Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Chrysler Group, LLC, a motor vehicle manufacturer, reimbursed two buyers of defective vehicles the full purchase price, including sales tax, pursuant to Nevada's lemon law. Thereafter, Chrysler sought refunds of the sales taxes that the vehicles' retailers had collected and remitted when they originally sold the vehicles to the buyers. The Department of Taxation had previously refunded lemon law sales tax reimbursements to manufacturers but denied Chrysler's refund requests because the state attorney general's office advised the Department that there was no statutory authority for such refunds. The district court concluded that Chrysler was entitled to a refund. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nevada law did not allow for such a refund and the Department was not required to adhere to its prior erroneous interpretation of the law. View "State, Dep't of Taxation v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

Turner, the author of Tax Free!, instructed readers to escape income taxation by using common law trust organizations (colatos), and established FAR to assist in implementing colatos. In 1991, Turner enlisted Leveto, the owner of a veterinary clinic, as a FAR member. FAR created Center, a foreign colato, and appointed Leveto as the general manager and Turner as a consultant. Leveto “sold” his clinic to Center, which “hired” Leveto as its manager. Leveto continued to control the clinic, but stopped reporting its income. Center did not pay taxes because it distributed the income to other foreign colatos, which, Turner claimed, “transformed” it to untaxable foreign source income. Leveto began to market Tax Free! In 1995, the IRS began a criminal investigation. In 2001, Turner and Leveto were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS by concealing Leveto’s assets, 18 U.S.C. 371. Turner moved to exclude recorded conversations between Leveto and an undercover agent and foreign bank records seized from Leveto’s office and residence. The district court admitted the conversations, reasoning that they furthered an unindicted conspiracy to impede tax collection efforts, and held that the government properly authenticated the foreign bank documents. Turner was convicted, sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay $408,043 in restitution, without any findings about his ability to pay. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

The Commonwealth of the Northern Marina Islands obtained two tax judgments in the U.S. district court against the Millars for unpaid taxes. The Millards, who previously resided in the Commonwealth, relocated before the Commonwealth was able to obtain the judgments. The Commonwealth commenced proceedings as a judgment creditor asseking a turnover order against garnishees holding assets of the Millars. The Commonwealth named a Canadian bank (Bank) headquartered in Toronto, with a branch in New York, as a garnishee under the theory that the Millards maintained accounts in a foreign subsidiary of Bank. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for a turnover order against Bank. The Court of Appeals accepted certification to answer questions of law, holding (1) for a court to issue a post-judgment turnover order pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225(b) against a banking entity, the entity itself must have actual, not merely constructive, possession or custody of the assets sought; and (2) therefore, it is not enough that the banking entity's subsidiary might have possession or custody of a judgment debtor's assets. View "Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce" on Justia Law

Country Vintner sued Gallo, under North Carolina law over the wholesale distribution of an Argentinian wine. At issue on appeal was what expenses related to electronically stored information (ESI) were taxable under the federal taxation-of-costs statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920(4). The district court entered an order taxing only the costs of converting electronic files to non-editable formats, and transferring files onto CDs. The court agreed with the district court's finding that only the conversion of native files to TIFF and PDF formats, and the transfers of files onto CDs, constituted "making copies" under section 1920(f), and that none of Gallo's expenses constituted fees for exemplification. View "The Country Vintner v. E & J Gallo Winery" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a class action lawsuit filed by Plaintiff, a resident of Defendant City, challenging the City's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of the taxes paid. The trial court ruled that class claims for a refund were barred under Woosley v. State and dismissed the case. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that Plaintiff could file a class claim for a TUT refund under the recently decided Ardon v. City of Los Angeles. In Ardon, the Supreme Court held that the Government Claims Act (Act) permits a class action claim by taxpayers against a local government entity for the refund of an unlawful tax in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims statute. The City appealed, asserting that its municipal code contained an "applicable governing claims statute" barring class action claims for a tax refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a local ordinance is not a "statute" within the meaning of the Act. View "McWilliams v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The Living Word Bible Camp, a tax-exempt organization, owned property in Itasca County. Living Word sought to obtain the necessary governmental approvals to use the property as a summer bible camp and retreat center. Itasca County classified the property as tax-exempt from 2001 to 2007 then reclassified the property as taxable as of 2008. Living Word challenged the reclassification for the 2008 and 2009 assessments. The tax court affirmed the County's reclassification because Living Word had failed to make sufficient progress in obtaining the necessary governmental approvals for its proposed use of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court (1) erred in concluding that Living Word was not entitled to an exemption because it was not using the property in furtherance of a charitable purpose; and (2) erred in determining that Living Word's current activities on the property could not be considered in determining whether that use was sufficient to qualify as a tax-exempt use. Remanded. View "Living Word Bible Camp v. County of Itasca" on Justia Law

