Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

University Park at Evansdale, LLC (UPE) was the lessor of certain property owned by the West Virginia University Board of Governors commonly known as “University Park.” The Monongalia County Assessor assessed UPE’s leasehold interest in University Park at just over $9 million for the tax year 2015. UPE challenged the assessment, arguing that its leasehold interest was $0 because the leasehold was neither freely assignable nor a bargain lease. The Board of Equalization and Review (BER) affirmed, determining that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability, rather than valuation, reviewable only by the Tax Commissioner. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that UPE advanced a challenge that the BER had no jurisdiction to review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that UPE’s protest presented an issue of taxability. Remanded. View "University Park at Evansdale, LLC v. Musick" on Justia Law

Southwest Royalties, Inc, an oil and gas exploration company, filed a tax refund claim with the Comptroller asserting that its purchases of casing, tubing, other well equipment, and associated services were exempt from sales taxes under a statutory exemption. The Comptroller denied relief. In response, Southwest sued the Comptroller and the Attorney General. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the State, concluding that Southwest failed to meet its burden of proving the exemption applied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Southwest was not entitled an exemption from paying sales taxes on purchases of the equipment. View "Southwest Royalties, Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

The Pascagoula-Gautier School District and the City of Pascagoula took issue with the Jackson County Board of Supervisors’ approval of the Tax Assessor’s methodology in assessing taxes on Chevron’s leasehold interest in property it leased from Jackson County. After several years of litigation, and after the trial court had denied two motions to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court sua sponte reversed course and granted the second motion to dismiss for lack of standing, reasoning that the School District and City lacked standing because Mississippi Code Section 11-51-77 did not specifically grant them standing. Because the School District and the City did not need to show a specific statute authorizing standing, and because they otherwise demonstrated standing, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court judgment on this issue. View "Pascagoula-Gautier Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Jackson County" on Justia Law

Defendant, the owner and operator of a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada, was found guilty of nine counts of tax-related offenses. Defendant was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who ʺcorruptly or by force or threats of force . . . endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title.” Another portion of the statute, often referred to as the ʺomnibus clause,ʺ imposes criminal liability on one who ʺin any other way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.ʺ On appeal, defendant argued that the court, like the Sixth Circuit, should construe the phrase ʺthe due administration of this titleʺ in the omnibus clause to include only a pending IRS action of which a defendant was aware. The court rejected defendant's argument and joined three of its sister circuits in concluding that section 7212(a)ʹs omnibus clause criminalizes corrupt interference with an official effort to administer the tax code, and not merely a known IRS investigation. The court also concluded that an omission may be a means by which a defendant corruptly obstructs or impedes the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code under section 7212(a). Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit procedural error by using the manner of calculating the tax loss and restitution amounts that it did, or by deciding not to apply a two‐level reduction to defendant's base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Marinello" on Justia Law

Two taxpayers sold their capital stock of a corporation and structured the transaction to comply with the terms of a definitional statute in order to qualify for a special capital gains election. The Nebraska Department of Revenue disallowed the taxpayers’ special capital gains election. The taxpayers filed a petition for redetermination, and the Tax Commissioner denied the petition. The district court affirmed. The taxpayers appealed, asserting that the district court erred in applying the “economic substance” and “sham transaction” doctrines in determining whether they were entitled to the special capital gains election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the economic substance doctrine and the sham transaction doctrines did not provide a basis to disallow the taxpayers’ election. Remanded. View "Stewart v. Nebraska Dep’t of Revenue" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from the City of San Ramon to build 48 townhouses on two parcels. Because an analysis showed that the cost to the city of providing services to the new development would exceed the revenue generated by the project, the city conditioned its approval on the developer providing a funding mechanism to cover the difference. Using California’s Mello-Roos Act, the developer petitioned the city to create a “community facilities district” and then, as landowner, voted to approve a tax within the district to raise the necessary revenue. Building Industry Association-Bay Area unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the tax. The court of appeal affirmed. The tax will provide “additional services” to meet increased demand for existing services resulting from the townhouse development and meets the requirements of the Mello-Roos Act; the tax is a special (and not a general) tax because it is imposed for specific purposes and not for general governmental purposes, and therefore meets the requirements of the California Constitution; and the property owners’ constitutional and statutory rights are not burdened by an ordinance explaining that the services funded by the special tax will not be provided by the city if the tax is repealed. View "Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay Area v. City of San Ramon" on Justia Law

The State Tax Commissioner and the Berkeley County Assessor denied an ad valorem property tax exemption to University Healthcare Foundation, Inc. for its property known as the Dorothy McCormack Cancer Treatment & Rehabilitation Center. The circuit court overruled the denial, concluding that the healthcare and recreational services provided in the Center were primarily and immediately related to the joint charitable purposes of the Center and the Berkeley Medical Center. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Center was being used exclusively for charitable purposes. View "Matkovich v. Univ. Healthcare Found., Inc." on Justia Law

Jefferson Industries Corporation filed a complaint challenging the valuation for tax year 2011 of a plant involved in manufacturing and stamping car frames. The Madison County Auditor valued the property at $34,500,000. On appeal, the Madison County Board of Revision (BOR) adjusted the valuation to $28,000,000. Jefferson Industries again appealed and offered its appraisal valuation of $10,420,000. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) agreed with the BOR’s value, largely on the basis of the Jefferson Local School District Board of Education’s (BOE) appraisal. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding that the BTA did not explicitly address important evidentiary conflicts but should have. Remanded to the BTA to reconsider the evidence in light of particular objections that were raised to the BOE’s appraisal but were not addressed by the BTA. View "Jefferson Indus. Corp. v. Madison County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The United States appeals the district court’s determination that commissions claimed by Defendant F. Gordon Spoor as personal representative of the Louise P. Gallagher Estate and as trustee of the Louise Paxton Gallagher Revocable Trust have priority over a special deferred estate tax lien on property designated by agreement under I.R.C. 6324A. The court agreed with the United States that special estate tax liens on property designated by section 6324A, unlike estate tax liens on the gross estate pursuant to section 6324, are not subject to an executor’s claims for administrative expenses. The court also held that Spoor’s administrative expenses do not take priority over income tax liens imposed pursuant to section 6321. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Spoor" on Justia Law

Gate Gourmet, Inc. owns and operates a facility near the Lambert-St. Louis International airport from which it sells frozen meals to various commercial airlines. Gate Gourmet filed sales tax returns for the tax years 2008-2010 in which it reported sales of frozen meals to its airline customers at the reduced sales tax rate of one percent as provided in Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.014. After an audit, the Director of Revenue issued sales tax assessments to Gate Gourmet totaling $296,357, concluding that the sale of airline meals should have been taxed at four percent under Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.020. The Administrative Hearing Commission upheld the Director’s determination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission’s decision was based upon a proper construction of the law and was supported by competent and substantial evidence. View "Gate Gourmet, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue" on Justia Law