Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Tariff Act of 1930 permits the Department of Commerce to impose two types of duties on imports that injure domestic industries: antidumping duties on goods sold in the U.S. "at less than ... fair value,” 19 U.S.C. 1673 and countervailing duties on goods that receive “a countervailable subsidy” from a foreign government, 1671(a). Commerce has long collected both types of duties from market economy importers. In 2012, Congress enacted legislation that overruled the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision, GPXI, and permitted imposition of both antidumping and countervailing duties with respect to importers from non-market economy (NME) countries. Because this law is retroactive and does not require Commerce to adjust for any double counting that may result from the retroactive imposition of both countervailing and antidumping duties, Wireking, an importer affected by the change, claimed that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution. The Court of International Trade upheld the new law. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Wireking did not show that the absence of a retrospective double-counting provision negates the law’s predominantly remedial impact. The 2012 law is not punitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Guangdong Wireking Housewares v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, the IRS levied defendant John Williamson's wife's wages to collect his back taxes dating back thirty years. The IRS sent a notice of the levy, which Defendant returned, writing across the document: "Refused for cause. Return to sender, unverified bill." He enclosed an affidavit explaining why he did not need to pay income taxes. Subsequent notices of the levy were also returned. Later that year, Defendant sent an invoice for $909,067,650.00 to two IRS agents who had worked on the matter, listing the value of real and personal property allegedly seized by the IRS, added damages for various alleged torts, and then trebled the total "for racketeering." A grand jury indicted Defendant and Mrs. Williamson on two counts: (1) "endeavor[ing] to impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code by filing a false and fraudulent Claim of Lien;" and (2) "fil[ing] . . . a false lien and encumbrance against the real and personal property [of the IRS agents] on account of the performance of [their] official duties." Mrs. Williamson pled guilty to the second count in return for dismissal of the first count against her. Defendant, however, proceeded to trial. His defense was essentially that he genuinely believed his lien was proper. A forensic psychologist testified that Defendant suffered from a delusional disorder that prevented him from abandoning his beliefs even when confronted with overwhelming evidence that he was wrong. Defendant requested instructions that would support his "genuine belief" defense to both charges, but the court rejected them and the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the two charges. Defendant was sentenced to four months in prison and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming the district court erred by not giving the requested jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williamson" on Justia Law

BNSF filed suit seeking refunds of certain taxes that it, and its predecessor companies, paid under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA), 26 U.S.C. 3201 et seq. The court concluded that, at least as applied to Non-Qualified Stock Options (NQSOs), the term "compensation", as used and defined by the RRTA, was inherently ambiguous; the IRS's definition was reasonable as applied to the NQSOs; although RRTA "compensation" may exclude certain in-kind benefits such as free rail passes that would otherwise be compensation under section 3121, the court concluded that NQSOs were properly included as "compensation" under the RRTA as interpreted by Treasury Regulation 31.3231(e)-1; the court's conclusion found firm support in the purpose, structure, and legislative history of the RRTA; and therefore, NQSOs were properly taxed as compensation under the RRTA. The court also concluded that, although the informal claims that BNSF filed for the employee tax paid on moving-expense benefits in 1996 and 1997 may satisfy the informal clams doctrine, it was undisputed that BNSF failed to perfect those claims prior to filing the present suit. Accordingly, BNSF's refund claims for those years must be dismissed. The court further concluded that a more reasonable interpretation of section 3231(e)(1)(iii) permitted exclusion of payments to employees for traveling expenses and bona fide and reasonable expenses related to travel, an interpretation harmonizing section 3231(e)(1)(iii) and section 3231(e)(5) as required by the specific-general canon and the rule against superfluities. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "BNSF Railway Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009 Betty and Wayne submitted a tax return on behalf of a Betty Phillips Trust, signed by Betty, who was listed as the trustee, claiming income of $47,997. A second return on behalf of a Wayne Phillips trust, was signed by Wayne, but Betty was listed as trustee. This return reported income of $1,057,585. Both returns claimed that all income had gone to pay fiduciary fees, so that the trusts had no taxable income. The Wayne Trust claimed a refund of $352,528. The Betty Trust claimed $15,999. The IRS issued a check for $352,528. They endorsed the check and deposited it into a joint account. The returns were fraudulent. The IRS had no record of any taxes being paid by the trusts. In December, the IRS served summonses. That month, the couple withdrew $244,137 remaining from their refund proceeds using 13 different locations. They followed the same strategy the next year, but did not receive checks. A jury convicted Betty of conspiracy to defraud the government with respect to claims (18 U.S.C. 286), and of knowingly making a false claim to the government (18 U.S.C. 287.1). The district court sentenced her to 41 months’ imprisonment and ordered them to pay $352,528 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the court improperly admitted evidence, and that the government constructively amended the indictment and violated Betty’s right against self‐incrimination.View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Appellants, two couples, challenged the Tax Court's decisions disallowing their claims of dependency exemption deductions and child tax credits for a child of each husband's prior marriage. For each couple, the only tax year at issue, a year in which the ex-wife, the custodial parent, failed to sign a document stating that she "will not claim such child as a dependent" that year, even though she had agreed to provide that document if her ex-husband paid all required child support. The court reviewed the Tax Court's interpretation of the governing statute de novo and concluded that its decisions were consistent with the plain language of 26 U.S.C. 152(e)(2). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Armstrong, et al. v. C.I.R." on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service and several oil companies agreed to settle a tax dispute over a jointly-developed pipeline system in a closing agreement. After entering the agreement, Phillips Petroleum Company (now ConocoPhillips Company) acquired Arco Transportation (one of the original signatories to the agreement). In 2000 and 2001, Conoco revisited the tax implications of its acquisition and claimed "going-forward" and "basis-increase" deductions on its amended consolidated tax returns. The IRS refunded Conoco's 2000 going-forward deductions, but disputed the remaining deductions. The parties took the dispute to federal district court, where the district court decided the issue on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court rejected Conoco's position and granted summary judgment to the IRS. Conoco appealed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "going-forward" deductions were impermissible for interests that Arco Transportation did not own as of July 1, 1977, and "basis-increase" deductions were impermissible because the Closing Agreement did not fix the amount of a liability or exempt that liability from section 461(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the Court held that Conoco was not entitled to the going-forward or basis-increase deductions. View "United States v. ConocoPhillips Company" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commissioner's disallowance of a $30 million deduction on the Estate's tax return for a lawsuit pending at the time of Gertrude Saunders' death (the Stonehill Claim). The court concluded that the Stonehill Claim was disputed at the date of the decedent's death, and its estimated value as of that date was not ascertainable with reasonable certainty. Therefore, the tax court properly disallowed the Estate's deduction, but correctly allowed a deduction in the amount paid to settle the Stonehill Claim after the decedent's death. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Estate of Saunders v. CIR" on Justia Law

