Equalization's valuation of 176 parcels of real property for property-tax purposes. Scott identified himself as "Agent for Owners" in his notice of appeal. The Department, Jefferson County, and the Board moved to dismiss Scott's appeal, arguing that he had incorrectly filed the tax appeal and had not paid the necessary filing fees.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that Scott was improperly attempting to aggregate 176 separate and distinct parcels of property into one lawsuit for the purpose of appealing tax assessments on each parcel. The court concluded that each parcel required a separately filed lawsuit accompanied by the appropriate filing fees. Scott then appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the tax appeal. The court held that the relevant statutes, §§ 40-3-24 and 40-3-25, Ala. Code 1975, do not require a taxpayer to appeal each assessment separately. The court found that the language of the statutes allows for multiple contested assessments to be included in a single appeal to the circuit court. The court also noted that consolidating challenges to multiple parcels into one appeal is consistent with the liberal joinder allowed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not address whether multiple owners could use a single appeal to contest the assessments of multiple parcels, as this issue had not been sufficiently explored at this point in the action. View "Scott v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

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In 2012, Jennifer Zuch and her then-husband Patrick Gennardo filed late 2010 federal tax returns. Gennardo's return showed a significant balance due, which he addressed by submitting an offer in compromise, involving $50,000 in estimated tax payments. The IRS applied these payments to Gennardo's account. Zuch later amended her return, reporting additional income and resulting in $28,000 in taxes due. She argued that the $50,000 should be credited to her account, entitling her to a refund, but the IRS disagreed and placed a levy on her property. Zuch requested a collection due process hearing, which upheld the levy. She appealed to the Tax Court.The Tax Court initially reviewed the case but dismissed it as moot after Zuch's tax liability was reduced to zero through overpayments applied by the IRS. The court ruled it lacked jurisdiction since there was no longer a basis for a levy. Zuch appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated the dismissal, holding that the IRS's abandonment of the levy did not moot the proceedings, as the Tax Court could still address the underlying tax dispute.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §6330 to resolve disputes when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. The Court reasoned that the Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the determination of whether a levy may proceed. Once the levy is no longer in question, the Tax Court cannot address the underlying tax liability. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Commissioner v. Zuch" on Justia Law

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From 2016 to 2021, Irene Michelle Fike worked at an accounting firm and later as an independent contractor for a client, J.M., and J.M.'s family. Fike used her access to J.M.'s financial accounts to pay her personal credit card bills and make purchases from online retailers. She concealed her fraud by misrepresenting J.M.'s expenditures in financial reports. Fike defrauded J.M. of $363,657.67 between April 2018 and September 2022.Fike pleaded guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in 2024. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky sentenced her to thirty-six months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court also ordered her to pay $405,867.08 in restitution, which included the principal amount stolen and $42,209.41 in prejudgment interest. Fike appealed, arguing that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) does not authorize prejudgment interest and that the interest calculation was speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the MVRA allows for prejudgment interest to ensure full compensation for the victim's losses. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest, as it was necessary to make J.M. whole. The court also determined that the district court had a sufficient basis for calculating the interest, relying on J.M.'s declaration of losses, which was submitted under penalty of perjury and provided a reliable basis for the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fike" on Justia Law

