Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Appellants in this case were three companies engaged in providing cable-television services to subscribers (collectively, "Charter"). In a consolidated petition for review, Charter challenged the Tax Division of Appellee Arkansas Public Service Commission's ad valorem assessments of its properties for the tax years 2006 through 2009. The Commission upheld the Tax Division's assessments, and the circuit court affirmed. Charter appealed, arguing (1) the assessments were erroneous because they included the valuation of intangible personal property, which it claimed was exempt from taxation, and (2) the assessment of intangible property was illegal because the tax Division failed to promulgate rules that would provide notice of the change to taxpayers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not err by assessing the value of Charter's intangible personal property because the relevant statutes require the assessment of a cable-television company's intangible personal property, and the exemption provision exempting the taxation of intangible personal property did not apply; and (2) the Court was precluded from addressing Charter's second issue on appeal. View "Falcon Cable Media LP v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n" on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of real property in the Town of Chester (Town), New York. Plaintiffs then lived in New Jersey, and their address there appeared on the deed. Plaintiffs subsequently moved without informing the Town taxing authorities of their new address. After Plaintiffs failed to pay taxes on their New York property for three years, Plaintiffs defaulted in a foreclosure proceeding brought by the County on their New York property. The property was later sold. Plaintiffs subsequently sued the County, asserting that the attempts to give them notice of the foreclosure were constitutionally inadequate and seeking a declaration that they still owned the property. Supreme Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when notice mail to Plaintiffs at their last known address proved undeliverable, the tax collector was not constitutionally required to find some means of making personal service on them, or to address a notice to "occupant" at the former address, or to search New Jersey public records for a new address; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs were not deprived of their property without due process of law. View "Naughton v. Warren County" on Justia Law

When an employee's name and Social Security number listed on Form W-2 do not match in the SSA's database and this happens to a sufficient number of employees, the SSA sends the employer a "no-match" letter. In 2006, Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request with the SSA seeking the names of the 100 U.S. employers that generated the most no-matches from 2001 through 2006. The agency declined to produce such records, concluding that they were exempt under FOIA Exemption 3. The district court agreed with the SSA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the records sought by Judicial Watch would disclose "return information" and were protected from disclosure by the Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. 6103(a). Moreover, the Haskell Amendment was not applicable here because Judicial Watch sought data that could be associated with a particular taxpayer, the employer. View "Judicial Watch, Inc. v. SSA" on Justia Law

Appellants, contractors and engineers, filed a declaratory judgment action against Appellee, the tax commissioner of Ohio, seeking a judgment declaring that the Ohio commercial activity tax (CAT), as it related to motor-vehicle-fuel sales, violated Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a. The trial court granted summary judgment for the tax commissioner. The appellate court affirmed, applying the rationale of Ohio Grocers Ass'n v. Levin, concluding that the background and history of Section 5a did not support the contention that the CAT was a tax "relating to" motor vehicle fuel sales. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expenditure of the CAT revenue that was derived from motor-vehicle-fuel sales were "related to" fuels used for propelling motor vehicles on a highway, within the meaning of Section 5a, and consequently, the excise tax violated the Ohio Constitution to the extent that the revenue raised was used for purposes other than those specified in Section 5a. View "Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa" on Justia Law

On October 10, 2011 the board of revision issued a decision ordering reductions in the valuation of property owed by a county club. The local school district board of education (school board) attempted to appeal that decision to the board of tax appeals (BTA) by sending the appropriate notices by certified mail on October 14, 2011. That same day, the country club physically presented its notices of appeal to the common pleas court and the BOR. The school board argued that it had filed its appeal first because it placed its notices in the mail earlier on October 14 than the country club had filed its appeals at the courthouse and the BOR. The BTA ruled that the country club had filed its appeal first, determining that the time of the mailing was immaterial and that the probative force of the school board evidence of the time of mailing was questionable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in determining that the school board had not proven the time when its notice of appeal was mailed, it properly held that the country club's filing in the common pleas court had priority for jurisdictional purposes. View "Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Preacely pleaded guilty in 2009 to tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The district court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release, with a special condition, prohibiting him from participating in his former occupation of tax preparer. When the district court imposed the special condition, counsel asked: “may he own the business if he himself does not prepare any taxes himself?” The court responded, “No … you should not engage in the business of tax preparation directly or indirectly.” After his release from prison, Preacely transferred ownership of his business to his wife, but when an undercover IRS agent asked to speak to the vice-president, he was directed to Preacely. The IRS also executed a search warrant at the business and interviewed a number of employees. The district court revoked Preacely’s supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and that Preacely was involved only administratively with the business by doing things such as dropping off food, office supplies, and signing paychecks. View "United States v. Preacely" on Justia Law

In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the city school district board of education challenged a decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) that affirmed the county board of revision's (BOR) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2007. The school board argued in part that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property owner's spouse, who was not a lawyer. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA's decision, holding (1) the filing of a valuation complaint by the owner's spouse validly invokes the BOR's jurisdiction; and (2) the record furnished a sufficient basis to support the BTA's finding. View "Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

SEW operated 113 franchise Waffle House restaurants when it filed its Chapter 11 petition in 2008. From January, 2005, to the Petition Date, SEW did not pay federal income tax withholding, social security (FICA), or unemployment (FUTA) taxes or timely file returns. During four years before the Petition Date, the IRS assessed penalties of more than $1,500,000. SEW subsequently made payments that were applied to its tax obligations and also made undesignated prepetition payments that were applied in partial satisfaction of the assessed penalties. SEW later sought recovery of prepetition tax penalty payments of $637,652.07 or an offset against the tax amounts still owed. SEW alleged that payment of these penalties provided no value to SEW; that SEW did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the Penalty Payments; that at the time that of the payments, SEW was insolvent; and cited 11 U.S.C. 548 and 544. The government argued that dollar-for-dollar reduction in SEW’s antecedent tax-penalty liabilities constituted reasonably equivalent value. SEW did not allege that the penalty obligations were themselves avoidable. The Bankruptcy court dismissed SEW’s adversary petition for failure to state a clam. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "SE Waffles, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to determine when a well "started" under Utah Code 59-5-102. Although that statute imposes a severance tax on oil or gas produced from a well, section 59-5-102(5)(c) permits an exemption for "the first six months of production for development wells started after January 1, 1990." Summit Operating, LLC argued that a well starts when it begins commercial production. Under this interpretation, Summit asserted that it was entitled to a six-month tax exemption for its well, which started commercial production in 2008. The Utah State Tax Commission asserted that a well starts on the date that drilling begins, and thus, Summit was not entitled to the tax exemption because drilling for Summit's well began in 1983. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order granting summary judgment to the Auditing Division of the Commission, holding that under the Tax Exemption Statute, a well "starts" when drilling begins. View "Summit Operating v. State Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law