Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Plains Marketing, LP and Van Hook Crude Terminal, LLC, appealed an order affirming a Mountrail County Board of County Commissioners' decision to deny their application for an abatement of 2013 real estate taxes for three parcels of land in Mountrail County. They argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should reverse the County Board's denial of their application for an abatement because the County Board incorrectly applied the omitted property provisions in N.D.C.C. ch. 57-14. After review of the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the order. View "Plains Marketing, LP v. Mountrail Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Department's issuance of a proposed tax assessment on American Business, for taxes and interest on the company’s internet sales transactions. The tax assessment was issued by the Department to American Business pursuant to section 212.05(1)(l) of the Florida Statutes. The court concluded that section 212.05(l) does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to American Business’s internet sales of flowers, gift baskets, and other tangible personal property where all four prongs of the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady test have been satisfied. The court further concluded that no due process violation is present on the facts of this case where American Business’s activities have a substantial nexus to Florida. Accordingly, the court quashed the Fourth District's decision to the extent that it holds that the assessment of sales tax on sales of flowers, gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property ordered by out-of-state customers for out-of-state delivery violates the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Florida Dept. of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp." on Justia Law

The City of Eugene sued to collect from Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. (Comcast) a license fee that the city, acting under a municipal ordinance, imposes on companies providing “telecommunications services” over the city’s rights of way. Comcast did not dispute that it used the city’s rights of way to operate a cable system. However it objected to the city’s collection effort and argued that the license fee was either a tax barred by the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), or a franchise fee barred by the Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). The city read those federal laws more narrowly and disputed Comcast’s interpretation. The trial court rejected Comcast’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Eugene v. Comcast of Oregon II, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue raised for the Supreme Court's review was whether freight brokerage services were excepted from local business privilege taxation1 under the “public utility” exception found in Section 301.1(f)(2) of the Local Tax Enabling Act (“LTEA”), Act of December 31, 1965, P.L. 1257, as amended, 53 P.S. sec. 6924.301.1(f)(2). The Commonwealth Court concluded that S&H Transport was not excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision because the Supreme Court concluded that the rates of the common motor carriers with whom S&H did business were not fixed and regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, and thus the entire exception was inapplicable. View "S & H Transport v. City of York" on Justia Law

New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, an affiliate of AT&T Mobility LLC, provides both wireless voice telephone services and data services to customers in the city of Clyde Hill. Clyde Hill imposes a local utility tax on wireless telephone services, which applies to both voice and data services. New Cingular had for years collected utility taxes from Clyde Hill's residents on all charges for wireless and telephone voice and data services, and paid the tax to the city. In this case, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the cellular service provider could challenge a city fine through an action for declaratory judgment in superior court. The trial court dismissed, holding that a declaratory judgment action was improper and judicial review should have been sought by way of a statutory writ of review under RCW 7 .16.040. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the declaratory action and remanding for a decision on the merits. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. City of Clyde Hill" on Justia Law

Christine C. Peterson and Roger V. Peterson challenged the tax court's determination that deferred compensation payments under corporate plans made after Christine's retirement from Mary Kay, Inc. in tax year 2009 were derived from her former Mary Kay association, making them subject to self-employment tax. The court held that the percentage commissions received by Christine, a retired National Sales Director, under the Family Program and Futures Program are subject to self-employment tax, because they are classified specifically as deferred compensation, derived from her prior association with Mary Kay. Because the Petersons did not pay the self-employment tax Christine owed for her 2009 commission payments from two post-retirement, deferred-compensation programs, the Family Program and Futures Program, “the tax court did not err in upholding the additional tax imposed by the IRS,” including interest and penalties. Therefore, the appeal from the decision of the tax court upholding Christine’s self-employment tax for 2009, Appeal No. 14-15774, is affirmed. The consolidated appeal from the decision of the Tax Court relating to tax years 2006 and 2007, Appeal No. 14-15773, is dismissed as improperly filed. View "Peterson v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged an administrative summons issued by the IRS after it issued an approximately $25 million penalty against petitioner and his company. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied petitioner's request for jurisdictional discovery. The court agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity to allow suits to quash summonses that are “issued in aid of the collection of . . . an assessment,” and that the challenged summons was issued in aid of collection. Moreover, the IRS had authority to issue the summons, as there was not an outstanding criminal referral at the time the summons was issued. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery because petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that the requested discovery is likely to produce the facts needed to establish jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Haber v. United States" on Justia Law

Several indoor tanning salons filed claims for tax refunds with the Department of Revenue for admissions taxes. Apparently, in 2012, the Attorney General’s office had issued an opinion that Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2703(1) did not authorize subjecting tanning salons to admissions taxes. The Department has since repealed the regulation listing tanning salons among the businesses subject to the tax and has ceased collecting the tax. The Tax Commissioner disallowed the claims, stating that “[a] refund of a tax improperly or erroneously collected can only be issued by the State directly to the purchaser who paid the tax.” The district court consolidated the cases and affirmed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the salon customers were the taxpayers of the admissions tax. View "Aline Bae Tanning, Inc. v. Neb. Dep't. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The City of Russellville created the City Corporation to operate, maintain, and improve the city’s municipal waterworks system. The City Corporation managed a water treatment plant that provided potable drinking water to the residents of Russellville. In 1998, Carrothers Construction Company of Arkansas, LLC (Carrothers) constructed an expansion of the water-treatment plant. Carrothers purchased several items of machinery and equipment for the project. Carrothers installed this machinery and equipment for an extensive three-phase water treatment process at the Russellville plant. In 2004, the auditor for the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) conducted an audit of Carrothers’s records pertaining to its activities and purchases in 1999 and 2000 in performing its contractual obligations to expand the Russellville water treatment plant. The auditor determined that Carrothers purchased personal property from out-of-state vendors and that these purchases were subjected to Arkansas’s state and local use taxes, plus interest. Carrothers objected to the assessments, resulting in a lawsuit to challenge the tax assessments, and to demand refund of additional use taxes paid. Carrothers filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, it qualified for a manufacturing exemption. In 2015, the circuit court granted Carrothers’s motion for summary judgment and ruled that Carrothers was entitled to the manufacturing exemption. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "Carrothers acquired materials and constructed a facility to treat and clean the water, but it did not manufacture the water. Thus, Carrothers is not entitled to the manufacturing exemption," and therefore not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. View "Walther v. Carrothers Constr. Co. of Ark." on Justia Law

In a prior appeal of this tax case, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to disregard the partnership form of Chemtech Royalty Associates, L.P. (Chemtech I), and Chemtech II, L.P. (Chemtech II), for tax purposes but vacated and remanded as to the penalty award. On remand, the district court reinstated the vacated penalty award and further held that a tax penalty for gross-valuation misstatement applied to Chemtech II. Real party in interest Dow now appeals the penalty award solely as to Chemtech I. The court rejected Dow’s theory that the court's mandate required the district court to consider whether Dow had a reasonable basis and substantial authority for its sham-partnership position; the district court did not err in failing to justify the negligence and substantial-understatement penalties on the basis of the court's sham-partnership holding, but it could have done so; and the court affirmed the applicability of the negligence and substantial-understatement penalties on the ground that the district court would have been correct to do so. The court also concluded that Dow lacked substantial authority for its position that Chemtech I was a valid partnership. For substantially the same reasons, Dow fails to meet the lesser reasonable-basis standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chemtech Royalty Ass'n, LP v. United States" on Justia Law