Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Texas Student Housing Authority (TSHA) had title to the Cambridge at College Station, a student-residential facility near two college campuses. In the summers of 2005 to 2008, TSHA provided lodging at the Cambridge to non-college students attending university-sponsored instructional programs. The Brazos County Appraisal District (BCAD) voided TSHA’s property-tax-exempt status for the years 2005 to 2008 and assessed millions of dollars of back taxes. The trial court affirmed, concluding that TSHA forfeited the exemption once the Cambridge hosted people who were not students, faculty or staff members of an institution of higher learning. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TSHA did not forfeit its exemption under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 53.46 by housing summer program participants at the Cambridge because the statute imposes no conditions but rather declares the property-tax exemption in absolute terms. View "Tex. Student Housing Auth. v. Brazos County Appraisal Dist." on Justia Law

Taxpayers claimed a $220,800 charitable deduction on their 2003 and 2004 returns that corresponded to the purported value of a historic preservation facade easement on their Boston home, which they donated to the Trust of Architectural Easements. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction. The Tax Court found that the actual value of the easement was zero and that Taxpayers were liable under applicable IRS regulations for a forty percent accuracy-related penalty for making a gross valuation misstatement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Tax Court’s finding that Taxpayers were liable for accuracy-related penalties was sound as a legal matter and not clearly erroneous as a factual matter; and (2) Taxpayers' second argument on appeal was waived. View "Kaufman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Nebraska Advantage Act, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) entered an agreement with the Tax Commissioner with the aim of using incentives set forth in the Act for a project in Platte County. ADM sought a personal property tax exemption for the year 2010 under the Act for property involving agricultural processing equipment. The Department denied the exemption on the grounds that the personal property tax exemption claim had not been timely filed. The Tax Equalization Review Commission (TERC) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) ADM did not timely file its claim for a personal property tax exemption for the subject property, and therefore ADM was not entitled to the exemption; and (2) TERC did not err when it affirmed the order of the Tax Commission denying ADM’s protest. View "Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State" on Justia Law

After voters in School District rejected a bond proposal to construct an addition to existing high school building, School District entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Bank, which agreed to finance the project. Appellants, residents and taxpayers in the school district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief contending that the agreement violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 79-10,105. The trial court denied relief, concluding (1) under section 79-10,105, lease-purchase agreements may be used to make school improvements without the voters’ approval if the project is not funded by bonded debt; and (2) School District in this case did not fund the project through bonded indebtedness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants’ claims were moot because, as of the time of this appeal, the addition had been completed, but the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied; and (2) section 79-10,105 does not prohibit a school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement to finance a capital construction project if it has not created a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district, and because there was no evidence that this occurred in this case, School District did not violate section 79-10,105 by entering into the lease-purchase agreement with Bank. View "Nebuda v. Dodge County Sch. Dist. 0062" on Justia Law

Taxpayers Don and Mary Frankenberg made improvements to their home in 2001. The Garvin County Assessor did not increase the fair cash value of the property for the improvements until 2012 when she visually inspected the property and discovered the improvements. The Assessor notified the Taxpayers of a new assessed fair cash value, which was a substantial increase from the previous valuation in 1999. The Taxpayers protested the assessment, arguing that under Art. X, section 8B of the Oklahoma Constitution, the fair cash value of the property could not be increased more than 5% in any year. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Taxpayers, and the Assessor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the exception to the 5% cap for improvements to a property existed only for the year the improvements were made to the property and did not apply in the year when the Assessor first discovers the improvements. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Frankenberg v. Strickland" on Justia Law

When parties discharge waste that could affect the quality of California’s water they must pay a permit fee set by the State Water Resources Control Board, Wat. Code, 13260. In 2011, two of the five Board seats were vacant; two of the remaining three members approved an increase of fees for the 2011-2012 fiscal year. CBI argued that section 183 required the fees to be approved by a majority of the five-person Board and that the increase was an illegal tax because the fee imposed on the dischargers in the storm water program (one of eight areas in the permit program) exceeded the cost of regulating this particular program. The court of appeal upheld the fee; section 181, not section 183, applied to adoption of the fee schedule and the vote by a majority of the Board’s quorum complied with section 181. Section 13260 requires that the total fees collected from all waste dischargers must equal the costs of regulating the entire waste discharge permit program. View "Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

