Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Between 2004 and 2009, Valpak of Omaha, LLC (“Valpak”) paid more than $5.5 million to Val-pak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. (“Direct Marketing”) to print direct mail advertisements and distribute them around Omaha, Nebraska. The Nebraska Department of Revenue assessed use taxes on that amount. Valpak asked the Tax Commissioner for a redetermination that no taxes were due, arguing that its payments to Direct Marketing were not transactions that were subject to use taxes under Nebraska law. The Tax Commissioner denied Valpak’s petitions for redetermination, concluding that Valpak was subject to use taxes under the Department’s sales and use tax regulations. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that Valpak was an advertising agency and was liable for use taxes on its payment to Direct Marketing. View "Valpak of Omaha, LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

Powerex Corporation wholesales natural gas and electricity to purchasers throughout the western part of North America. The issue on appeal was how much of Powerex's income was taxable in Oregon. This case turned on whether Powerex’s sales of electricity and natural gas occurred "in this state." The rules for making that determination differed depending on whether the sales are sales of "tangible personal property" or other types of sales. Generally, sales of tangible personal property are "in this state" if "[t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser * * * within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." In the Tax Court, the parties agreed that natural gas was tangible personal property. They disagreed whether, in selling natural gas, Powerex shipped or delivered natural gas to purchasers "within this state." The Tax Court found that Powerex shipped gas to purchasers in other states through a hub in Malin where two pipelines intersected. It concluded that, in doing so, Powerex had not shipped or delivered gas to purchasers within Oregon. Regarding Powerex’s sales of electricity, the parties disagreed whether electricity is tangible personal property. The Tax Court ruled that electricity is not tangible personal property and that, because the greater part of the activity that produced the income from Powerex’s electricity sales occurred in British Columbia, those sales were not attributable to Oregon. The Tax Court accordingly concluded that, for the tax years at issue here, neither Powerex’s sales of electricity nor its sales of natural gas were "in this state." The Department of Revenue appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court correctly held that Powerex's natural gas sales were not "in this state." With regard to electricity, the Court reversed the Tax Court, and remanded the case to that court for consideration of whether electric transmission systems functioned in the same way that natural gas pipelines did: "[i]f the Tax Court makes that finding on remand, then our conclusion regarding Powerex’s natural gas sales presumably will control how most of Powerex’s electricity sales will be allocated." View "Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District under the Santa Clara County Water District Act, to prevent depletion of the acquifers from which Great Oaks extracts water. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, finding that: the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D and subject to some of the constraints of that enactment; it is also a charge for water service, and, therefore, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification; pre-suit claims submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D; and the court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The State Director of Taxation retroactively assessed ten online travel companies for unpaid general excise tax (GET) and transient accommodations tax (TAT) for periods beginning between 1999 and 2001 and continuing until 2011. The Director also assessed penalties. The online travel companies appealed the assessments. The tax court (1) ruled in favor of the Director with regard to the GET assessments; but (2) ruled in favor of the online travel companies with regard to the TAT assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment in regard to the GET assessments and penalties and affirmed in regard to the TAT assessments, holding (1) the GET apportioning provision was misapplied in this case; and (2) the TAT was not applicable to the online travel companies in the assessed transactions. Remanded. View "In re Tax Appeal of Travelocity.com, L.P." on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a superior court's validation of roughly $200 million in municipal bonds (the "2014 NSP Bonds") that were to be issued by the Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("Invest Atlanta"). Invest Atlanta and the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority (collectively, the "New Stadium Entities") proposed to have the 2014 NSP Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and operating a new stadium facility in downtown Atlanta for the Atlanta Falcons professional football team. Additional funding for the NSP would have been provided by the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company, LLC ("StadCo"), a company associated with the Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC, as well as through the sale of personal seat licenses. On February 4, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Bond Validation in the superior court to authorize the issuance of the 2014 NSP Bonds. Several individuals moved to intervene in the proceedings to file objections to the bond validation, and the trial court allowed them to do so. Among other things, the intervenors contended that OCGA 48-13-51 (a) (5) (B) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court ultimately entered a Validation Order and Final Judgment validating the 2014 NSP Bonds and overruling all objections. One of the intervenors appealed that ruling. However, finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Authority" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether several food and beverage concessionaires at the City-owned airport held taxable possessory interests under the test in "Board of County Commissioners v. Vail Associates, Inc.," (19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001)). Relying on "Vail Associates," the City and County of Denver assessed property taxes on the concessionaires' possessory interests in their airport concession spaces. The concessionaires protested the valuation and eventually sued. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the concessionaires' interest were taxable under Vail Associates. The Supreme Court also affirmed: the concessionaires' interests were sufficiently exclusive because the concessionaires had the right to exclude others from using their respective concessions spaces; the totality of the circumstances reflected that the concessionaires' revenue-generating capability was independent of the City; and the valuation of the interests was consistent with the General Assembly's possessory interest valuation scheme set forth by statute, and supported by the record. View "Cantina Grill, JV v. City & Cty. of Denver Cty. Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