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Conmac Investments, Inc., an Arkansas company, owns, leases, and manages farms. Between 2004 and 2013, Conmac purchased farmland and negotiated to receive rights to "base acres," which entitle the owner to subsidy payments from the USDA. Initially, Conmac did not claim deductions for amortization of these base acres on its tax returns from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, Conmac began amortizing its base acres without filing an "Application for Change of Accounting Method" and claimed amortization deductions for the years 2009 through 2014. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading Conmac to petition the Tax Court.The United States Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, determining that Conmac's decision to amortize base acres constituted a change in the method of accounting, which required IRS approval. Conmac appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Conmac's initiation of amortization for base acres in 2009 was indeed a change in the method of accounting. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2), changing the treatment of an asset from nonamortizable to amortizable is a change in the method of accounting. The court rejected Conmac's argument that the change was due to a change in underlying facts, noting that Conmac's realization about the amortization of base acres did not constitute a change in underlying facts but rather a change in the timing of cost recovery.The court also addressed the Section 481 adjustment, concluding that the "year of the change" was 2013, when the Commissioner changed Conmac's method of accounting, thus triggering the adjustment to prevent duplicated deductions or omitted income. The judgment of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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Between 2007 and 2010, the taxpayer transferred millions of dollars between his business entities, characterizing them as loans. On December 31, 2010, he canceled many of these purported loans. On his 2010 income tax return, he reported $145 million of cancellation-of-debt (COD) income but excluded it due to his personal insolvency. He also reported a short-term capital loss of nearly $87 million due to a nonbusiness bad debt write-off, claiming that the discharged debt automatically rendered it worthless. The IRS disagreed and disallowed the deduction.The taxpayer challenged the IRS's decision in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had not established that the debts were worthless in 2010 and could not be deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 166. The court also found that the taxpayer had not proven the insolvency of the entities involved, which would have allowed the COD income to flow through to him. As a result, the Tax Court determined income tax deficiencies of over $5 million for the taxpayer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Tax Court did not err in requiring the taxpayer to prove the worthlessness of his discharged debts and in declining to presume worthlessness because COD income arose from that discharge. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's interpretation of the relevant tax statutes and found that the taxpayer had failed to provide sufficient objective evidence to demonstrate the worthlessness of the debts. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, resulting in the taxpayer's appeal being denied. View "Kelly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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In 2017, Tower Health, a non-profit corporation, acquired Pottstown Hospital, an acute care facility in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Tower Health created a non-profit LLC, Pottstown Hospital, LLC, to manage the hospital. The hospital provides various health services, including emergency care, inpatient and outpatient services, and community outreach. The hospital applied for a charitable real estate tax exemption for three properties, which was initially granted by the Montgomery County Board of Assessment Appeals.The Pottstown School District appealed the exemption to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that the hospital did not operate entirely free from a profit motive due to high executive compensation and the relationship with Tower Health. The trial court found that the hospital met the criteria for a purely public charity under the HUP test, including operating free from a private profit motive, and upheld the tax exemption. The court noted that the hospital provided substantial uncompensated care and that executive compensation was reasonable and within market value.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's decision, focusing on the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees charged to the hospital. The court concluded that the hospital did not operate free from a private profit motive, as a substantial portion of executive compensation was tied to financial performance.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that the compensation of Tower Health's executives and the management fees were not relevant to the hospital's tax exemption status. The court emphasized that only the hospital's operations and executive compensation should be considered. The court found that the hospital's executive compensation was reasonable and within market value, thus meeting the HUP test. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and reinstated the trial court's order granting the tax exemption. View "Pottstown SD v. Mont Co Bd" on Justia Law

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Utility companies operating in Placer County, California, filed a complaint against the County and the Board of Equalization, seeking a refund of taxes. They alleged that the tax rate imposed on their state-assessed property was unconstitutionally higher than the rate imposed on locally-assessed property. The tax rate for state-assessed property is calculated under Revenue and Taxation Code section 100, while locally-assessed property is taxed under a different formula. The utility companies argued that this discrepancy violated article XIII, section 19 of the California Constitution, which mandates that utility property be taxed to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.The Superior Court of Placer County sustained the County's demurrer, effectively dismissing the complaint. The trial court relied on the precedent set by the appellate court in County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, which held that the tax rates imposed on utility property were constitutional. The utility companies acknowledged that the Santa Clara decision was binding on the trial court but maintained that they had a good faith basis for their claims on appeal.The California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the utility companies had not established that the trial court erred. The appellate court found that the utility companies did not present a valid basis for defining comparability to state a valid claim. The court noted that while the utility companies argued for comparable tax rates, they failed to provide a clear standard or formula to determine what constitutes comparability. Consequently, the court held that the utility companies did not meet their burden of proving that the County's tax rates were unconstitutional. View "Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County of Placer" on Justia Law

