Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the United States under 26 U.S.C. 7426, seeking a judgment of $2,915,000 in compensation for an alleged wrongful levy by the IRS. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's section 7426 claim was time barred because she filed it more than nine months after the IRS served her with the relevant notice levy, and that plaintiff could not have brought a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1346 because claims for a tax refund are unavailable to plaintiffs who could have brought a claim under section 7426 but for the expiration of the statue of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mottahedeh v. United States" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether and to what extent (if any) an electric utility was entitled to the industrial-processing tax exemption for tangible personal property located outside its generation plants. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to the full industrial-processing exemption for the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the property subject to this suit was simultaneously used for exempt “industrial processing” activity under MCL 205.94o(7)(a) and nonexempt “distribution” and “shipping” activities under MCL 205.94o(6)(b). In these circumstances, the taxpayer was entitled to the industrial-processing exemption based on the “percentage of exempt use to total use determined by a reasonable formula or method approved by the department [of Treasury].” MCL 205.94o(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Detroit Edison Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Billhartz left more than $20 million to his four children when he died. His estate tax return claimed a deduction for more than $14 million because the amounts paid to the children through a trust were paid pursuant to Billhartz’s contractual obligation under a marital settlement agreement with his first wife. The IRS disallowed the deduction in full and issued a notice of deficiency. The Estate filed suit. Before trial the Estate and the IRS settled; the IRS conceded 52.5% of the claimed deduction. Soon after the settlement, Billhartz’s children sued the Estate in state court, claiming that they were entitled to a larger portion of their father’s fortune and that their prior acceptance of a lesser amount had been obtained fraudulently. The Estate asked the Tax Court to vacate the settlement on the basis that, were the children to prevail, the settlement would bar the Estate from claiming an estate tax refund for any additional amount paid to the children. The Tax Court rejected the Estate’s arguments, and entered a decision reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to set aside the settlement. View "Billhartz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Lumber, a tax-exempt insurance trust (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9)), purchased life insurance issued by GAMHC. GAMHC converted from an insurer owned by policyholders to one owned by stockholders. In 2003, Lumber received a $1,474,442.30 liquidating distribution and a statement that the entire “initial distribution . . . will constitute long-term capital gain.” Lumber reported the gain on its return for fiscal year 2004 and paid capital gains tax of $200,686. Lumber received additional distributions of $285,647 and $213,567, which it reported as taxable capital gains on its 2006 and 2008 returns. The IRS had adopted the position that a policyholder’s proprietary interest in a mutual insurance company had a tax basis of zero. In 2008, the Claims Court rejected that position. Lumber sought refunds for 2004, 2006, and 2008. The IRS delayed a ruling until the Federal Circuit affirmed, then allowed Lumber’s claims for 2006 and 2008 and refunded $42,847 and $32,035, but denied Lumber’s claim for 2004, citing the three-year limitations period. The district court granted Lumber summary judgment, concluding that the mitigation provisions, I.R.C. 1311-1314, permitted correcting the erroneous recognition of gain. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Allowing taxpayers to reopen closed tax years based upon a favorable change in, or reinterpretation of, the laws would be inconsistent with the congressional intent in enacting the mitigation provisions to “preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations.” View "Ill. Lumber & Material v. United States" on Justia Law

The IRS received information from French authorities concerning United States persons with undisclosed bank accounts at HSBC and issued summonses to the Chabots requesting that they appear to give testimony and produce documents about their foreign bank accounts for the period from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2009. The Chabots’ attorney notified the IRS that the Chabots would not appear, were asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and would not produce the requested documents. The IRS amended the two summonses, limiting their scope to only those documents required to be maintained under 31 C.F.R. 1010.420. The Chabots continued to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege, and the IRS filed a petition to enforce the amended summonses.The Chabots appealed the district court's grant of the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that six other circuits have held that these records fall within the required records exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. View "United States v. Chabot" on Justia Law

Zavadil organized AS and was its sole owner until he sold it to an employee stock ownership plan and received a $28,760,000 note, payable in annual installments. Zavadil served without compensation as CEO and on the board of directors. In 2004 and 2005, AS paid Zavadil’s personal expenses. Zavadil reimbursed the company monthly by personal check. AS recorded Zavadil’s personal expenses on a ledger after Zavadil used his company credit card or instructed an employee to issue a check. AS’s creditors required that all ledger accounts, including Zavadil’s, be paid off at the end of each month. In some months, however, Zavadil’s personal bank account had insufficient funds; Zavadil would write a personal check and AS brought the ledger balance to zero. At the beginning of the next month, AS advanced funds to Zavadil to cover the check, recorded the advance as an expense, and then cashed the personal check received the previous month. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency. The tax court ruled in favor of the Zavadils on charitable contributions made before July 2005, finding that Zavadil reimbursed AS and bore the economic burden; disallowed charitable deductions made later, because Zavadil did not demonstrate that he bore the economic burden; and disallowed unreimbursed expenses, finding Zavadil failed to introduce credible evidence regarding the nature and purpose of the payments. The tax court assessed deficiencies (about $260,000, with penalties) and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Zavadil v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

The Tax Court issued its final order and decision, granting taxpayer relief from joint and several income tax liabilities and denied taxpayer’s motion for attorney’s fees and litigation costs. At issue was whether a unilateral concession by the IRS is a settlement, for purposes of the Qualified Offer Rule (QOR) of the Internal Revenue Code, codified at 26 U.S.C. 7430(c)(4)(E). In this case, taxpayer made a qualified offer to settle her tax liability. The IRS's concession that taxpayer was entitled to full relief and owed no tax liability is not a settlement within the meaning of section 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I). The court concluded that the IRS was unwilling to settle this case on the terms and at the times offered by taxpayer, and the IRS cannot sidestep the consequences of such refusal by conceding the issues after taxpayer had effectively presented the case for disposition by the court. Accordingly, the court reversed the Tax Court's decision and found that taxpayer is a prevailing party for purposes of section 7430. The court reversed and remanded for the Tax Court to determine costs and attorney's fees. View "Knudsen v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Metamore Elevator Company filed complaints with the Fulton County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking to reduce the property value of two parcels and to remove grain storage bins from the real property assessment, claiming that they were business fixtures and thus should be classified as personal property not subject to real estate tax. The BOR left the assessed valuation unchanged. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the storage bins were temporary structures and should be classified as personal property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA correctly applied the statues when it found that the grain storage bins were personal property. View "Metamora Elevator Co. v. Fulton County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2012, Fountain, an IRS employee, helped orchestrate several schemes that involved filing false tax returns, claiming refunds under the Telephone ExciseTax Refund,the First Time Homebuyer Credit, or the American Opportunity Tax Credit. Fountain employed her knowledge of IRS fraud detection to avoid detection. Fountain and Ishmael enlisted people, including Johnson, to recruit claimants to provide their personal information in exchange for part of a cash refund. A jury convicted Fountain, Ishmael, and Johnson on multiple counts of conspiracy and filing false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 286, 287. Fountain was also convicted of Hobbs Act extortion and making or presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); 26 U.S.C. 7206. Additionally, Johnson was convicted of filing false claims while on pretrial release. The court sentenced Fountain to 228 months in prison and ordered her to pay $1,740,221 in restitution; sentenced Ishmael to 144 months and $1,750,809 in restitution; and sentenced Johnson to 216 months in prison and to pay $1,248,592 in restitution. Each sentence fell within the Guidelines range after various enhancements were applied. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Fountain" on Justia Law