Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Mirando pleaded guilty to mail fraud, money laundering, and tax evasion relating to the 1995 and 1996 tax years. Following his 2003 release from prison, the IRS assessed additional tax, interest, and penalties for the 1995 and 1996 tax years and for unpaid tax liabilities for 2000 and 2004. In 2007, Mirando was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States and four counts of tax evasion, one for each of the 1995, 1996, 2000, and 2004 tax years. He again pleaded guilty. The parties stipulated that as of June 2007, the total tax liability, including interest and penalties, amounted was $448,776.13. Mirando made payments to the IRS before entering his plea, totaling $467,686.04, inexplicably paying $18,909.91 more than the agreed amount. He was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment. In 2008, Mirando and his ex-wife filed amended returns, claiming refunds for the taxable years 1995, 1996, and 2000 in the amounts of $38,871, $54,112, and $32,332, respectively. The IRS denied the claims. Mirando filed a tax refund suit. The IRS argued that judicial estoppel barred Mirando from challenging the amount; Mirando argued that the government waived its estoppel argument because it failed to assert it as an affirmative defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the IRS.View "Mirando v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury" on Justia Law

Kerford Limestone Co. purchased a motor grader for use in its manufacturing business and claimed an exemption from sales and use tax on the purchase. The State Tax Commissioner concluded that Kerford had failed to prove the motor grader was exempt manufacturing machinery and equipment. The district court (1) reversed the Commissioner’s determination that to qualify for an exemption, Kerford was required to show that the motor grader was used in manufacturing at least fifty percent of the time; (2) affirmed the Commissioner’s determination that Kerford’s use of the motor grader to maintain “haul roads” was not an exempt use; and (3) remanded for a determination of whether use of the motor grader to maintain inventory stockpile areas qualified Kerford for an exemption. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court’s order that remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding (1) Kerford’s use of the motor grader to maintain inventory stockpile areas was a use in manufacturing; and (2) therefore, Kerford was entitled to an exemption from sales and use tax on its purchase of the motor grader. Remanded to the district court with direction to enter an order granting Kerford the exemption. View "Kerford Limestone Co. v. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Respondent, the City of Concord (City) appealed a superior court decision granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC d/b/a FairPoint Communications - NNE (FairPoint), in its equal protection challenge to the City’s taxation of FairPoint’s use and occupation of public property, and striking the tax levied against FairPoint. In order to provide telecommunications services throughout the City, FairPoint maintained poles, wires, cables, and other equipment within the City’s public rights-of-way. For the 2000 to 2010 tax years, the City imposed a real estate tax upon FairPoint for its use and occupation of this public property. Prior to 2010, the City did not impose a right-of-way tax upon Comcast, which used the City’s rights-of-way to provide cable services pursuant to a franchise agreement. The City began imposing the tax upon Comcast in 2010 in response to a ruling by the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) that, notwithstanding the franchise agreement, Comcast was subject to the tax. Prior to 2008, the City did not impose the same tax upon Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) because it was unaware that PSNH had used and occupied the rights-of-way. Similarly, the City did not tax certain other users of its rights-of-way for their use and occupation of public property during the relevant tax years because it was not aware of their usage. FairPoint brought an action challenging, in relevant part, the constitutionality of the City’s right-of-way tax assessments against it for the 2000 through 2010 tax years. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In granting FairPoint’s motion, and denying the City’s motion, the trial court ruled, as an initial matter, that "intentionality" was not a required element of FairPoint’s equal protection claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that FairPoint’s equal protection claim was one of "selective enforcement," and not an equal protection challenge to the tax scheme itself. Thus, because the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in ruling that the City selectively imposed the tax upon FairPoint, the Court vacated the trial court’s rulings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC v. City of Concord" on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue calculated that AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Company, a commercial laundry operation, owed approximately $40,000 in use taxes for its soap and water treatment chemicals purchased from out-of-state vendors. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) concluded that AAA Laundry’s purchases of soap were exempt from use taxes under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, and AAA Laundry’s purchases of water treatment chemicals were exempt under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.030.2(15). The State sought judicial review of the AHC’s decision. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether AAA Laundry should benefit from the type of sales and use tax exemptions that were denied the taxpayer in Unitog Rental Services, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, even though AAA Laundry brought substantially similar claims based on substantially similar facts. The Court reversed, holding that because AAA Laundry failed to distinguish to discredit Unitog, which held that various sales and use tax exemptions did not apply to commercial laundry operations, it was not entitled to the exemptions it sought.View "AAA Laundry & Linen Supply Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Schnucks grocery stores purchased electricity and natural gas from Union Electric Company, doing business as Ameren Missouri, to operate equipment such as ovens, retarders, and proofers in its bakery departments. Ameren sought a refund for sales tax paid on the energy provided to forty Schnucks stores, alleging that the bakery departments’ energy costs fell within a statutory sales tax exemption for energy used in “processing” products. The Director of Revenue denied the refund request. The Administrative Hearing Commission affirmed, finding that Schnucks’ use of energy to prepare the baked goods for sale and consumption did not constitute “processing” of products. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “processing,” as used in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.054.2, does not include in-store preparation of cooked goods for retail sale. View "Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2006, U-Store-It, L.P. acquired several self-storage facilities in Franklin County in a bulk purchase. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the 2006 sale prices as the value of those properties for the 2006 tax year. U-Store-It appealed, arguing (1) the sale involved related parties and thus could not qualify as an arm’s-length transaction for purposes of valuing the properties; and (2) the sale prices could not be used because they included consideration paid for personal property as well as real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the 2006 sale prices as the value of the properties at issue.View "Hilliard City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of a Superior Court's order ruling in favor of the petitioners, eight individual New Hampshire residents and taxpayers and LRS Technology Services, LLC (LRS), on their petition for a declaratory judgment that the Education Tax Credit program. The State and several intervenors defended the program. The intervenors were three New Hampshire citizens, who wanted their children to receive scholarship funds under the program, and the Network for Educational Opportunity, a non-profit organization involved with the program. The trial court ruled that the petitioners had standing. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petitioners’ declaratory judgment petition because it concluded that: (1) the 2012 amendment to RSA 491:22, I, which allowed taxpayers to establish standing without showing that their personal rights have been impaired or prejudiced, was unconstitutional; and (2) absent that amendment, the petitioners had no standing to bring their constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Duncan v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Landowners appealed the Superior Court of Monroe County's denial and dismissal of their petition for a writ of mandamus and related adverse rulings involving their real property tax appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a commercial building consisting of a warehouse and office space. The tax year at issue was 2005. The property owner disagreed with the auditor’s valuation of the subject property and filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented a value using the income approach as an “owner’s opinion of value.” The BOR found the valuation evidence “competent, credible, and probative” and adopted the value suggested by that approach. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reinstated the auditor’s determination of value, determining that the income-approach valuation did not qualify as an admissible owner’s opinion and was not probative evidence of value in any event. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) certain expert testimony coupled with the income-approach valuation was competent evidence of value; and (2) the BTA may not revert to the auditor’s value when the BOR relied on competent evidence. View "Worthington City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island each tax the transfer of real estate. In separate actions, the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island and the Commissioners of Bristol County, Massachusetts (the municipalities) brought actions against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the entities), seeking declaratory judgments that the entities owed transfer taxes as well as money damages and equitable relief to recover the unpaid taxes. Federal district courts granted the entities’ motions to dismiss based on statutory exemptions from taxation. The municipalities appealed, arguing that a real property exception in the entities’ tax exemptions applies to the transfer taxes and that the exemptions themselves are unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims, holding (1) the transfer taxes are not included in the real property exception to the entities’ tax exemptions; and (2) the tax exemptions are a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and do not violate the Tenth Amendment. View "Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency" on Justia Law