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A cheesesteak restaurant owner, Nicholas Lucidonio, was involved in a payroll tax fraud scheme at Tony Luke’s, where he avoided employment taxes by issuing paychecks for “on-the-books” wages, requiring employees to sign back their paychecks, and then paying them in cash for both “on-the-books” and “off-the-books” wages. This led to the filing of false employer tax returns that underreported wages and underpaid employment taxes. Employees, aware of the scheme, received Form W-2s listing only “on-the-books” wages, resulting in underreported income on their personal tax returns. The conspiracy spanned ten years and involved systemic underreporting of wages for 30 to 40 employees at any given time.Lucidonio pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the IRS (Klein conspiracy) under 18 U.S.C. § 371. He did not appeal his conviction but challenged his sentence, specifically the application of a United States Sentencing Guideline that increased his offense level by two points. The enhancement applies when conduct is intended to encourage others to violate internal revenue laws or impede the IRS’s collection of revenue. Lucidonio argued that the enhancement was misapplied because it required explicit direction to others to violate the IRS Code, which he claimed did not occur, and that his employees were co-conspirators, not additional persons encouraged to violate the law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court disagreed with Lucidonio’s interpretation that the enhancement required explicit direction. However, it found that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Lucidonio encouraged anyone other than co-conspirators, as the employees were aware of and participated in the scheme. Consequently, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Lucidonio" on Justia Law

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Richard Spizzirri and his fourth wife, Holly Lueders, entered into a prenuptial agreement requiring Spizzirri’s estate to transfer $6 million to Lueders and $3 million to her children upon his death. After Spizzirri’s death, the estate paid the stepchildren and deducted the payments as “claims against the estate” for tax purposes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, denying these deductions, leading the estate to petition the tax court for review.The U.S. Tax Court ruled that the transfers to the stepchildren were not deductible as “claims against the estate” because they were neither “contracted bona fide” nor “for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” The estate failed to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, as it did not provide credible evidence to support the deductions. The court found that the payments were essentially donative in character, as they were made to keep Lueders happy and maintain the marriage, rather than as part of an arm’s length transaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the tax court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the payments to the stepchildren were not contracted bona fide, as they were related to Lueders’s expectation of inheritance and lacked the characteristics of a bona fide transaction. The court emphasized that the payments were made with donative intent and were not part of an ordinary business transaction. Therefore, the estate was not entitled to deduct the $3 million transfer to the stepchildren as “claims against the estate.” View "Estate of Spizzirri v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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Burnsville Medical Building, LLC owns a three-story medical office building in Burnsville, Minnesota. Dakota County assessed the value of the property for 2021 taxes at $8,007,800. The taxpayer challenged this assessment, arguing that it overstated the property's value. The property was 25 years old, with 47,894 square feet of rentable space and an occupancy rate of 90.13 percent. The taxpayer presented an appraisal report by Kelsey K. Hornig, who used both the sales comparison approach and the income capitalization approach to value the property at $7,075,000 and $7,175,000, respectively.The Minnesota Tax Court held a trial and found that the taxpayer's appraisal overcame the prima facie validity of Dakota County's assessment. However, the tax court rejected Hornig's occupancy adjustment under the sales comparison approach, finding her testimony not credible and her adjustments internally inconsistent. The tax court also rejected Hornig's use of effective net rent to calculate potential gross income under the income capitalization approach, determining that the taxpayer did not present sufficient evidence to support reducing potential gross income by tenant improvement allowances or free rent.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the tax court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the tax court did not err in using market rent rather than effective net rent to calculate the property's potential gross income, as there was no evidence that the tenant improvement allowances or rent concessions were excessive or atypical. The Supreme Court also upheld the tax court's rejection of Hornig's occupancy adjustment, finding no clear error in the tax court's credibility determinations and factual findings. The final valuation of the property was set at $9,300,000. View "Burnsville Medical Building, LLC vs. County of Dakota" on Justia Law