Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Board of Managers of the French Oaks Condominium, a residential complex located in the Town of Amherst, commenced a Real Property Tax Law article 7 proceeding against the Town challenging the Town’s tax assessment of the development as excessive. A referee concluded that the Board established that its property was overassessed and directed the Town to amend its tax roll and remit any tax overpayments to the Board. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board did not rebut the presumption that the initial tax assessment was valid.View "Bd. of Managers of French Oaks Condo. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-consumers brought an action against Defendant-retailer under two consumer protection statutes, alleging that Defendant improperly charged them sales tax reimbursement on sales of hot coffee sold “to go,” when, according to Plaintiffs, the tax code rendered such sales exempt from sales tax. Plaintiffs sought a refund of the asserted unlawful charges, damages, and an injunction forbidding collection of sales tax reimbursement for such sales. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Revenue and Taxation Code provides the exclusive means by which Plaintiffs’ dispute over the taxability of a retail sale may be resolved, and Plaintiffs’ current lawsuit was inconsistent with tax code procedures; and (2) the consumer statutes under which Plaintiffs brought their action could not be employed to avoid the limitations and procedures set out in the tax code.View "Loeffler v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

Commercial Barge Line (CBL) was a Delaware corporation and the single member of two limited liability companies, one of which was American Commercial Barge Line (ACBL). In 2007, the Department of Revenue (DOR) conducted an audit and determined that CBL and ACBL (together, Taxpayers) owed Missouri sales and use tax on goods and supplies delivered to ACBL’s towboats while the towboats traveled south on the Mississippi River. Taxpayers sought review of these assessments. The Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC) upheld the DOR’s determination that Taxpayers owed Missouri sales and use tax on the goods and supplies at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the AHC, holding (1) the sales and use tax assessments did not violate the Commerce Clause because the supplies were purchased or used within Missouri and were fairly related to the services the Taxpayers received from the state; (2) the taxes did not violate the Maritime Transportation Security Act because they were assessed on ACBL’s purchases and deliveries of supplies and not on the towboats; and (3) the relevant statute of limitations did not bar the DOR from assessing tax liability for the audit period, 2001 through 2006. View "Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Greenwood Gaming and Entertainment appealed the Commonwealth Court's en banc decision overruling exceptions and affirming a panel decision of that court, which likewise affirmed the order of the Board of Finance and Review regarding calculation of a slot machine tax. Greenwood petitioned the Supreme Court to reverse the decision and hold that the relevant section of the Gaming Act (4 Pa.C.S. sections 1101-1904) allowed for the cost of promotional awards given away by the gaming facility to be subtracted prior to calculation of the "gross terminal revenue" for purposes of slot machine taxes. Upon review of the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings: "to be deductible, the promotional awards must result from playing slot machines, and Greenwood is obligated to prove as much. After review of the Stipulation, we conclude that questions of fact remain concerning whether the specific awards claimed are a 'result of playing a slot machine.'"View "Greenwood Gaming v. PA Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Interstate Traffic Signs, Inc. (“Interstate”) rented traffic control equipment to contractors working on road construction projects. Prior to April 2010, Interstate charged sales tax on the equipment rental charge but did not charge tax on its delivery and “pick-up” charges, which included costs associated with retrieving and returning the rental equipment to Interstate. Beginning in April 2010, Interstate charged sales tax on the delivery charges but did not charge tax on pick-up charges. After an audit, the Commissioner of Revenue assessed an additional $37,838 in sales and use tax, determining that Interstate should have been charging sales tax on its pick-up charges. The tax court upheld the Commissioner’s assessment, concluding that the pick-up charge was subject to sales tax pursuant to Minn. Stat. 297A.62(1). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pick-up charges fall within the definition of “sales price” under section Minn. Stat. 297A.61(7), making those charges subject to sales tax under section 297A.62(1).View "Interstate Traffic Signs, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant CDR Systems Corporation entered into a stock purchase agreement to sell all of its assets. In August 2009, CDR filed its 2008 Oklahoma Small Business Corporation Income Tax Return and claimed the Oklahoma Capital Gains Deduction for gains received from the sale. The Oklahoma Tax Commission denied the deduction claimed by CDR because CDR was not headquartered in Oklahoma for three years prior to the sale as required by state law. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and found the deduction violated the dormant commerce clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court found there was no discrimination against interstate commerce to which the dormant commerce clause applied. Furthermore, the Court held that even if the dormant commerce clause applied in this case, the deduction did not facially discriminate against interstate commerce, it did not have a discriminatory purpose, and the deduction had no discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.View "CDR Systems Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2005, real property owned by Roger and Sharon Barkoff was sold for $1.4 million. In 2008, after performing the reappraisal that the law required every six years, the Summit County Fiscal Officer determined the value of the property to be $902,320. The Akron City School District Board of Education challenged the assessment, asserting that the 2005 sale price should be adopted as the value of the property. The Summit County Board of Revision retained the fiscal officer’s value. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the Barkoffs had not rebutted the presumption that the sale was within a reasonable time before the tax-lien date, therefore adopting the $1.4 million sale price from 2005 as the value of the property for tax year 2008. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s application of the recency presumption, holding that when a property has been the subject of the reappraisal that occurs every six years, a sale that occurred more than twenty-four months before the lien date should not be presumed recent if a different value has been determined for that lien date as part of the reappraisal, and thus no presumption arises that the sale price reflects the property’s value.View "Akron City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Summit County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Respondent, a Mississippi corporation with operations in several states, including Missouri, established a “rabbi trust” to fund its executive deferred compensation plan for company executives. In filing its 2007 Missouri corporate income tax return, Respondent reported income from the rabbi trust as “non-business” income and, therefore, reported and allocated all trust income to Mississippi and paid Mississippi income taxes on that income. The Missouri director of revenue determined that the trust income was business income subject to apportionment and taxation in Missouri. On appeal, the Administrative Hearing Commission concluded that the trust income was non-business income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trust income was business income “used for the current operational purpose of attracting and retaining key employees” and was therefore subject to apportionment in Missouri. View "MINACT, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant was a Missouri corporation that sold rides on untethered hot air balloons. Appellant collected sales tax on receipts of balloon rides and subsequently requested a refund of those sales taxes from the director of revenue. The director denied Appellant’s request. The director also assessed sales taxes on the amount paid to Appellants by third-party vendors and use taxes on a hot air balloon and inflator fan purchased in Texas. The administrative hearing commission (AHC) denied Appellant’s claim for a refund of the sales taxes paid and Appellant’s challenge to the assessment of sales and use taxes. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the ruling of the AHC as to the assessment of sales taxes on all sales of hot air balloon rides - those purchased directly from Appellant in Missouri and those purchased by flight certificate from out-of-state third-party vendors - because the taxes on those gross receipts were state taxes on air commerce, which are prohibited by the Anti-Head Tax Act; and (2) affirmed the AHC in regard to the assessed use taxes, holding that Appellant was liable for use taxes on equipment purchased outside of Missouri. View "Balloons Over the Rainbow, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Shelby County Board of Equalization petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition, to direct the Shelby Circuit Court to dismiss as untimely an appeal filed by Central Shelby LTD. challenging a final ad valorem tax assessment issued by the Board. In response to Central Shelby's objection to the Board's 2013 assessed value of real property owned by Central Shelby, the Board entered a final ad valorem assessment. The clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court mailed a copy of the notice of appeal to the Board, which received the notice on July 8, 2013. Thereafter, the Board moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Central Shelby had not filed with the secretary of the Board its notice of appeal within 30 days of the final assessment as, the Board contended, section 40-3-25 requires. The trial court, without stating the findings on which its decision was based, denied the Board's motion. In response, the Board filed this petition alleging that, as a result of the alleged untimely notice to it of Central Shelby's appeal, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying appeal. Central Shelby faulted the circuit clerk for her alleged untimely mailing of the notice of appeal to the secretary of the Board. The Supreme Court concluded the appealing taxpayer is charged with the responsibility of filing the notice of appeal with the secretary of the Board. As a result of Central Shelby's failure to comply with the provisions of 40-3-25, its appeal was not perfected and the trial court's jurisdiction was never invoked. The Supreme Court therefore granted the Board's petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the Board's motion to dismiss and to dismiss Central Shelby's appeal as untimely. View "Central Shelby LTD. v. Shelby County Board of Equalization" on Justia Law