Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Karmjit Virk appealed an increase in his tax liability to the Mississippi Department of Revenue’s Board of Review. When Virk failed to appear at his Board of Review hearing, his appeal was involuntarily withdrawn. Virk’s appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals and the Chancery Court; both were dismissed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Board of Review, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the Chancery Court.View "Virk v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The City of Oshkosh levied special assessments against a corner lot property owned by CED Properties, LLC (“CED”). The City issued two special assessments, one for the portion of CED’s property bordering Jackson Street and one for the portion running alongside Murdock Avenue. CED appealed the special assessments by filing a complaint with the circuit court. CED then filed an amended complaint well past the ninety-day time limit to appeal. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to the City, holding that CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required ninety-day time limit. The court of appeals affirmed but on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CED’s original complaint, which was filed within the required ninety-day time period, was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock Avenue special assessment but also the Jackson Street special assessment; and (2) CED’s complaint was sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special assessments.View "CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from an adversary proceeding initiated by Appellant James Vaughn within his Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Appellant sought a declaration that his taxes assessed for the years 1999 and 2000 were dischargeable. After a trial, the bankruptcy court determined the taxes were not dischargeable because Appellant had filed a fraudulent tax return and sought to evade those taxes. The bankruptcy court's decision was affirmed by the federal district court on appeal. Appellant appealed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's affirming of the bankruptcy court's decision. View "In re: Vaughn, et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Indiana’s tax statutes allow Caterpillar, Inc. to increase its Indiana net operating losses (NOLs) by deducting foreign source dividend income. Caterpillar commenced an original tax appeal in the Indiana Tax Court challenging the Indiana Department of State Revenue’s longstanding application of the Indiana tax statutes. The Tax Court entered summary judgment for Caterpillar, concluding that the Indiana NOL statute does not reference or incorporate the foreign source dividend deduction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Caterpillar may not deduct foreign source dividends when calculating Indiana NOLs, and Caterpillar did not meet its burden to show that disallowing the deduction discriminates against foreign commerce under the Foreign Commerce Clause. View "Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue v. Caterpillar, Inc." on Justia Law

On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner on Southern LNG, Inc.'s request for the writ of mandamus, on the ground that Southern had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of tax appeals brought under OCGA 48-5-311. The court said that Southern could raise, and had raised, its statutory claim that it was a public utility required to return its property to the Commissioner rather than to Chatham County in appeals of the county’s tax assessments to the county board of equalization and then to the Chatham County Superior Court. Upon second review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's analysis was incomplete: "the Chatham County tax appeals, as currently constituted, appear not to provide Southern with an adequate alternative to mandamus. . . . The parties have not briefed [their] issues here or below; the trial court did not address them; and this Court should not try to resolve them in the first instance." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie" on Justia Law

Nordstrom, Inc. created several subsidiary corporations, including NIHC, Inc., which engaged in a series of transactions, with each other and with Nordstrom, involving the licensing rights to Nordstrom’s trademarks. The rights to use Nordstrom’s trademarks eventually ended up back with Nordstrom. In the process, Nordstrom’s Maryland taxable income was significantly reduced, and Nordstrom realized a significant gain. The Comptroller of the Treasury issued tax assessments against the subsidiaries’ income, determining that the transactions were an effort to shift income from Nordstrom, where a portion of the income would be taxable by Maryland, to the subsidiaries, where the income would escape Maryland taxation, as the subsidiaries had arguably no nexus to Maryland. The tax court affirmed the assessments against the two subsidiaries, concluding that the activities of the subsidiaries must be considered the activities of Nordstrom, which had a nexus with Maryland, and therefore, the subsidiaries’ income was taxable by Maryland. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NIHC did not carry its burden of showing that the Comptroller’s assessment was wrong. View "NIHC, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury" on Justia Law

Appellants owned residential real estate in West Des Moines. In 2011, the Dallas County Board of Review established an assessment value of Appellants’ property for tax purposes. In 2012, the Board established a new, greater value for the property. Appellants filed a petition with the Board protesting the assessment. The petition stated that the protest was lodged against the 2011 property valuation. At a hearing before the Board, Appellants stated that they wished to protest the valuations for both 2011 and 2012. The Board denied Appellants’ protest, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the 2011 protest was untimely. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellants’ petition was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board and bring Appellants’ protest within the Board’s authority to review; and (2) the Board had the authority to entertain a request for amendment of Appellants’ petition and relate it back to the original filing. Remanded.View "Allen v. Dallas County Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Appellee taxpayer Trevor Jenkins owned and lived on property in the Town of Milton. He failed to pay property taxes for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 tax years. The Town mailed him three delinquent tax notices, in June 2008, June 2009, and January 2010, respectively, advising him to take additional steps to avoid a tax sale. The notices were sent to taxpayer by first-class mail. He denied receiving them, and the notices were not returned to the Town. In 2010, a notice of tax sale was sent via registered mail, return receipt requested. Nearly two weeks before the tax sale, the notice sent to taxpayer by registered mail was returned to the Town’s attorney unclaimed after two attempts at delivery. The Town proceeded with the sale and Loren and Kathryn Hogaboom purchased taxpayer’s property at auction. On the day following the tax sale, the Town’s attorney sent a letter by first-class mail informing taxpayer that his property had been sold in a tax sale, he had one year from the date of sale to redeem the property, and interest would accrue on the purchase amount. This letter was not returned to the Town’s attorney. Taxpayer did not redeem the property during the one-year period, and the Town issued a deed to the purchasers. Purchasers filed a complaint for ejectment in 2011, seeking a writ of possession for the property. Taxpayer admitted his failure to pay taxes but denied ever having received notice of the tax sale. He filed a counterclaim against purchasers and a third-party complaint against the Town, seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside the tax sale as void. Purchasers and the Town both filed motions for summary judgment, contending that notice to taxpayer satisfied the requirements of due process. The Superior Court concluded taxpayer's due process rights were violated because of the undelivered notices. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hogaboom v. Jenkins v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, the Kentucky Department of Revenue, and eight horse Kentucky racing associations that wished to expand their businesses to include wagering upon historical horse racing. Appellants filed an action for a declaration of rights concerning the operation of mechanical and electronic devices for wagering on previously run horse races, so-called “historical horse racing.” The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held (1) the Commission has the statutory authority to license and regulate the operation of pari-mutuel wagering on historic horse racing; (2) under the present statutory scheme, the Department does not have the authority to tax the wagering upon historical horse races; and (3) whether the licensed operation of wagering on historic horse racing violates the gambling provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code is an issue that depends upon facts not in the record, therefore requiring further proceedings in the circuit court.View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky." on Justia Law