This case involves the intersection of sections 482 and 965 of the United States Tax Code. Foreign subsidiaries of United States-based companies sometimes pay dividends to their United States-based parent companies, which constitute taxable income for the United States-based parent company. However, rather than pay these dividends, and the accompanying taxes, many United States-based multinational corporations park large sums of earnings in accounts owned by their foreign subsidiaries. Doing so allows these corporations to avoid federal income taxes, but only as long as the cash remains overseas. This case involves a decision by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to partially disallow BMC Software, Inc.’s (BMC) repatriated-dividends tax deduction under 26 U.S.C. 965(b)(3) on the ground that subsequently created accounts receivable constituted "indebtedness" and reduced BMC’s eligibility for the deduction. Because the plain text of section 965 did not support the Commissioner’s interpretation, and because BMC never agreed to treat the relevant accounts receivable as indebtedness, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "BMC Software, Incorporated v. Comm'r Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

As part of a grand jury investigation, the grand jury issued a subpoena to Appellant requiring her to produce certain records. When she failed to produce all of the requested documents, the government moved for an order to show cause as to why Appellant should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena. At the show-cause hearing, Appellant testified that she did not produce other materials responsive to the subpoena because of the advice of her attorney. The district court ultimately found Appellant guilty of criminal contempt. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court violated her due process rights by requiring her to prove her advice-of-counsel defense, a burden she claimed belonged to the government. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Appellant. View "United States v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

In 1999-2000, AmerGen purchased three nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission transferred the operating licenses, making AmerGen obligated to decommission the plants, and extended the licensing to 2029, 2034, and 2026. Decommissioning may take 60 years. Prior owners had established qualified and nonqualified trust funds to pay for decommissioning. Contributions to a qualified fund (I.R.C. 468A), subject to limitations, are currently deductible. Investment incomes are taxed at a fixed rate. A nonqualified fund does not have those tax advantages. AmerGen's accountants advised that it was unlikely that the IRS would allow AmerGen to include the assumed decommissioning liability in the basis of the assets acquired on the date of the purchase and that the entire cash consideration would be allocated to the basis of transferred nonqualified funds, rather than to the basis of the plants. AmerGen sought IRS private letter rulings and required the sellers to make additional contributions to the trusts. They transferred $393 million in qualified funds and $581 million in nonqualified funds. On its 2001-2003 tax returns, AmerGen claimed that, in addition to the $93 million purchase price, it assumed decommissioning liabilities of $2.15 billion that should be included in the basis of the plants at the time of purchase. With that adjustment and corresponding depreciation and amortization deductions and reduced capital gains, AmerGen attempted to reduce its taxable income by $110 million per year. The IRS rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the economic performance requirement of 26 U.S.C. 461(h) applies to AmerGen as an accrual basis taxpayer so that it may not include the liabilities in basis. AmerGen did not economically perform decommissioning in the relevant tax years. View "Amergen Energy Co, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Alabama imposes sales and use taxes on railroads purchasing or consuming diesel fuel, but exempts their competitors: trucking companies and companies that transport goods interstate through navigable waters. Motor carriers pay an alternative fuel-excise tax on diesel, but water carriers pay neither sales tax nor excise tax. CSX, an interstate rail carrier, alleged discrimination against a rail carrier under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulation Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4). The Supreme Court held that a tax “discriminates” when it treats “groups [that] are similarly situated” differently without sufficient justification. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that CSX could establish discrimination by showing that Alabama taxed rail carriers differently than their competitors, but rejected Alabama’s argument that the fuel-excise tax on motor carriers justified the sales tax on rail carriers. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. CSX’s competitors are an appropriate comparison class; the class need not consist of “general commercial and industrial taxpayers.” The Act’s subsections (b)(1) to (b)(3), addressing property taxes, limits the comparison class to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. Subsection (b)(4) contains no such limitation, so the comparison class is based on the claimed theory of discrimination. When a railroad alleges discrimination compared to transportation industry competitors, its competitors in that jurisdiction are the comparison class. The comparison class must consist of individuals similarly situated to the claimant. Discrimination in favor of competitors frustrates the Act’s purpose of restoring railways’ financial stability while fostering competition among all carriers. The Eleventh Circuit erred in refusing to consider Alabama’s proposed justification. An alternative, roughly equivalent tax is one possible justification. On remand, the court is to consider whether Alabama’s fuel-excise tax is the rough equivalent of sales tax on diesel fuel and whether any alternative rationales justify the water carrier exemption. View "Ala. Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law