Taxpayer timely filed a 2010 personal property tax return properly listing certain taxable property. The property, however, was not placed on the tax rolls. In 2013, the Colfax County Board of Equalization placed the personal property back on the tax rolls. Taxpayer appealed. The Tax Equalization and Review Commission ultimately decided that the Board’s action was void on the grounds that the Board did not have authority to place the items of personal property on the tax rolls, thereby reversing and vacating the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board’s action in placing Taxpayer’s personal property on the tax rolls for 2010 was void because it lacked statutory authority to do so under Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1507(1). View "Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. v. Colfax County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

In 2007 Rogers, a U.S. citizen, lived in Hong Kong and worked as a flight attendant for United Airlines. She flew and worked in and over foreign countries and also in and over the United States and over international waters. She and her husband filed a tax return reporting all of her flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income.” The IRS determined a tax deficiency of $3,428.30 on the portion of Rogers’s earnings attributable to her work outside foreign countries, as well as a 20% penalty. Rogers argued that 26 U.S.C. 911(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) authorized exclusion of Rogers’s flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income,” because it was received “from sources within a foreign country or countries,” Rogers’s Hong Kong-based job. and that they should not be charged the negligence penalty. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that they could only exclude the portion of Rogers’s earnings that were related to her time spent working in or over foreign countries. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rogers v. Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

Retired officers of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department were subsequently re-hired by the D.C. Protective Services Division, which protects government buildings and D.C.-owned property. They received pension benefits from their service with the Police Department and salaries for their jobs with Protective Services, but Section 5- 723(e) of the D.C. Code requires reduction of plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions to prevent so-called double-dipping. Pursuant to that provision, D.C. reduced plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. Following a remand for consideration under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs raised a claim under the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C. 111(a)), which was rejected. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Public Salary Tax Act allows states and D.C. to impose “taxation” on compensation paid to employees of the federal government, only if the taxation does not discriminate against federal employees. The D.C. salary reduction provision at issue is not “taxation.” It does not raise revenue, but operates on the opposite side of D.C.’s financial ledger. It reduces D.C.’s total expenditures on salaries. View "Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Donald Kipnis, Lawrence Kibler, Barry Mukamal and Kenneth Welt,appealedthe district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint against defendants-appellees Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG and HVB U.S. Finance, Inc. (collectively, “HVB”) as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. This appeal arose out of the parties’ participation in an income tax shelter scheme known as a Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) transaction. In short, Plaintiffs alleged that HVB and its co-conspirators defrauded Plaintiffs by promoting and selling CARDS for their own financial gain. Plaintiffs “paid a heavy price in damages” as a result of HVB’s wrongdoing, including “substantial fees (and interest payments)” they paid HVB and other CARDS Dealers to participate in the CARDS strategy and “hundreds of thousands of dollars in ‘clean-up’ costs” they incurred after HVB failed to advise them to amend their tax returns. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought to recover the “damages that reasonably flow” from HVB’s misconduct. These damages included fees they paid to HVB and other CARDS Dealers, attorney’s fees and accountant’s fees incurred in litigating against the IRS, back taxes and interest paid by Plaintiffs, punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the instant action. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims did not accrue until November 1, 2012, because they did not sustain any damages until the tax court issued its final decision. By December 5, 2001 (plaintiffs’ mandatory repayment date) Plaintiffs had sustained part of the damages they sought to recover, including the fees they paid to HVB.The district court found Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane," (565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)), to be misplaced, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as time-barred. The parties agreed that Florida law controlled the sole issue in this appeal: when did Plaintiffs’ claims against HVB accrue for purposes of the statutes of limitations. It was not clear under Florida law when Plaintiffs first suffered injury, and thus when their claims against HVB accrued for purposes of the applicable statutes of limitations. Because the relevant facts were undisputed, and this appeal depended wholly on interpretations of Florida law regarding the statute of limitations, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. View "Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-UND Vereinsbank, AG" on Justia Law