Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

A taxpayer in the City of Findlay filed a mandamus action against the city and various municipal officials, alleging that the city failed to comply with municipal income-tax statutes and initiated fraudulent tax collection efforts against him and other delinquent taxpayers. He sought to enjoin the city from engaging in these tax collection activities and to compel compliance with local tax ordinances. In his filings, the taxpayer did not claim that any tax complaint was currently pending against him or allege a specific, individualized injury. Instead, he asserted standing as a taxpayer and attempted to bring his action on behalf of all taxpayers, invoking the public right doctrine.Previously, this dispute had resulted in several adverse judgments against the taxpayer in both the Third District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio, all relating to similar underlying facts concerning Findlay’s efforts to collect unpaid municipal taxes. In the present matter, the Third District Court of Appeals granted the city’s motion to dismiss the mandamus action under Civil Rule 12(B)(6). The appellate court found that the taxpayer lacked standing because he failed to allege a specific injury distinct from the general public and that his claims were not cognizable in mandamus. The court also denied his request for leave to file a third amended complaint, concluding that he had not demonstrated good cause to do so.On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer lacked standing to pursue the mandamus action because he did not allege an actual injury personal to him that was fairly traceable to the city’s conduct, as required for individual standing. The Supreme Court also rejected reliance on the public right doctrine, reaffirming its prior decision that this doctrine had been overruled, and denied both the motion to supplement the record and the request for oral argument. View "State ex rel. Martens v. Findlay" on Justia Law

Disney Platform Distribution, BAMTech, and Hulu, subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Company, provide video streaming services to subscribers in the City of Santa Barbara. In 2022, the City’s Tax Administrator notified these companies that they had failed to collect and remit video users’ taxes under Ordinance 5471 for the period January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2020, resulting in substantial assessments. The companies appealed to the City Administrator, and a retired Associate Justice served as hearing officer, ultimately upholding the Tax Administrator’s decision.Following the administrative appeal, the companies sought judicial review by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Santa Barbara County. The trial court denied their petition, finding that the Ordinance does apply to video streaming services and rejecting arguments that the Ordinance violated the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the First Amendment, and Article XIII C of the California Constitution. The trial court also found there was no violation of Public Utilities Code section 799’s notice requirements, as the City’s actions did not constitute a change in the tax base or adoption of a new tax.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the Ordinance applies to video streaming services, interpreting the term “channel” in its ordinary, non-technical sense and finding that the voters intended technological neutrality. The court further held that the Ordinance does not violate the Internet Tax Freedom Act because video streaming subscriptions and DVD sales/rentals are not “similar” under the Act. Additionally, the court concluded the tax is not a content-based regulation of speech under the First Amendment, and that delayed enforcement did not constitute a tax increase requiring additional voter approval or notice under the California Constitution or Public Utilities Code section 799. View "Disney Platform Distribution v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

A retailer in North Carolina sold a product called “Replenishments” for a wireless provider. During the period audited by state tax authorities, the way Replenishments could be used changed. In the first part of the audit period, customers could only redeem Replenishments for prepaid wireless service. In the second part, they could redeem them for wireless service or for a broader range of products and services from the wireless provider. The state tax agency audited the retailer and determined that sales tax should have been collected and remitted on all Replenishment sales at the point of sale, assessing a significant tax liability.The retailer challenged the assessment in the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), which divided the audit period into two: Period I (pre-September 2017) and Period II (post-September 2017). The administrative law judge found the retailer responsible for tax collection during Period I, since Replenishments were only for wireless service, but not responsible during Period II, when Replenishments functioned as stored-value cards (like gift cards) usable for various products, making the wireless provider responsible for collecting tax at redemption. The North Carolina Business Court reviewed the case and disagreed with OAH about Period II, holding the retailer responsible for collecting sales tax on all Replenishment sales across both periods.The Supreme Court of North Carolina conducted a detailed statutory analysis, affirmed the Business Court’s ruling for Period I, and reversed as to Period II. The Supreme Court held that in Period I, Replenishments were prepaid wireless calling services taxable at the point of sale, making the retailer responsible for tax collection and remittance. For Period II, the Court held Replenishments were stored-value cards, taxable only when redeemed, with the wireless provider responsible for tax. The Court remanded the case for recalculation of the retailer’s tax liability consistent with this holding. View "N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Wireless Ctr. of N.C., Inc" on Justia Law

