Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court in "Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Moore," (730 SE2d 671 (2012)) correctly determined that, once the Georgia Department of Revenue settles a refund action with one responsible party against whom unpaid sales taxes were assessed, the Department was thereafter precluded by the voluntary payment doctrine from attempting collection of any amount still owing from a second responsible party. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals' reasoning in that case was incorrect, and therefore the Court remanded the case for further consideration. View "Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the government, seeking a refund of payments on a federal withholding tax penalty assessed against her under 26 U.S.C. 6672. The government counterclaimed against plaintiff and her husband to reduce to judgment the remaining balance of the trust fund recovery penalties assessed against them. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against the husband individually where he did not provide a basis of law for his contention that the assessment of the 100% penalty against him was not made within the limitation period set forth in section 6672; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff because the undisputed record showed that she was properly liable for the 100% penalty where she was a "responsible person" under section 6672 during the relevant tax periods and where she "willfully" failed to see that the withholding taxes were paid; and affirmed the district court's determination of the amounts of the respective tax liabilities under section 6672. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a Project that provided for the design and construction of a new Midtown Tunnel. The Commonwealth Transportation Board affirmed the Project and specifically approved and ratified the imposition and collection of tolls on the Project as contemplated by a Comprehensive Agreement entered into by Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) and Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC (ERC). Plaintiff and other individuals filed a complaint against ERC and VDOT, alleging, inter alia, that the General Assembly, through its enactment of the Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA), unconstitutionally delegated its power of taxation to VDOT and ERC in violation of the Virginia Constitution. The circuit court concluded that the General Assembly exceeded its authority in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Project tolls were user fees and not taxes, and therefore, the General Assembly did not delegate its power of taxation to agencies such as VDOT in violation of the Virginia Constitution; (2) the General Assembly properly delegated to VDOT and ERC the legislative power to impose and set the rates of user fees in the form of tolls under the terms of the PPTA; and (3) the Comprehensive Agreement did not abridge the Commonwealth's police power. View "Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether certain property in Cumberland County, which was owned by the City of Philadelphia as trustee of the Stephen Girard Trust and leased by the Board of Directors of City Trusts to the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, was subject to local real estate taxation in Cumberland County. The trial court held that the property was both immune and exempt from local real estate taxation. The Commonwealth Court reversed. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the trial court’s order on grounds of tax immunity. View "City of Philadelphia v. Cumberland Cty Brd Assess Appeals" on Justia Law

Five income tax assessments were levied against Appellant for the tax years 2003-2007 for Appellant's failure to file returns. Appellant filed reassessment petitions, which the tax commissioner denied. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed Appellant's appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to address the errors Appellant specified in his notices of appeal because those errors had not been raised before the tax commissioner. In so concluding, the BTA rejected another jurisdictional argument raised by the commissioner, namely, that because Appellant had not paid the assessment, the tax commissioner had lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's reassessment petitions. The BTA concluded, rather, that the prepayment provision of Ohio Rev. Code 5747.13(E)(3) was triggered by a failure to file tax returns and that Appellant had in fact filed returns for the tax years at issue. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's ruling that the prepayment requirement did not apply in this case, vacated the remainder of the BTA's decision, and remanded with instructions that the reassessment petitions be dismissed for lack of prepayment. View "Abraitis v. Testa" on Justia Law

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, structured a tax-deferred exchange for Plaintiffs, a husband and wife and the cattle ranch they owned. It was later determined that the exchange did not qualify for deferred tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. 1031, resulting in significant tax liability for Plaintiffs. Defendants filed an action against Defendants for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims on grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' tort claims were timely filed, and the issue of whether Plaintiffs' timely filed their misrepresentation claim was a question of material fact to be resolved by a jury; (2) Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for breach of contract and the claim was not time barred; and (3) the district court erred in granting Defendants a protection order to prevent discovery of alleged work product and attorney-client communications, as further analysis and fact finding were necessary to determine which documents were discoverable and which qualified for work product or attorney-client protection. Remanded. View "Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink" on Justia Law

