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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government in a suit by Union Pacific to recover a refund of about $75 million in taxes that it paid the federal government from 1991 to 2007 under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA). The court held that the RRTA unambiguously does not require payment of RRTA taxes on remuneration in stock. Furthermore, the RRTA does not require Union Pacific to pay taxes when it made so-called ratification payments to employees when their unions ratified collective bargaining agreements. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board, which concluded that, under a provision of the Massachusetts sales tax statute known as the “drop shipment rule,” Taxpayer was responsible for collective and remitting sales tax due on products it sold to out-of-state retailers and then delivered to consumers. Taxpayer sold goods to retailers at wholesale and delivered the goods to Massachusetts consumers and others on behalf of those retailers. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Commissioner of Revenue and the Board did not err in determining that Taxpayer was responsible as the vendor for collecting and remitting the sales tax due on products it sold to the out-of-state retailers and then delivered to consumers where it failed to meet its burden of proving that the retailers were engaged in business in Massachusetts; and (2) the statutory drop shipment rule does not violate the dormant commerce clause of the federal Constitution. View "D & H Distributing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

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South California Edison (Edison) was not due a refund of use tax paid to Nevada because it did not demonstrate the existence of substantially similar entities that gained an unfair tax advantage because of the unconstitutional tax, and Edison was not owed a tax credit in an amount equal to the transaction privilege tax (TPT) levied by Arizona because the TPT did not qualify as a sales tax paid by Edison within the meaning of Nev. Admin. Code 372.055. Edison filed a claim with the State Department of Taxation for a refund of the use tax it paid between 1998 and 2000. The Department and Nevada Tax Commission denied the requested refund. Edison then filed an independent action in the district court seeking a refund of the taxes it paid. The district court concluded that, while the negative implications of the dormant Commerce Clause rendered Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.270 (the use tax exemption) unconstitutional, Edison was not entitled to a refund because it did not have favored competitors that benefitted from the discriminatory taxation scheme. The Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons set forth above. View "Southern California Edison v. State Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

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Taxpayers who failed to report and pay tax on foreign income filed suit after the IRS denied their applications for the expanded Streamlined Procedures program. The Streamlined Procedures' reduced benefits were counterbalanced by fewer compliance requirements; as relevant here, the Streamlined Procedures participant need not pay any accuracy-based penalty. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the district court was without jurisdiction to resolve taxpayers' claims in light of the jurisdiction-stripping provision contained in the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), 26 U.S.C. 7421 et seq. View "Maze v. IRS" on Justia Law

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Chandler’s-Boise, LLC (“Chandlers”), challenges a district court’s grant of summary judgment upholding the Idaho State Tax Commission’s (the “Commission”) deficiency determination. Chandlers owned and operated a restaurant in downtown Boise, Idaho. The Commission, through its Sales, Use, and Miscellaneous Tax Audit Bureau (the “Bureau”), conducted a comprehensive sales audit of Chandlers for the period of May 1, 2007, through May 31, 2010 (the “Audit Period”), to determine sales tax law compliance. After its audit, the Bureau found errors in sales, fixed asset additions, ordinary purchases, and meals given to employees and guests. The only error relevant to this appeal was Chandlers’ failure to pay sales tax on automatically added gratuities that were added to banquet meals, room service meals, and restaurant dining services for groups having six or more persons (the “Charges”). The bills that Chandlers gave its customers during the Audit Period did not contain a written statement indicating that the Charges could be declined as required by the Pre-2011 Rule. Chandlers did not retain the Charges in question; rather, the employees involved in preparing or providing the meals, including the server, busser, and bartender, kept the Charges. The Bureau issued a Notice of Deficiency Determination to Chandlers wherein it determined that Chandlers owed $91,243 for sales and use tax plus penalty and interest. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in rejecting Chandlers’ arguments with respect to non-payment of the Charges, and affirmed that court’s judgment. View "Chandlers-Boise v. Idaho Tax Commission" on Justia Law