Eden Prairie Mall, LLC (EPM) owned a mall. Included in the mall parcel for property tax purposes were the mall's in-line tenants, five anchor tenants, and a movie theater complex. EPM sought review of the tax court's market value determinations for the mall and one of its anchor tenants for the assessment dates of 2005 and 2006. The tax court adopted the market values for the mall parcel proposed by Hennepin County in its post-trial brief, which were higher than the value opinions presented by either party's appraiser at trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the tax court's value determinations were not supported by the record and remanded with instructions for the tax court to explain its reasoning and describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. On remand, the tax court adopted market values that exceeded its earlier determinations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court failed to follow the Court's remand instructions because the tax court failed to explain its reasoning and describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. Remanded. View "Eden Prairie Mall, LLC v. County of Hennepin" on Justia Law

The subject property was located at 44 Lafayette Road in Saint Paul. Relators challenged the County's assessments for the assessment dates 2007, 2008, and 2009. After trial, the tax court adopted the market values proposed by the County in its post-trial brief, which were higher than the value opinions presented by either party's appraiser at trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the tax court to explain its reasoning for rejecting the appraisal testimony and to describe the factual support in the record for its determinations. On remand, the tax court again adopted market values that exceeded the parties' appraisal opinions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tax court failed to follow the Court's remand instructions in its calculation of parking income and expenses. Remanded for a further evidentiary hearing regarding the appropriate calculation of net parking income. View "444 Lafayette, LLC v. County of Ramsey" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the tax court's determination related to a deficiency in petitioners' federal income tax involving distributions from petitioners' variable universal life insurance policy. The Commissioner asserted that surrender charges could never be considered under I.R.C. 402(b)(2), and maintained that petitioners actually received the full stated policy values of their respective policies. The court affirmed the tax court's determination that the "amount actually distributed" when petitioners received ownership of the policies after their employer wound down their employees' benefit trust was "the fair market value of what was actually distributed." Further, the surrender charges associated with a variable universal life insurance policy could permissibly be considered as part of the general inquiry into a policy's fair market value. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision. View "Schwab v. CIR" on Justia Law

Retirement accounts are exempt from creditors’ claims in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 22(b)(3)(C) and (d)(12). The debtor inherited, from her mother, a non-spousal individual retirement account worth about $300,000. The bankruptcy court held that the inherited IRA was not exempt from claims by the debtor’s creditors. The district court reversed. Noting a conflict with other circuits, the Seventh Circuit reversed, reinstating the bankruptcy court holding. The court noted that while it remains sheltered from taxation until the money is withdrawn, many of the account’s other attributes changed. No new contributions can be made, and the balance cannot be rolled over or merged with any other account. 26 U.S.C. 408(d)(3)(C); instead of being dedicated to the debtor/heir’s retirement years, the inherited IRA must begin distributing its assets within a year of the original owner’s death. 26 U.S.C. 402(c)(11)(A). View "Rameker v. Clark" on Justia Law