Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether several food and beverage concessionaires at the City-owned airport held taxable possessory interests under the test in "Board of County Commissioners v. Vail Associates, Inc.," (19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001)). Relying on "Vail Associates," the City and County of Denver assessed property taxes on the concessionaires' possessory interests in their airport concession spaces. The concessionaires protested the valuation and eventually sued. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the concessionaires' interest were taxable under Vail Associates. The Supreme Court also affirmed: the concessionaires' interests were sufficiently exclusive because the concessionaires had the right to exclude others from using their respective concessions spaces; the totality of the circumstances reflected that the concessionaires' revenue-generating capability was independent of the City; and the valuation of the interests was consistent with the General Assembly's possessory interest valuation scheme set forth by statute, and supported by the record. View "Cantina Grill, JV v. City & Cty. of Denver Cty. Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

This case involves the intersection of sections 482 and 965 of the United States Tax Code. Foreign subsidiaries of United States-based companies sometimes pay dividends to their United States-based parent companies, which constitute taxable income for the United States-based parent company. However, rather than pay these dividends, and the accompanying taxes, many United States-based multinational corporations park large sums of earnings in accounts owned by their foreign subsidiaries. Doing so allows these corporations to avoid federal income taxes, but only as long as the cash remains overseas. This case involves a decision by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to partially disallow BMC Software, Inc.’s (BMC) repatriated-dividends tax deduction under 26 U.S.C. 965(b)(3) on the ground that subsequently created accounts receivable constituted "indebtedness" and reduced BMC’s eligibility for the deduction. Because the plain text of section 965 did not support the Commissioner’s interpretation, and because BMC never agreed to treat the relevant accounts receivable as indebtedness, the Fifth Circuit reversed. View "BMC Software, Incorporated v. Comm'r Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

As part of a grand jury investigation, the grand jury issued a subpoena to Appellant requiring her to produce certain records. When she failed to produce all of the requested documents, the government moved for an order to show cause as to why Appellant should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena. At the show-cause hearing, Appellant testified that she did not produce other materials responsive to the subpoena because of the advice of her attorney. The district court ultimately found Appellant guilty of criminal contempt. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court violated her due process rights by requiring her to prove her advice-of-counsel defense, a burden she claimed belonged to the government. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Appellant. View "United States v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

In 1999-2000, AmerGen purchased three nuclear power plants. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission transferred the operating licenses, making AmerGen obligated to decommission the plants, and extended the licensing to 2029, 2034, and 2026. Decommissioning may take 60 years. Prior owners had established qualified and nonqualified trust funds to pay for decommissioning. Contributions to a qualified fund (I.R.C. 468A), subject to limitations, are currently deductible. Investment incomes are taxed at a fixed rate. A nonqualified fund does not have those tax advantages. AmerGen's accountants advised that it was unlikely that the IRS would allow AmerGen to include the assumed decommissioning liability in the basis of the assets acquired on the date of the purchase and that the entire cash consideration would be allocated to the basis of transferred nonqualified funds, rather than to the basis of the plants. AmerGen sought IRS private letter rulings and required the sellers to make additional contributions to the trusts. They transferred $393 million in qualified funds and $581 million in nonqualified funds. On its 2001-2003 tax returns, AmerGen claimed that, in addition to the $93 million purchase price, it assumed decommissioning liabilities of $2.15 billion that should be included in the basis of the plants at the time of purchase. With that adjustment and corresponding depreciation and amortization deductions and reduced capital gains, AmerGen attempted to reduce its taxable income by $110 million per year. The IRS rejected the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that the economic performance requirement of 26 U.S.C. 461(h) applies to AmerGen as an accrual basis taxpayer so that it may not include the liabilities in basis. AmerGen did not economically perform decommissioning in the relevant tax years. View "Amergen Energy Co, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Alabama imposes sales and use taxes on railroads purchasing or consuming diesel fuel, but exempts their competitors: trucking companies and companies that transport goods interstate through navigable waters. Motor carriers pay an alternative fuel-excise tax on diesel, but water carriers pay neither sales tax nor excise tax. CSX, an interstate rail carrier, alleged discrimination against a rail carrier under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulation Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 11501(b)(4). The Supreme Court held that a tax “discriminates” when it treats “groups [that] are similarly situated” differently without sufficient justification. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that CSX could establish discrimination by showing that Alabama taxed rail carriers differently than their competitors, but rejected Alabama’s argument that the fuel-excise tax on motor carriers justified the sales tax on rail carriers. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. CSX’s competitors are an appropriate comparison class; the class need not consist of “general commercial and industrial taxpayers.” The Act’s subsections (b)(1) to (b)(3), addressing property taxes, limits the comparison class to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. Subsection (b)(4) contains no such limitation, so the comparison class is based on the claimed theory of discrimination. When a railroad alleges discrimination compared to transportation industry competitors, its competitors in that jurisdiction are the comparison class. The comparison class must consist of individuals similarly situated to the claimant. Discrimination in favor of competitors frustrates the Act’s purpose of restoring railways’ financial stability while fostering competition among all carriers. The Eleventh Circuit erred in refusing to consider Alabama’s proposed justification. An alternative, roughly equivalent tax is one possible justification. On remand, the court is to consider whether Alabama’s fuel-excise tax is the rough equivalent of sales tax on diesel fuel and whether any alternative rationales justify the water carrier exemption. View "Ala. Dep't of Revenue v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado requires residents who purchase goods from a retailer that does not collect sales or use taxes to file a return and remit taxes directly to its Department of Revenue. Noncollecting retailers must notify any Colorado customer of the requirement and report tax-related information to those customers and the Department. An association of retailers sued, alleging that Colorado’s law violates the United States and Colorado Constitutions. The district court enjoined enforcement of the notice and reporting requirements. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), which provides that federal district courts “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” 28 U.S.C. 1341, deprived the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed. The requested relief would not “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection” of taxes. The terms “assessment,” “levy,” and “collection” do not encompass enforcement of notice and reporting requirements. The terms, read in light of the federal Tax Code, refer to discrete phases of the taxation process that do not include informational notices or private reports of information relevant to tax liability. Assessment and collection are triggered after the state receives the returns and makes the deficiency determinations that the notice and reporting facilitate. The context in which the TIA uses the word “restrain” favors a narrow meaning. The Court took no position on whether the suit such as this might be barred under the “comity doctrine.” View "Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl" on Justia Law

