Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The owners of residential properties in Lowndes County appealed a final superior court order that declared OCGA 48-5-2(3) (B.1), which excluded low-income housing income tax credits from consideration for the purpose of assessing ad valorem tax, was unconstitutional for violating the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution. The properties at issue were eligible to receive federal and state low-income housing income tax credits. In exchange for receiving a ten-year award of tax credits, the property owners agreed to lease their rental units to eligible low-income tenants at below-market rents set by the state Department of Community Affairs (GDCA) for thirty years or more. During the credit period, the owner may not sell, transfer, or exchange the property without first requesting GDCA’s approval of the proposed sale, transfer, or exchange. After being awarded state and federal income tax credits by the GDCA, the property owners in this case “sold” the tax credits to investors in that they allowed investors to purchase limited partnership interests. The tax credits would “flow through” the partnerships to the limited partners, who would then use the tax credits to reduce their individual income tax liabilities. The Lowdnes County Board of Tax Assessors filed for a declaration as to the constitutionality of OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1), which precluded the Assessors from considering the tax credits in determining the fair market value of the real property at issue. After review of the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed: "inasmuch as OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) exempts these income tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties at issue, the statute grants preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and creates a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution." View "Heron Lake II Apartments, L.P. v. Lowndes Cty Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Taxpayer TransCanada Hydro Northeast, Inc. appealed a superior court order setting the value of its Bellows Falls hydroelectric facility at $130,000,000, with $108,495,400 taxable by the Town of Rockingham TransCanada argued that the superior court erred when it relied on testimony of the Town’s expert witness. After review, the Supreme Court corrected the trial court’s valuation to read $127,412,212, and affirmed. View "TransCanada Hydro Northeast Inc. v. Town of Rockingham" on Justia Law

Marvel challenges the tax court's grant of summary judgment for the Commissioner. At issue is whether Marvel's consolidated group must reduce its consolidated net operating loss (CNOL) under I.R.C. 108(b)(2)(A) by the total amount of the groupʹs previously excluded cancellation of indebtedness income under a ʺsingle entityʺ approach as opposed to determining the amount of CNOL apportionable to each member and applying section 108(b)(2)(A) on a member‐by‐member basis. Applying de novo review, the court affirmed the tax court's application of a ʺsingle entityʺ approach to reduce the CNOL, and finding of deficiencies in income tax due for the taxable years 2003 and 2004 in the amounts of $2,144,756 and $14,453,653, respectively. View "Marvel Entm't, LLC v. Comm'r" on Justia Law

Nichols is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer in the City of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. Rehoboth Beach held a special election, open to residents of more than six months, for approval of a $52.5 million bond issue to finance an ocean outfall project. The resolution passed. Nichols voted in the election. She then filed suit challenging the election and the resultant issuance of bonds. The district court, reasoning that Nichols was not contesting the expenditure of tax funds, but the legality of the Special Election; found that Nichols, having voted, lacked standing; and dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that because Nichols failed to show an illegal use of municipal taxpayer funds, she cannot establish standing on municipal taxpayer grounds. The court rejected her claims of municipal taxpayer standing on the basis of two expenditures by Rehoboth Beach: the funds required to hold the special election and the funds used to purchase an advertisement in a local newspaper. View "Nichols v. City of Rehoboth Beach" on Justia Law

Prior to petitioner-appellant Corbin McNeill retiring as an executive to a utility company, "he came across a complicated little scheme suggested by some well-heeled tax advisors." At its core, the scheme was to transfer to McNeill losses that foreign debt holders had already suffered: McNeill would claim the losses as deductions against his income; the foreign debt holders would transfer their assets for a slight premium over their current (and much reduced) market value because McNeill could use them to secure a tax advantage they didn’t need. To accomplish this, McNeill's tax advisors established a series of partnerships to which the foreign debt holders contributed their underwater debt instruments and their basis in them. McNeill contributed a relatively small sum of money, but owned over 90% of the partnership. When the partnership sold the debt to third parties, it could claim to realize the whole of the losses, and McNeill could claim his income was offset by the losses. In aid of the scheme, various accounting and law firms supplied opinion letters affirming that the scheme would withstand IRS scrutiny. The IRS indeed questioned McNeill's partnerships, and determined McNeill owed back taxes. McNeill paid the tax then filed suit seeking a partial refund. McNeill didn’t suggest that the partnership scheme was lawful or that he should have been excused the taxes the IRS assessed. Instead, he argued only that he should have been excused from the penalties and associated interest the IRS had imposed. The district court declined to decide the merits of McNeill’s partner level defense, holding it was precluded from doing so by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). The Tenth Circuit concluded this judgment was made in error, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mc Neill v. United States" on Justia Law

