Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Fadden earned over $100,000 per year but did not submit tax returns. After an audit, the IRS garnished his wages. Fadden filed for bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay. Fadden claimed that he had no interest in any real property nor in any decedent’s life insurance policy or estate. Fadden actually knew that he would receive proceeds from the sale of his mother’s home (listed by the executor of her estate for $525,000) and would receive thousands of dollars as a beneficiary on his mother’s life insurance policies. A week later, Fadden mentioned his inheritance to a paralegal in the trustee’s office and asked to postpone his bankruptcy. When Fadden finally met with his bankruptcy trustee and an attorney, he confirmed that his schedules were accurate and denied receiving an inheritance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions under 18 U.S.C. 152(1) for concealing assets in bankruptcy; 18 U.S.C. 152(3) for making false declarations on his bankruptcy documents; and 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) for making false statements during the investigation of his bankruptcy. Counts 1 and 2 required proof of intent to deceive. Fadden proposed a theory-of-defense instruction based on his assertion that his conduct was “sloppiness.” The Seventh Circuit upheld the use of pattern instructions, including that “knowingly means that the defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” View "United States v. Fadden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court concluding that a large inventory of jet engine repair parts were not exempt from ad valorem property taxation.Petitioner maintained a vast inventory of jet engine repair parts at its West Virginia facility. Petitioner argued that the repair parts were exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to the Freeport Amendment contained in the West Virginia Constitution. The county assessor determined that the repair parts were not exempt from ad valorem taxation. The state tax commission upheld the determination. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the inventory of repair parts did not fall within the Freeport Amendment exemption. View "Pratt & Whitney Engine Services v. Steager" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of this putative class action for lack of standing.Taxpayers, owners of real property and payers of property taxes in Glacier County, paid their taxes under protest 2015 in response to an independent audit that revealed deficiencies in the County’s budgeting and accounting practices. Taxpayers sued the County and the State, alleging that both entities failed to comply with budgeting and accounting laws. The district court denied class certification and dismissed the case for lack of standing, concluding that Taxpayers failed to demonstrate that they had suffered a concrete injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that Taxpayers lacked standing to sue either the County or the State. View "Mitchell v. Glacier County" on Justia Law

Petitioner, Sierra Club, requested the Oklahoma Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction and petitioned for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. Petitioner alleged that House Bill 1449 was a revenue bill that violated Article V, Section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution. H.B. 1449 created the Motor Fuels Tax Fee for electric-drive and hybrid-drive vehicles, of $100 and $30 per year respectively, and directed that the money from the fees be deposited to the State Highway Construction and Maintenance Fund. The House passed H.B. 1449 on May 22, 2017 and the Senate passed it on May 25, 2017. H.B. 1449 passed with more than 51%, but less than 75%, of the vote in both chambers. It was scheduled to take effect November 1, 2017. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction and transformed the petition into a request for declaratory relief. The Court found H.B. 1449 was enacted to raise revenue and was in violation of Article V, Section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution. View "Sierra Club v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n" on Justia Law

El-Bey, a "Moorish national," created an EIN for the Trust, naming himself as the trustee and fiduciary. El-Bey filed six tax returns for the Trust, each seeking a $300,000 refund, signing each return, identifying himself as the fiduciary, and listing his date of birth as the date of trust creation. The IRS flagged these returns as frivolous and notified El-Bey that he would be assessed a $5,000 penalty per return if he failed to file a corrected return. El-Bey returned the letters to the IRS, including vouchers and tax forms bearing no relation to the returns. Based on the fourth and fifth tax returns, the IRS mailed two $300,000 refund checks, which El-Bey deposited, using the funds to purchase vehicles and to buy a house. After the sixth return, El-Bey was indicted on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and six counts of making false claims to the IRS, 18 U.S.C. 287. The district court allowed El-Bey to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel over El-Bey’s objection. El-Bey advanced irrelevant arguments, interrupted the judge, and made it challenging to manage the trial. The court expressed frustration, but later instructed the jurors, who indicated that they could continue to be impartial. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a new trial. Statements by the court in the presence of the jury conveyed that El-Bey was guilty or dishonest and impaired El-Bey’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. View "United States v. El-Bey" on Justia Law

