Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The county seized and sold residential property that was in default on property taxes. Sale proceeds exceeded the tax delinquency. Carloss, the son of the deceased former resident of the property, made a claim under Rev. & Tax. Code, 4675(a), (e)(1)(B), (f), which permits a “person with title of record” to tax-defaulted property or the person’s successor to claim sale proceeds in excess of the tax liability. Carloss’s mother was listed as the property owner in county tax records and had lived in the house for over 50 years. The county denied the claim because no deed appears in the county records, reasoning that title of record can be established only with a recorded deed. The trial court found the action time-barred, as not filed within 90 days of the administrative decision. The court of appeal reversed, finding the action timely and that a recorded grant deed is not the exclusive means of proving title of record. While proving title may be difficult in the absence of such a deed, in unusual circumstances such as Carloss alleged, title of record may be established by various recorded instruments, assessor’s records, and testimony that, as a whole, proves that the claimant or the claimant’s predecessor in interest held title of record. View "Carloss v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Jerold Fisher entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to submitting fraudulent tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service. In return, the Government promised, among other things, not to charge Fisher with any further crimes arising out of the same underlying conduct. Following the plea agreement and before sentencing, the district court found Fisher had breached the plea agreement and released the Government from its no-new-charges obligation. The Government then indicted Fisher on related structuring charges. The court subsequently reversed itself and reinstated the plea agreement, but the Government did not dismiss the new indictment. At sentencing on the tax fraud charge, Fisher asked the district court to find that the Government: (1) had breached the plea agreement by failing to dismiss the structuring charges; and (2) had engaged in vindictive prosecution. The court sentenced Fisher to 41 months in prison without ruling on either of those requests. Fisher appealed, arguing the district court erred by declining to decide his governmental breach claim. Because that claim was moot, the Tenth Circuit concluded it lacked jurisdiction over it. To the extent Fisher tried to raise a similar argument regarding his vindictive prosecution claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded he forfeited that claim and waived it through inadequate briefing. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the magistrate judge's order denying a petition to quash an IRS summons. The court concluded that: (i) the attorney-client privilege was not waived by appellants’ provision of documents to a consortium of banks sharing a common legal interest in the tax treatment of a refinancing and corporate restructuring resulting from an ill-fated acquisition originally financed by the Consortium; and (ii) the work-product doctrine protects documents analyzing the tax treatment of the refinancing and restructuring prepared in anticipation of litigation with the IRS. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Schaeffler v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant received his 2006 income tax refund twice and the IRS sought to recover the erroneous refund by levy. At the tax court stage, the IRS conceded that the levy was an improper collection method, zeroed out appellant's disputed tax liability and moved to dismiss the case as moot. Appellant objected to the dismissal. Appellant argued that, because he paid $5,100 to the IRS during the course of the administrative proceedings and he is entitled to a return of those funds, this controversy precludes dismissal on mootness grounds. The court affirmed the tax court's rejection of appellant's argument, concluding that the abeyance of a pending levy meant that no case or controversy remained. In this case, appellant has received all the relief that 26 U.S.C. 6330 authorizes the tax court to grant him, and he must seek relief in the Court of Federal Claims for the disputed $5,100. View "Willson v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

In 2012, the South Dakota Department of Revenue (Department) commenced an audit of Taxpayer’s excise tax and sales tax licenses for tax period 2009 through 2012. At issue in this case was whether Taxpayer’s construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities were subject to a contractor’s excise tax under S.D. Codified Laws 10-46A-1. Taxpayer did not remit excise tax on the gross receipts it received from its construction management at-risk services provided to public and non-profit entities. As a result of the audit, the Department issued Taxpayer a certificate of assessment for $43,020, which included excise tax and interest. The circuit court reversed the Department’s certificate of assessment, ruling that Taxpayer’s services were not subject to a contractor’s excise tax under section 10-46A-1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Taxpayer’s act of entering into a contract with a public entity to guarantee a satisfactorily completed public improvement project by a specific date for a specific cost was subject to excise tax under section 10-46A-1. View "Puetz Corp. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a professional association of certified public accountants and their firms, challenged an IRS program that allows previously uncredentialed tax return preparers who take required courses and fulfill other prerequisites to obtain a “Record of Completion.” The program also requires them to have their names listed in the IRS’s online “Directory of Federal Tax Return Preparers.” The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, finding that the Institute lacks actual or imminent harm. The court concluded that the Institute has adequately alleged the program will subject its members to an actual or imminent increase in competition and that it therefore has standing to pursue its challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "American Institute of Certified Public Accountants v. IRS" on Justia Law

Petitioners are subsidiaries of the Howard Hughes Corp., an entity involved in selling and developing commercial and residential real estate. Petitioners used the completed contract method of accounting in computing their gains from sales of property under long-term construction contracts. The IRS challenged the method and the Tax Court sided with the IRS. At issue was whether petitioners' contracts were “home construction contracts” within the meaning of I.R.C. 460(e)(6)(A), thereby making petitioners eligible to use the completed contract method of accounting. The court concluded that petitioners' construction contracts do not fall within the meaning of subsection (i) of section 460(e)(6)(A) or subsection (ii) of section 460(e)(6)(A). Because petitioners' contracts are not "home construction contracts," within the meaning of the statute, the court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Howard Hughes Co. v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Five separate groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies (collectively, “Claimants”) were authorized to provide workers’ compensation coverage in Tennessee. As a result of an audit conducted by the State of Tennessee, Claimants were required, under Tennessee’s retaliatory tax statute, to recalculate their Tennessee taxes to include certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation charges, file amended tax returns, and remit payment of the additional taxes totaling over $16 million. Claimants paid the taxes under protest. Each Claimant subsequently filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission (the “Commissioner”) seeking a refund of the retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner issued five identical judgments, each granting summary judgment in favor of the State. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments were no longer paid by the insurance companies but were imposed on the employer-policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments did not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. View "Chartis Casualty Co. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Attorney General (AG) filed a complaint resulting in a civil enforcement action by the AG, alleging that Sprint knowingly violated the New York Tax Law, engaged in fraudulent or illegal acts, and submitted false documents to the State pursuant to the New York False Claims Act (FCA). Sprint moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the New York Tax Law imposes sales tax on interstate voice service sold by a mobile provider along with other services for a fixed monthly charge; (2) the statute is unambiguous; (3) the statute is not preempted by federal law; (4) the AG’s complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action under the FCA; and (5) the damages recoverable under the FCA are not barred by the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. View "People v. Sprint Nextel Corp." on Justia Law

Platinum Lodging, LLC, the former owner of the property at issue in this appeal, was a party throughout proceedings challenging a real property valuation for the tax year 2008. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the valuation. Platinum Lodging and the current property owners appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court remanded the matter to the BOR. On remand, the BOR dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the complainant lacked standing. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education and Platinum Lodging appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed the appeals on the grounds that, because the first appeal had been filed in the common pleas court, the BTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the BOR’s dismissal order on remand. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s order or dismissal as to Platinum Lodging, holding that Platinum Lodging acted properly in filing its notice of appeal at the BTA instead of in the common pleas court. Remanded to the BOR with instructions that it determine the value of the property in accordance with the earlier remand order issued by the common pleas court. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law