A special agent with Homeland Security Investigations was discovered to have stolen money from criminal targets, embezzled agency funds, and entered into a cash-for-protection arrangement with a confidential source. The agent’s conduct came to light after the confidential source was arrested by the DEA, and text messages between the two were uncovered. Investigators found that the agent deleted incriminating messages, misappropriated cash from drug dealers and agency sources, manipulated controlled buys for personal gain, and protected his source from law enforcement scrutiny. The agent was also shown to have structured cash deposits to evade bank reporting requirements and failed to report significant taxable income.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, conducted a thirteen-day jury trial in 2023. The jury found the agent guilty on all counts, including filing false tax returns, structuring cash transactions, and concealing material facts from the government. The district court denied the agent’s post-trial motions for acquittal and a new trial, then imposed sentence. The agent appealed, contesting the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict on all counts. The evidence included direct and indirect proof of unreported income, clear indications of structuring to evade reporting requirements, and material omissions on government forms. The court found no grounds to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations or the district court’s denial of post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Sabaini" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted following a jury trial for filing a fraudulent tax return and theft of government funds, after he submitted a tax form claiming a large refund based on a mistaken belief about a government “trust” linked to Social Security. He received and spent the refund, then requested another, which was denied. The IRS investigated, and he later filed a document stating he was deceased. His defense at trial centered on his claim that he misunderstood tax law due to information from an online forum and advice from an IRS agent.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana oversaw the criminal trial, where the petitioner was represented by attorney John Davis. During trial, Davis pursued motions under Brady v. Maryland, seeking exculpatory evidence, but the motions were denied. After conviction, Davis was removed from the Seventh Circuit Bar for misconduct in an unrelated case. The petitioner then moved for a new trial and, later, for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on Davis’s disciplinary history and alleged trial errors. The district court denied both motions, finding Davis’s performance did not prejudice the petitioner’s defense and that his disciplinary issues in other cases did not establish ineffectiveness in the present case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of collateral relief de novo for legal issues and for clear error regarding factual findings. The court held that there is no per se rule that concurrent or subsequent attorney discipline renders counsel ineffective; instead, a petitioner must show specific deficient performance and resulting prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel’s alleged errors affected the outcome of the trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion. View "Blake v USA" on Justia Law