Defendant Kathleen Stegman was convicted by a jury of two counts of evading her personal taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Stegman was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 51 months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The district court also ordered Stegman to pay a $100,000 fine, plus restitution in the amount of $68,733. Stegman established several limited liability corporations pertaining to a “medical aesthetics” business she owned, using these corporations to effectively launder client payments. As part of this process, Stegman would use the corporations to purchase money orders, typically in denominations of $500 or less, that she in turn used to purchase items for personal use. In 2007, Stegman purchased 162 money orders totaling $77,181.92. In 2008, she purchased 252 money orders totaling $121,869.99. And in 2009, she purchased 157 money orders totaling $73,697.31. Notably, Stegman reported zero cash income on her federal income tax returns during each of these years. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury convicted Stegman of evading her personal taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008 (Counts 4 and 5), as well as evading corporate taxes for the tax years 2008 and 2009 (Counts 1 and 2). The jury acquitted Stegman of evading corporate taxes for the tax year 2010 (Count 3). The jury also acquitted Stegman and Smith of the conspiracy charge (Count 6). Stegman moved for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted the motion as to the two counts that related to the evasion of corporate taxes (Counts 1 and 2), but denied the remainder of the motion. In doing so, the district court chose to acquit Stegman of the corporate tax evasion counts not due to a lack of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt that this corporation evaded taxes,” but rather because “the indictment itself was flawed in attributing the loss as due and owing by Ms. Stegman, when actually it was due and owing by the corporation.” Stegman raised five issues on appeal, four of which pertain to her convictions and one of which pertained to her sentence. Although several of these issues require extensive discussion due to their fact-intensive nature, the Tenth Circuit concluded that all of these issues lacked merit. View "United States v. Stegman" on Justia Law

In this direct appeal, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether the “net loss carryover” provision of the Pennsylvania Revenue Code for tax year 2007 (“NLC”), which restricted the amount of loss a corporation could carry over from prior years as a deduction against its 2007 taxable income to whichever is greater, 12.5% of the corporation’s 2007 taxable income or $3 million, violated Article 8, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (“the Uniformity Clause”). Nextel Communications, incorporated in Delaware, earned $45,053,282 in taxable income on its business activities in the Commonwealth. Under the NLC, Nextel was entitled to deduct from its 2007 taxable income the net losses it sustained in prior tax years in the amount of $3 million or 12.5% of its 2007 taxable income, whichever total was greater. In 2007, Nextel had a cumulative net loss dating from the tax year 1997 of $150,636,792. Because 12.5% of Nextel’s 2007 taxable income amounted to $5,631,660, and, hence, was greater than $3 million, Nextel claimed the 12.5% amount as a net loss deduction, thereby reducing its taxable income for 2007 to $39,421,622. Under the corporate net income tax rate of 9.9%, Nextel’s total tax liability to the Commonwealth on this adjusted income was $3,938,220, which Nextel paid to the Department. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s holding that the NLC, as applied to Nextel violated the Uniformity Clause. However, the Court also found that the portion of the NLC which created the violation, the $3 million flat deduction, could be severed from the remainder of the statute, while still enabling the statute to operate as the legislature intended. View "Nextel Communications v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Defendant Darren Rose, a member of the Alturas Indian Rancheria, ran two smoke shops located in Indian country but far from any lands governed by the Alturas Indian Rancheria. In those smoke shops, Rose sold illegal cigarettes and failed to collect state taxes. California brought an enforcement action to stop illegal sales and collect civil penalties. Rose appealed, arguing: (1) California and its courts did not have jurisdiction to enforce California’s civil/regulatory laws for his actions in Indian country; and (2) the amount of civil penalties imposed was inequitable and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) federal law and tribal sovereignty did not preempt California’s regulation and enforcement of its laws concerning sales of cigarettes; and (2) the superior court’s imposition of civil penalties was proper. View "California v. Rose" on Justia Law

In May 2007, the Medical Center Hospital Authority (“Hospital Authority”) filed an action against the Columbus Board of Tax Assessors and related parties (together, “the Tax Board”) in which it sought a declaration that its leasehold interest in a building located on real property owned by a private entity constituted public property exempt from ad valorem taxation under OCGA 48-5-41 (a) (1). The superior court granted summary judgment to the Hospital Authority, finding that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest qualified as “public property,” and was thus exempt from ad valorem property taxation. The Tax Board appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that two prior bond validation orders conclusively determined, for purposes of OCGA 48-5-41 (a) (1) (A), that the property at issue was “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxation. The Court held that these orders did not conclusively establish that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest was “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxes and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Medical Center Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to the sheriff and treasurer of Barbour County and the assessor of Barbour County (collectively, Respondents) and finding that Petitioners were liable for payment of certain property taxes for the years 2011 and 2012. Petitioners had purchased a tax lien on certain mineral interests from the Deputy Commission of Delinquent and Nonentered Lands of Barbour County on September 19, 2011 and secured a deed to the property on January 23, 2012. On appeal, Petitioners argued that they were not liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes because they were not owners in possession of the property during those years. Respondents argued that Petitioners were liable for the taxes at issue because their deed specified that they acquired title in 2004. The Supreme Court held that because W. Va. Code 11A-3-62 relates the tax lien purchaser’s title back to the year of the assessment for the property taxes that became delinquent, the circuit court did not err in determining that Petitioners were liable for the 2011 and 2012 property taxes. View "Ancient Energy, Ltd. v. Ferguson" on Justia Law