Various groups and several Colorado state legislators filed suit in federal district court to challenge the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR) violated the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution, was in direct conflict with provisions of the Enabling Act, and impermissibly amended the Colorado Constitution. In order to avoid Eleventh Amendment sovereignty issues, the Governor of Colorado was designated as the named defendant. Governor John Hickenlooper filed his Answer to the plaintiffs' Complaint, and promptly followed with a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and prudential standing, and that their claims were barred by the political question doctrine. That motion was denied by the district court, and the Governor appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending the district court erred. The Governor asked the Court to dismiss the case on the same bases that he presented at district court. The ultimate issue before the Tenth Circuit was: whether plaintiffs suffered a particularized injury not widely shared by the general populace that entitled them to have their case heard by the federal courts, and whether the question presented was purely political in nature and should not be reached by the courts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that these plaintiffs could bring their claims, and that the political question doctrine did not bar the Court's consideration. View "Kerr, et al v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellants Esgar Corporation, George and Georgetta Tempel, and Delmar and Patricia Holmes appealed two United States Tax Court decisions, arguing that the Tax Court erred in valuing conservation easements they claimed as charitable deductions and in determining the holding period of state tax credits they sold. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the Tax Court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed that court's decision. View "Esgar Corporation, et al v. Comm'r of Internal Rev." on Justia Law

The IRS held a tax lien against Patrick Hannon’s property, including a parcel of land Hannon owned in Newton, Massachusetts. The IRS discharged that specific parcel from its tax lien under 26 U.S.C. 6325(b)(2)(A) to allow the City of Newton could take the property by eminent domain, and the IRS authorized the discharge upon its receipt of a portion of the amount paid by Newton. Following the taking, Hannon sued Newton in Massachusetts state court and was awarded damages for undercompensation. Both the government and Rita Manning, a lower-priority creditor who had obtained a judgment against Hannon, intervened and asserted priority to receive the damages award. A federal district court entered summary judgment in favor of Manning on the issue of whose lien had priority, concluding that the IRS’s decision to discharge the property from federal tax liens in exchange for payment from the taking meant the government had relinquished any tax lien on the later damages award. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the IRS certificate issued under section 6325(b)(2)(A) did not release any claims the IRS had on the post-taking proceeds awarded to Hannon; and (2) the IRS tax lien on those post-taking proceeds was valid and thus senior to Manning’s judgment lien. View "Hannon v. United States" on Justia Law