Tesoro Corporation challenged its income taxes assessed for 1994 through 1998. The state Department of Revenue (DOR) calculated Tesoro’s Alaska income by applying a three-factor apportionment formula to Tesoro’s worldwide income, including that of its non-Alaskan subsidiaries. An administrative law judge ruled Tesoro was a unitary business that could be subject to formula apportionment, and that DOR could permissibly assess penalties against Tesoro. Tesoro appealed to the superior court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Tesoro argued that only the income of its Alaska-based subsidiaries should have been subject to taxation in Alaska because Alaska’s tax scheme violates the Due Process and Interstate Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. Because Tesoro’s business was unitary, the Supreme Court rejected Tesoro’s challenge to the constitutionality of taxing all of its income under formula apportionment. Because Tesoro lacked standing to challenge the formula’s constitutionality, the Court did not reach the internal consistency issue Tesoro raised. Furthermore, the Court concluded that DOR permissibly imposed penalties on Tesoro. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court decision that affirmed the administrative law judge’s decision and order. View "Tesoro Corporation v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Brownington Center Church of Brownington, Vermont (now known as New Hope Bible Church and Ministries, Inc.) (the Church)), appealed a Superior Court determination that certain land and buildings owned by the Church were not exempt from real estate taxes for the tax year commencing April 1, 2009 under 32 V.S.A. 3832(2). The parties did not dispute that the property was dedicated for pious use and that it is owned and operated by the Church as a nonprofit organization. The issue was whether the property was excluded from the pious-use exemption of section 3802(4) by the language in section 3832(2). The Church argued that the property qualified for exemption, primarily because everything that occurred on the property facilitated its religious ministry and that “worship and service of the Believer in Christ” takes place everywhere on the premises. Under this belief, the Church maintains that the steel equipment building, the cabins, kitchen and the tent, are all church edifices. It defines “church edifice” to be a “structure or facility that is used exclusively or primarily to propagate a religious message to persons who receive that message for a worshipful purpose.” It contended that an overnight summer camp for religious purposes transformed the entire property into a place of worship and education. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Superior Court. View "Brownington Center Church v. Town of Irasburg" on Justia Law

A trust filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction of a county auditor's valuation of a self-storage facility for the tax year 2008. The Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education (BOE) filed a countercomplaint requesting retention of the auditor's valuation. After a hearing, the County Board of Revision (BOR) ordered a reduction of the property value as requested by the trust. After the BOE appealed, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals remanded with instructions that the BOR dismiss the valuation complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint misidentified the owner of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there is no statutory requirement that a valuation complaint accurately identify the legal owner of the subject property, identification of the owner is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Remanded. View "Groveport Madison Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

North Dakota Initiated Constitutional Measure 2, which would have abolished property taxes, was disapproved by the voters in the June 2012 primary election. Empower the Taxpayer ("Empower"), Charlene Nelson, and Robert Hale supported Measure 2. Before the election, Empower, Nelson, and Hale brought this action against numerous state and local government officials and other entities alleging violations of the Corrupt Practices Act, and sought injunctive relief, including prohibiting the defendants from "advocating any position on Measure 2" and declaring the defendants "no longer eligible to run for public office." The County Defendants sought sanctions against the plaintiffs and their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11, alleging the action against them was frivolous and that it had been brought for an improper purpose. The action was ultimately dismissed by the district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. After the action was dismissed, the district court considered the County Defendants' motion for sanctions, concluding a competent attorney could not in good faith have believed that a cause of action existed against the County Defendants. The court therefore ordered reasonable attorney fees and costs for defending against the action and that the plaintiffs prepare a written retraction of their allegations of corruption and impropriety to be published in the major newspapers of the state. Upon review of the sanctions issue, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's orders did not provide an adequate explanation of the evidentiary and legal basis for its decision; the Court was unable to adequately understand the basis for the court's decision to review on appeal. Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded to the district court to clarify its opinion. View "Empower the Taxpayer v. Fong" on Justia Law