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RIHC, a Maine nonprofit entity, owns Roque Island, 1,242 acres of land, with five houses and numerous outbuildings. Roque Island is a homestead that has been owned by the same family since the early 1800s. In 2010, Jonesport hired a certified private assessor for revaluation of all town properties. The assessor used state-approved assessment software. Its calculations include the character of the neighborhood so that values for island properties are calculated at a lower rate because they are not benefitted by certain services that mainland properties receive. Building values on islands are subject to an “economic obsolescence factor” of 200%, resulting in a greater assessed value than for a comparable mainland structures because of the additional cost of building on an island. Due to an oversight, the economic obsolescence factor originating with the 2010 revaluation was not fully applied to the Island structures until the 2014 tax year, when their total valuation increased by 52% from the previous year. RIHC sought an abatement of $1,305,150 from the 2014 building valuation assessment of $2,609,846, which would result in a property tax reduction of $20,000. That application was constructively denied. The Board of Appeals also denied RIHC’s application, concluding that RIHC’s buildings were being taxed consistently with buildings on islands in other towns. The lower court and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed; the record does not compel the conclusion that the rate differentiation is unjustly discriminatory. View "Roque Island Gardner Homestead Corp. v. Town of Jonesport" on Justia Law

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Applying Wis. Stat. 70.47(7)(aa) and Wis. Stat. 74.37(4)(a) in a manner that required submission to a tax assessor’s search as a precondition to challenging the revaluation of their property violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights. Plaintiffs brought this case claiming that the assessment of their real property was excessive and that sections 70.47(7)(aa) and 74.37(4)(a), as applied, were unconstitutional because they conditioned their right to challenge the assessor’s valuation of the property on submission to a search of the interior of their home. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Town. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sections 70.47(7)(aa) and 73.37(4)(a) were unconstitutionally applied to Plaintiffs. View "Milewski v. Town of Dover" on Justia Law

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This appeal raised a question of whether the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution permitted a taxing authority to selectively appeal only the assessments of commercial properties, such as apartment complexes, while choosing not to appeal the assessments of other types of property – most notably, single-family residential homes – many of which were under-assessed by a greater percentage. The common pleas court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint, finding Appellants’ claims failed as a matter of law because the School District (the taxing authority) was not the entity that set assessments, and the applicable statute gave it a clear statutory right to appeal tax assessments set by the County. In rejecting Appellants’ argument relating to discriminatory treatment, the Court indicated that “[t]he filing of selective appeals does not result in a uniformity violation, and it is not deliberate discrimination.” In this regard, the court ultimately concluded “the Uniformity Clause does not require equalization across all subclassifications of real property.” The Commonwealth Court affirmed in a published decision. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, finding Appellants’ complaint set forth a valid claim that the School District’s appeal policy violated the Uniformity Clause. View "Valley Forge Towers v. Upper Merion SD" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for innocent spouse relief based on lack of jurisdiction and from an order denying petitioner's motion to vacate the order of dismissal. The court held that petitioner's failure to file the petition within the statutorily prescribed period deprived the Tax Court of jurisdiction to review her claim. View "Matuszak v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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Clayton County appealed the trial court’s order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed by the City ofCollege Park. This dispute arose over the taxation of alcoholic beverages at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Of the many businesses located within the Airport, some are located in the unincorporated sections of the County while other businesses are located in the County within the incorporated limits of the City of College Park (the “City”). In its complaint, the City contended that since the 1983 enactment of OCGA section 3-8-1 (regulation and taxation of alcoholic beverages at public airports), it has not been receiving the proper amount of alcoholic beverage taxes to which it was entitled, and that the County improperly infringed on its authority to tax by instructing vendors to remit to the County 50% of the taxes due from the sale of alcohol in those portions of the Airport located within the City limits. The City and County disagree on the interpretation of OCGA 3-8-1(e). In seeking a judgment on the pleadings, Clayton County asserted, among other things, that the City of College Park’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The matter of sovereign immunity was not briefed by the parties, and the trial court did not consider it. To permit a more thorough consideration of this question, the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to address it, with the benefit of full briefing. View "Clayton County v. City of College Park" on Justia Law