Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the assessor for the Town of Scarborough valued Plaintiff’s property for the tax year 2010-11 at the same assessed value as set in 2005. Plaintiff subsequently filed an application for a tax abatement, which the assessor denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an application for assessment review with Scarborough’s Board of Assessment Review, arguing that the Town’s assessor substantially overvalued his property. After a hearing, the Board denied Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that the property was substantially overvalued relative to its market value. The Supreme Court vacated the Board’s determination and remanded for a reevaluation of Plaintiff’s property, holding that, in this case, the evidence established that the property was substantially overvalued. View "Terfloth v. Town of Scarborough" on Justia Law

When a taxpayer is a large corporation such as Ford, it often takes years for the IRS to conduct an audit of the corporation’s tax liability. When the IRS determines that the taxpayer underpaid its taxes, the taxpayer is liable for underpayment interest that accrued while the IRS analyzed its tax liability, 26 U.S.C. 6601(a). If the IRS determines that the taxpayer overpaid its taxes for the year under scrutiny, the government owes overpayment interest, which accrues from “the date of the overpayment.” Ford remitted approximately $875 million to the IRS in the 1990s after the IRS initiated an audit and preliminarily determined that Ford had underpaid its taxes by nearly $2 billion during the preceding decade. Ford sent the money pursuant to Revenue Procedure 84-58, which allows taxpayers to remit funds to stop the accrual of underpayment interest and identifies: “deposits in the nature of a cash bond” and “advance tax payments.” Ford designated each of its payments as a deposit in the nature of a cash bond, which the IRS says is “made merely to stop the running of [underpayment] interest,” “is not a payment of tax,” and “if returned to the taxpayer, does not bear interest.” Later Ford asked the IRS to treat its remittances as advance tax payments, which do bear interest in the event of an overpayment. The IRS complied, but subsequently reversed its position and concluded that the monies Ford remitted to the IRS to cover the alleged deficiencies were actually an overpayment of taxes. The government refunded Ford’s tax remittances plus overpayment interest, calculated from the dates on which Ford requested that its deposits be converted into advance tax payments rather than from the earlier dates on which Ford remitted the deposits. View "Ford Motor Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal was the second appeal in a dispute between Taxpayer-appellant J. Clark Bundren, M.D. and appellees City of Tulsa and Tulsa Hills, LLC. The two issues in that case were: (1) whether Taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a declaratory judgment proceeding to determine the legality of certain public expenditures and financing; and (2) whether the appeal was moot because the appellees, Tulsa Industrial Authority, City of Tulsa Oklahoma, and Tulsa Hills, L.L.C. (TIA, City, and TH, respectively), obtained a declaratory judgment after Taxpayer was prohibited by the trial court from intervening. The Supreme Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for mootness and held that Taxpayer's claim for equitable relief presented by a motion to intervene was not made moot by the judgment rendered during the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order that denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a qui tam plaintiff, but reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to intervene in which Taxpayer sought equitable relief. The case what then remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court ordered Taxpayer to file his "Petition in Intervention" on or before August 16, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Taxpayer complied with the order by filing the petition. On September 14, 2012, the appellees each filed separate motions to dismiss, and asserted that the bondholders were necessary parties. Several months later, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss and allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition. The court included the requirement that if Taxpayer filed an amended petition seeking to enjoin the City from making payments to the bondholders who purchased the bonds used to finance the underlying transaction, then the Taxpayer must provide notice of the amended petition to the bondholders and file proof of such notice with the court. Taxpayer filed an amended petition, and the appellees responded with separate motions to dismiss. The trial court again dismissed Taxpayer's petition on the basis that Taxpayer did not provide notice to bondholders as necessary parties to the lawsuit, and that Taxpayer did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court found that the bondholders were necessary parties to the action and if not joined, the present parties to the action would face a substantial risk of incurring multiple and potentially inconsistent obligations. The court again dismissed without prejudice the causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief for failure to comply with the court's prior order and for failure to join all parties necessary "to a just adjudication of this matter." The court allowed Taxpayer twenty days to file an amended petition, and ordered that if Taxpayer did not amend the petition within that time, the action would be dismissed with prejudice to all the claims. Instead of amending the petition, Taxpayer filed an Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus to the Supreme Court. The trial court entered a final order of dismissal. The dispositive issue of this matter was whether Taxpayer had to include bondholders as necessary parties to this case. The Supreme Court concluded he did, and affirmed the trial court. View "Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

First United Security Bank and its wholly owned subsidiary, Paty Holdings, LLC (collectively, "the bank"), brought suit to recover excess funds received by Tuscaloosa County from the tax sale of real estate owned by Wayne Allen Russell, Jr., and on which First United had a mortgage. The bank foreclosed on its mortgage after the tax sale but before the demand for excess proceeds was made. The issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a purchaser at a foreclosure sale is an "owner" entitled under 40-10-28, Ala. Code 1975, to receive the excess proceeds from a tax sale of the real property foreclosed upon. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank was entitled to the excess tax-sale proceeds. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "First United Security Bank v. McCollum" on Justia Law

