Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The trial court in this case ruled that there was no conflict between the 2010 amendment to OCGA 48-5-2 (3) and a 1981 local constitutional amendment providing for the assessment of homestead property in Muscogee County for school and consolidated city-county government taxing purposes. The court further ruled that the 2010 amendment controlled the determination of the fair market value of appellee John Yeoman's recently-purchased homestead property. The Columbus Board of Tax Assessors appeals, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman" on Justia Law

Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS) filed an action against Hillsdale County, seeking mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund HCSS. The Hillsdale County voters approved the proposition in 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by HCSS. Defendant entered into a contract with HCSS from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, but did not levy and spend the full, voter-approved, 0.5 mill. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' writ for mandamus and ordered defendant to levy the entire 0.5 mill for the length of time approved by the voters. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the order, concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the Tax Tribunal had exclusive and original jurisdiction over the matter. HCSS appealed, and the Supreme Court, after its review, agreed that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Hillsdale County Senior Services Center v. Hillsdale County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a taxpayer could satisfy its obligation to "pay annually to the state" the $75,000 corporate minimum tax under ORS 3 317.090(2), by claiming on its corporate excise tax return a $75,000 "Business Energy Tax Credit" (BETC) under ORS 315.354. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, Con-Way, could satisfy its tax liability under ORS 317.090(2) by claiming a BETC on its return. The Department of Revenue (department) appealed, arguing that the Tax Court's conclusion was inconsistent with ORS 317.090(2), on the ground that a tax credit cannot be used to pay or otherwise satisfy the minimum tax imposed under ORS 2 317.090(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Pulaski County issued an assessment and taxation of property owned by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). On behalf of UAMS, Appellant (the University) filed a tax-exemption application seeking an exemption from ad valorem property taxes based on sovereign immunity. The county assessor's office and county equalization board denied the request. The county court also denied the exemption. On appeal, the circuit court denied the University's motion for summary judgment and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court dismissed the University's interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the University failed to establish an exception to the general rule that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. View "Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Pulaski County" on Justia Law

In 2003, after more than a decade of litigation, the IRS assessed penalties under now-repealed I.R.C. 6621(c), which penalizes “substantial” underpayments of tax “attributable to tax motivated transactions” against the 19 partners of the Dillon Oil Technology Partnership in tax years 1983 and 1984. The partners paid the tax and penalties in 2004, and, in 2006, initiated a refund suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, 1 I.R.C.7422(h), which provides that individual partners may not bring tax challenges relating to subject matter “attributable to a partnership item.” Such claims must be brought in a partnership-level suit by the partnership representative or Tax Matters Partner. The Federal Circuit affirmed, calling the claim an impermissible collateral attack. View "Bush v. United States" on Justia Law

Morpho, a California-based corporation that designs and builds explosives and other threat detection technology, contracted with the FAA on behalf of its then-newly established TSA, to supply its Explosive Detection System (EDS) to United States airports. Morpho subsequently sought an increase of the contract price to compensate for state assessments as "after-imposed taxes" pursuant to Clause 3.4.2-7(c) of the Acquisition Management System (AMS). The court denied Morpho's petition for review, agreeing with the TSA's rejection of Morpho's claim on the ground that the taxes at issue did not satisfy the after-imposed tax exception's precise terms. View "Morpho Detection, Inc. v. TSA" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Revenue audited Relator and assessed Relator for the amount of sales tax he collected from his customers but failed to remit to the State. The Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) adjusted the initial assessment and assessed tax. The tax court upheld the Commissioner's assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2011, Plaintiff submitted to the Commissioner documents and an informal request for a refund based on his repayment of sales tax to his customers. The Commissioner responded to Relator by letter, in which he denied Plaintiff's request for a refund. Plaintiff appealed to the tax court. The tax court concluded it lacked subject matter over the appeal, holding that the Commissioner's letter was not an appealable order of the Commissioner because it was merely administrative correspondence. However, the court also denied Relator's claim for a refund. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the tax court's decision as to its jurisdiction, holding that the Commissioner's consideration of Relator's refund claim was a final decision on the claim that could be appealed; and (2) affirmed the tax court's decision on the merits of Relator's refund claim, holding that Relator's arguments either lacked merit or were barred by res judicata. View "Schober v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his ex-wife both claimed their two children as dependents on their state individual income tax returns. The Minnesota Department of Revenue determined that only Plaintiff's ex-wife was entitled to claim the children as dependents and that Plaintiff had underpaid his state taxes. Plaintiff appealed. The extended deadline for filing Plaintiff's notice of appeal was December 27. On December 22, Plaintiff mailed his notice of appeal to the tax court and the Department of Revenue. The Department received the notice on December 27, but the notice sent to the court was marked by the court as filed on December 28. The The tax court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Plaintiff had not timely filed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the mailbox rule does not extend to statutorily created rights of appeal; and (2) Plaintiff failed to present direct evidence in support of his assertion that his notice of appeal arrived on December 27. View "Harbaugh v. Comm'r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Paula Ehrmantraut-Kiosee sought tax deductions for educational expenses incurred in pursuit of a doctoral degree in psychology. The Montana Department of Revenue disallowed the deductions sought by Paula individually in 2007, and jointly with Randy Myrup in 2008 and 2009. The Office of Dispute Resolution affirmed the disallowance, and the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) upheld the disallowance. The district court denied Taxpayers' petition for judicial review. After noting that educational expenses will be deemed nondeductible as qualification for a new trade or business if the education is a step towards obtaining a certification that, once obtained, would qualify the taxpayer to perform tasks significantly different from those the taxpayer performed before receiving the education, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the findings of STAB and the district court that Paula pursued her education in an effort to become a clinical psychologist, rather than simply to improve her skills as a counselor, were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) therefore, Taxpayers failed to demonstrate that the educational expenses were deductible under either 26 C.F.R. 1.162-5(a)(1) or (2). View "Myrup v. State, Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Eagle Rental was a licensed used car dealer. Daniel Bickford and his wife were the company's vice president and treasurer. In 2003, Eagle Rental began purchasing Cadillac Escalades and trading them in to dealers for newer models. The Bickfords were unable to sell their Escalade inventory for several years and drove the Escalades on personal business. The tax assessor assessed use taxes on four of those Escalades. The business and consumer docket affirmed the assessment. Eagle Rental appealed, arguing it did not owe use tax because the Bickfords operated the Escalades with dealer plates for their personal use in accordance with Maine's dealer plate statute. Read together, the dealer plate and taxation statutes provide that dealers and their immediate families may use dealer plates on vehicles in a dealer's inventory for their personal use without being subject to use tax until the vehicles to which the plates are attached are withdrawn from inventory. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle Rental did not meet its burden of proving that the Escalades were not withdrawn from inventory, and accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded they were subject to use tax. View "Eagle Rental, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor" on Justia Law