Dahmes Stainless, Inc. challenged the additional use taxes and interest assessed by the Commissioner of Revenue on components that Dahmes purchased to manufacture its products. In making the assessment, the Commissioner determined that Dahmes’s products constituted improvements to real property because they were common law fixtures. The tax court disagreed, concluding that Dahmes’s products were tangible personal property rather than improvements to real property, and therefore, the Commissioner erred by assessing use taxes. Dahmes subsequently filed a Minnesota Equal Access to Justice Act (MEAJA) application for attorney fees. The tax court awarded fees, concluding that the Commissioner’s position was not “substantially justified” by a “reasonable basis in law and fact” under Minn. Stat. 15.472(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Dahmes’s MEAJA application for attorney fees was timely filed; and (2) the tax court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees. View "Comm’r of Revenue v. Dahmes Stainless, Inc." on Justia Law

The Commissioner of Revenue disallowed certain charitable-contribution deductions claimed on an income tax return filed by Respondents. The tax court reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. In doing so, the court excluded evidence offered by the Commissioner of Revenue regarding a computational error made in calculating Respondents’ tax liability and thus failed to correct Respondents’ tax liability to account for the Commissioner’s computational error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the tax court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the Commissioner’s evidence of a computational error; and (2) the tax court’s finding regarding Respondents’ tax liability was supported by the record. View "Antonello v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Michael and Christine Wu each have an individual retirement account (IRA); each contributed $200,000 after selling their home in 2007. For that tax year their maximum allowable deduction for IRA contributions was $4,000, and “excess contributions” incur a tax of up to 6% annually until withdrawn. 26 U.S.C. 219(b)(1), (b)(5)(A), 4973(a), (b). The Wus realized their mistake in 2010, informed the IRS, and corrected the problem by withdrawing the excesses from their accounts. The Wus paid the taxes for 2007-2009, and although they conceded liability for the first two years, they each sought a refund for tax year 2009, arguing that they had avoided incurring taxes for that year by adjusting the IRA account balances before the April 2010 filing deadline for their 2009 tax return. The IRS rejected this contention. The Wus filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed with the government. Under section 4973(b), the consequence of taking a qualifying distribution under section 408(d)(4) is that the amount of the withdrawal “shall be treated as an amount not contributed,” but the Wus were not asking that their 2007 contributions be treated as if they were never contributed; they asked that those contributions be eliminated from the calculation for 2009 alone. View "Wu v. United States" on Justia Law

In an effort to raise more tax revenue, the Puerto Rico legislature amended the corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) in 2015. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc., the largest private employer in Puerto Rico, brought this action seeking an injunction against the continued enforcement of the AMT against it and a declaration that the AMT was unlawful. The district court permanently enjoined and declared invalid the enforcement of the AMT, concluding that the AMT violates the dormant Commerce Clause, the Federal Relations Act, and the Equal Protection Clause. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the federal district court had jurisdiction over the suit; and (2) the AMT is a facially discriminatory law that does not survive the heightened level of scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appeals the Tax Court's decision in these consolidated cases that SHI did not have deficiencies for the tax years under consideration and that SHLP and Vistancia had no adjustments to partnership items for their tax years which were under consideration. The tax court determined that the Taxpayers had used an accounting method that clearly reflected their income during the tax years under consideration. The court affirmed the tax court's decision that on the record before it, the Taxpayers used a permissible method of accounting and that method of accounting clearly reflected their income. The Tax Court determined that, as a matter of fact, the subject matter included the house, the lot, “the development . . . and its common improvements and amenities.” In this case, the Tax Court did not clearly err when it determined the subject matter of the Taxpayers’ home construction contracts; the Taxpayers’ application of the 95 percent test and the CCM logically flows from that determination. View "Shea Homes v. CIR" on Justia Law