Mr. and Mrs. Melot owed millions of dollars in federal taxes. Billy Melot was serving time in federal prison for tax crimes. The debt led the United States to foreclose on the Melots’ real properties, and the Melots tried to stop the foreclosure. Sanctions were imposed because of the methods used by the Melots in relation to their attempts to stop the foreclosure: the district court regarded them as fraudulent. The disagreement began when the district court reduced the tax assessments to judgments and ordered the sale of the Melots’ real properties. That order prompted a motion to intervene by Steven Byers, who filed documents asserting liens on the property. The documents were mailed from the city where the Melots’ properties were located (Hobbs, New Mexico). The government suspected fraud and collaboration with the Melots, pointing out to the court that: (1) Byers lived in prison; (2) he could not own any liens because he was destitute; (3) the Melots never disclosed any liens; (4) Mrs. Melot had signed Byers’ name on the lien and motion to intervene; and (5) the New Mexico address listed for Byers was actually the home of Mrs. Melot’s friends. At the hearing on the motion to intervene, Byers moved to withdraw his motion for lack of proof. The court denied the motion to withdraw, and the government presented evidence tending to show that the Melots and Byers created a scheme to derail the foreclosure. Mrs. Melot refused to answer questions, invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The magistrate judge certified criminal contempt by the Melots. More than a year later, the district court issued its order addressing the contempt certification with sanctions including removal of Mrs. Melots from the property, reimbursing the government's costs for the hearing, striking of the Melots' pending motions, and filing restrictions. The Melots argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by imposing sanctions without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Melot (Katherine), et al" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of Pennsylvania Leadership Charter School appealed an order of the Commonwealth Court which held that the retroactive real estate tax exemption provided in Section 1722-A(e)(3) of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. 17-1722-A(e)(3), was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed (though by different reasoning), concluding that retroactive application of the real estate tax exemption of Section 1722-A(e)(3) was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it violated the separation of powers doctrine. View "Friends of PaLCS v. Chester Cty Bd of Assess" on Justia Law

This case centered on the interpretation of a state tax deduction statute. Former RCW 82.04.4292 (1980) provided that in computing their business and occupation (B&O) tax, banks and financial institutions could deduct from their income "amounts derived from interest received on investments or loans primarily secured by first mortgages or trust deeds on nontransient residential properties." Between 2004 and 2007, petitioner Cashmere Valley Bank invested in mortgage-backed securities known as real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). Cashmere claimed that interest earned on these investments was deductible under RCW 82.04.4292. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded Cashmere could not claim the deduction because its investments in REMICs and CMOs were not "primarily secured" by first mortgages or trust deeds. The ultimate source of cash flow was mortgage payments. However, Cashmere's investments were not backed by any encumbrance on property nor did Cashmere have any legal recourse to the underlying trust assets in the event of default. Thus, Cashmere's investments were not "primarily secured" by mortgages or trust deeds. View "Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Wyoming Department of Revenue (Department) directed Appellants, on-line travel companies (OTCs), to collect and remit taxes on the total amounts they collected from customers booking hotel rooms in Wyoming. The State Board of Equalization (SBOE) upheld the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the SBOE did not err in finding that the full amount paid by a customer to the OTCs for a reservation of a hotel room in Wyoming was taxable to the Department; (2) the Department’s imposition of sales tax on the full amount collected by the OTCs did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution as applied to the OTCs; and (3) the imposition of the sales tax did not violate the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act.View "Travelocity.com LP v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Fradco, Inc., contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following an audit. Through its resident agent, Fradco requested the department send all information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco designated. The department mailed a copy of its preliminary decision and order of determination to Fradco's CPA. It sent the final assessment only to Fradco's place of business. Fradco's CPA inquired about the final assessment and was informed a month later that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection. The letter did not include a copy of the assessment. The department sought summary judgment in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment. The tribunal denied the motion, concluding that state law provided a parallel notice requirement whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period. Similarly, SMK, LLC, contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury. SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent SMK, and receive mail from the department. The department faxed the CPA a notice stating that the audit package had been submitted. It sent a final assessment to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final assessment. The CPA made several inquiries to the department and received no answers from the department. Five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK's CPA the final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed. The Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal and ordered that the Fradco and SMK appeals be heard together. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run.View "Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Ardmore paid a county demand notice for a documentary transfer tax and then filed a tax refund action, contending that Revenue and Taxation Code section 11911 does not authorize a documentary transfer tax based on the change in ownership of a legal entity that owns the legal entity that holds title to realty. The court affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment for the county, concluding that section 11911 permits a documentary transfer tax when a transfer of interest in a legal entity results in a "change of ownership" within the meaning of Revenue and Taxation Code section 64, subdivision (c) or (d). Therefore, the county was permitted to impose a transfer tax. View "926 North Ardmore Ave., LLC v. County of L.A." on Justia Law