A company engaged in oil and gas production in Wyoming purchased electricity to operate equipment—primarily electronic submersible pumps and pumpjacks—that lifted fluids from underground, moved them to surface facilities for separation, and ultimately delivered the separated crude oil to custody transfer units (LACTs). The company sought a refund of sales tax paid on a portion of this electricity, arguing that the power was used for “transportation” and therefore exempt from sales tax under a statutory provision for those “engaged in the transportation business.” Utility studies commissioned by the company attempted to quantify what percentage of electricity was used for surface movement of fluids.A prior audit by the Wyoming Department of Revenue covering different years led to a similar refund dispute, but the Department conceded that the company was “engaged in the transportation business,” and the Wyoming State Board of Equalization ruled in the company’s favor. However, for the tax years at issue here, the Department denied the refund, asserting the company was not engaged in the transportation business as required by statute. The Board, after a contested hearing, again ruled for the company, finding it met the exemption, but the Department appealed, and the District Court certified the case to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.The Supreme Court of Wyoming held that collateral estoppel did not bar the Department’s appeal because the issue of whether the company was engaged in the transportation business was not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, but stipulated. On the merits, the Court reversed the Board’s decision. It found that the company’s activities—moving crude oil from the wellhead to the LACT and separating water—were part of the production process, not transportation. The company was not engaged in the transportation business as contemplated by the statute and the electricity was used for production, not actual transportation purposes. Thus, the company was not entitled to a sales tax exemption or refund. View "Department of Revenue v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the ad valorem tax assessments for a low-income-housing property purchased in 2019 by Southampton 100, LLC. Dissatisfied with the Jefferson County Tax Assessor's valuations for several tax years, Southampton sought adjustments from the Jefferson County Board of Equalization and Adjustments. While the Board reduced some assessments, Southampton remained dissatisfied and filed separate appeals for each tax year. These appeals were consolidated in the Jefferson Circuit Court, where the Alabama Department of Revenue (ADOR) became the appellee.As the consolidated appeal progressed, the parties encountered repeated discovery disputes. ADOR filed multiple motions for sanctions, culminating in a request to depose Southampton’s second corporate representative, who resided in California, in person in Alabama. Southampton argued that requiring travel was unduly burdensome, offering instead to make this representative available via Zoom or for an in-person deposition immediately before trial. However, Southampton never sought a formal protective order. ADOR persisted and, after additional scheduling complications and denied motions, requested dismissal of the appeal as a sanction for alleged noncompliance. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted this request and dismissed Southampton’s appeal with prejudice, without a hearing or explanation.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case, applying the standard of whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in imposing sanctions. The Court held that dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction that requires a showing of willful and deliberate disregard for discovery obligations. The record did not support a finding that Southampton acted willfully or intentionally to prevent discovery. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southampton 100, LLC v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case concerns the State Water Resources Control Board's intervention in the Tulare Lake groundwater subbasin pursuant to California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). After local agencies in the subbasin submitted a groundwater sustainability plan that the Department of Water Resources twice determined to be inadequate, the State Board designated the basin as probationary in April 2024. This designation triggered state-imposed monitoring, reporting, and fee obligations on certain groundwater extractors. In response, the Kings County Farm Bureau and others filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint, asserting that the State Board exceeded its authority and challenging the validity of the designation and associated fees on several grounds.The Superior Court of Kings County addressed both a demurrer filed by the State Board and a request from the Farm Bureau for a preliminary injunction. The trial court dismissed the equal protection claim with leave to amend, but overruled the demurrer as to claims that (1) the State Board used improper “underground regulations” not adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), (2) the imposed extraction fee constituted an unlawful tax, and (3) general declaratory relief was appropriate. The trial court also granted a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the State Board’s enforcement activities.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer. The appellate court held that all actions by the State Board taken under sections 10735.2 and 10735.8 of the Act—including the designation of a probationary basin—are exempt from the APA unless the State Board voluntarily opts to adopt regulations using APA procedures. Therefore, the claim for improper “underground regulations” could not proceed. The court also held that a challenge to the extraction fee as an unlawful tax was barred by the constitutional “pay first” rule, as no exception applied. Lastly, the court determined that declaratory relief was unavailable because the Legislature provided for review of State Board actions exclusively by writ of mandate. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant the demurrer without leave to amend as to these three claims. View "State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization based in Queens purchased a 73-acre parcel in the Town of Callicoon, Sullivan County, in 2018. Although the organization originally intended to use the property as a retreat center, testimony established that its actual use involved farming vegetables on about one cleared acre for charitable distribution to low-income residents in Queens. Occasional overnight stays involved religious activities, but there was no evidence of regular organized religious services or use as a retreat center. The Town Supervisor, who lived nearby and farmed part of the property without a formal agreement, confirmed the farming use but did not observe overnight retreats.After the Town Assessor denied a religious use tax exemption for the property for the 2021 tax year, the organization filed a grievance complaint, which was denied by the Town’s Board of Assessment Review. The organization then initiated an RPTL article 7 proceeding in Supreme Court, challenging the denial. A similar process occurred for the 2022 tax year, and both proceedings were joined. Supreme Court held a nonjury trial, found all witnesses credible, credited the organization’s testimony about actual use, and granted the petitions for both tax years, concluding the property was exempt. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with one Justice dissenting.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the lower courts applied the correct legal standards: the burden to prove entitlement to exemption rests with the party seeking it, while the burden to prove a zoning violation rests with the municipality. The Court of Appeals found record support for Supreme Court’s factual findings and concluded that the Town failed to prove a zoning violation sufficient to defeat the exemption for both years. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed, with costs. View "Matter of First United Methodist Church in Flushing v Assessor, Town of Callicoon" on Justia Law

Four individuals established two illegal gambling businesses in northern Ohio, operating gaming rooms that paid out winnings in cash. To avoid detection, the true owners concealed their involvement by using nominal owners and destroyed financial records. The businesses operated almost entirely in cash, allowing the owners to hide profits and evade taxes. One of the defendants, an accountant, played a central role in managing finances and preparing false tax returns for the group. The scheme also involved efforts to launder money and shield assets from IRS collection, including the use of shell companies and deceptive real estate transactions.After law enforcement executed multiple search warrants in 2018, a grand jury indicted several participants on conspiracy, illegal gambling, tax evasion, and related charges. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied motions to dismiss and to sever the trials. At trial, a jury convicted two defendants on nearly all counts. At sentencing, the court calculated tax losses exceeding $3.5 million for each defendant, resulting in lengthy prison terms and substantial restitution orders. Both defendants challenged the loss calculations, the denial of severance, jury instructions, and other procedural aspects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, as no compelling prejudice was shown. The court found no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss the tax evasion count, concluding that affirmative acts of evasion within the limitations period were sufficiently alleged. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s tax loss calculations, the application of the sophisticated means enhancement, and the handling of jury instructions. The sentences were affirmed, but the case was remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the judgment regarding restitution interest. View "United States v. DiPietro" on Justia Law