Jones owned SAM Packaging and owed several hundred thousand dollars in back taxes for 2006-2008. Jones refused to provide the IRS with bank statements, and later submitted statements, with blacked-out parts. He submitted financial disclosure forms, disclosing accounts at Mutual of Omaha Bank (MO), but not accounts at Community Credit Union. He directed his financial activity to the undisclosed accounts. When the IRS levied on Jones’s MO accounts, they were nearly empty. Jones commingled personal and business accounts, then began dealing in cash. He refused to turn over accounts receivable, stating that he would terminate the business before doing so. In 2010, he declared that SAM had been “suspended” and he was unemployed. He had started a new company to secretly serve his customers. The IRS summonsed customers and learned Jones had performed work without billing them, preventing levy on his accounts receivable. Jones pled guilty to tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The district court imposed a two-level enhancement for use of sophisticated means, as recommended in the PSR. After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months and sentenced Jones to 24 months. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Jones’s actions were typical of tax evasion offenses and did not make detection more difficult. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Butler sells agricultural and construction equipment, primarily for Caterpillar. In 2002, Butler formed North Central to take over its leasing operations. The companies are ultimately controlled by the same family and share space. Butler performs North Central’s accounting and ordering functions and initially pays the wages of its employees. Caterpillar assigned separate dealer codes, but Butler used its code to order equipment for itself and North Central. Under North Central's like-kind-exchange (LKE) program, North Central sold its used equipment to third parties, who paid a qualified intermediary, Accruit, which forwarded proceeds to Butler; Butler purchased new Caterpillar equipment for North Central and transferred it to North Central via Accruit, charging the same amount that Butler paid for the equipment. Butler's LKE transactions facilitated favorable Caterpillar financing terms. Butler essentially received a six-month, interest-free loan from each exchange. From 2004-2007 North Central claimed nonrecognition treatment of gains from 398 LKE transactions under IRC 1031, so that the gain was not included in gross income at the time of actual sale or gain. The IRS declared that the transactions were not entitled to nonrecognition treatment, reasoning that North Central structured the transactions to avoid the related-party exchange restrictions of section 1031(f). The district court analyzed Butler's unfettered access to the cash proceeds and the relative complexity of the transactions and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "North Cent. Rental & Leasing, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service determined that Gyorgy (who did not file tax returns 2001-2007) owed approximately $100,000 in unpaid income taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2002 and 2003. The IRS mailed notices of his deficiencies in 2006 and 2007, including demands for payment, to the address on his most recently filed tax return. But Gyorgy no longer lived there and did not receive the notices. More than two years later, his debts were still outstanding, so the IRS filed notice of a federal tax lien on his property. Gyorgy challenged the action in a collection due process (CDP) hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals, which sustained the IRS’s filing of the lien notice, findings that the IRS properly mailed Gyorgy’s deficiency notices under I.R.C. 6212(b)(1) before filing the lien and correctly determined his underlying tax liabilities. The tax court and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Gyorgy presented no arguments and no evidence before the tax court to challenge the IRS’s calculation of the taxes and penalties he owes. View "Gyorgy v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Pilgrim's Pride was the successor-in-interest to Pilgrim's Pride Corporation of Georgia f/k/a Gold Kist, Inc., which was the successor-in-interest to Gold Kist, Inc. In 1998, Gold Kist sold its agriservices business to Southern States Cooperative, Inc. To facilitate the purchase, Southern States obtained a bridge loan that was secured by a commitment letter between Southern States and Gold Kist. The letter permitted Southern States to require Gold Kist to purchase certain securities from Southern States. In early 2004, Gold Kist and Southern States negotiated a price at which Southern States would redeem the securities. Gold Kist’s Board of Directors, instead of accepting the offer, decided to abandon the securities for no consideration. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's review centered on whether whether Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation's loss from its abandonment of securities was an ordinary loss or a capital loss. The Tax Court (in what appeared to be the first ruling of its kind by any court) ruled that 26 U.S.C. 1234A(1) applied to the abandonment loss and required that it be classified as capital. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. Because section 1234A(1) only applied to the termination of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment of capital assets, the Court reversed the Tax Court and rendered judgment in favor of Pilgrim's Pride. View "Pilgrim's Pride Corporation v. CIR" on Justia Law