Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The J.R. Simplot Foundation appealed a district court’s ruling that the charitable property tax exemption under Idaho Code section 63-602C did not apply to the property known as Jack’s Urban Meeting Place (JUMP) while JUMP was under construction. In 2015, the Foundation applied for a charitable property tax exemption for JUMP. The Ada County Board of Equalization (Ada County) denied the tax exemption because JUMP was under construction and therefore not used exclusively for the Foundation’s charitable purposes. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (IBTA) reversed, finding construction was not a “use” of the property and the only uses at JUMP were in furtherance of the Foundation’s charitable objectives. Accordingly, the IBTA held JUMP was entitled to the property tax exemption. Ada County appealed the decision of the IBTA to the district court. The district court, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, reversed the decision of the IBTA finding construction was a “use” of the property and that construction is not a charitable use. The Foundation appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Ada Co Bd of Equalization v. J.R. Simplot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissing NASCAR Holdings, Inc.’s notice of appeal solely because it was filed by an attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio.The Department of Taxation issued an assessment against NASCAR for $549,520. The Tax Commissioner affirmed the assessment. NASCAR filed a notice of appeal to the BTA. The notice was signed by a Florida-based attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio. The BTA dismissed the appeal, finding that the attorney had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he prepared and filed the notice of appeal on NASCAR’s behalf and that this rendered the notice of appeal void ab initio, thereby depriving the Board of jurisdiction over NASCAR’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred in not applying Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindley, 415 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1980), to the facts of this case. View "NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs-respondents in this case sued hundreds of defendants, whom the plaintiffs asserted had served them mixed drinks over a period of several years prior to filing the lawsuit. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants had violated a tax statute, 37 O.S.2011, section 576(B)(2), that required a 13.5% tax on the gross receipts the holders of a license by the ABLE Commission for sale of a mixed beverage. They contended that the licensees who failed to combine the retail sale price with the tax in its advertised price had overcharged their customers by 13.5%. The defendants appealed the trial court's interpretation of the statute. The Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded these cases with orders to dismiss: "Although the briefs from the parties skillfully address other permutations of argument on both sides of this cause, we conclude that what we have chosen to address sufficiently resolves the main issue presented. The statute's ambiguities caused sufficient problems in collection of the tax that the Legislature amended the statute. We hold that the statute's purpose does not involve protecting consumers from having a tax separately listed from the price of a drink instead of including it in the price of a drink. Because the complaints of the plaintiffs against the defendants rest on the assumption that 37 O.S.2011, section 576(B)(2) protects consumers, and we have held that it is solely a tax statute." View "Truel v. Aguirre, LLC" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against the United States under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 26 U.S.C. 7433(a). Plaintiff invoked section 7433 to recover damages he claims to have suffered as a result of a mix-up relating to the refund due to him on his 2011 income tax. The court held that section 7433 did not provide a jurisdictional path for plaintiff's action because the statute waives the government's sovereign immunity only for damages suffered in connection with collection of federal taxes, and plaintiff's injury (if any) related to collection of a student loan debt. View "Ivy v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

If the patent holder effectively controls the corporation such that he or she did not transfer all substantial rights to the patents, then the tax treatment allowed by 26 U.S.C. 1235 does not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on a petition for redetermination of federal income tax deficiencies in which taxpayers sought capital gains treatment of patent-generated royalties pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 1235(a). In this case, taxpayers did not transfer all substantial rights to the patents. The panel agreed with the Tax Court that taxpayers failed to meet their burden of showing that they actually relied in good faith on an adviser's judgment in order to avoid accuracy-related penalties. View "Cooper v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment affirming a certificate of assessment issued by the Department of Revenue requiring Valley Power Systems, Inc. to pay alternate contractor’s excise tax, use tax, interest, and a penalty.Valley Power contracted with Black Hills Power, Inc. (BHP) to install new exhaust manifolds on five mobile power units that were used by a utility company to provide supplemental power at one of its power plants, but Valley Power did not pay any tax with respect to the transaction. Instead BHP paid use tax on the transaction. After an audit of both companies, the Department refunded BHP’s use tax and issued a certificate of assessment requiring Valley Power to pay $54,404. An administrative hearing examiner and the circuit court affirmed the assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department did not err in concluding that Valley Power was required to pay excise and use tax. View "Valley Power Systems v. S.D. Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Tunica County, Mississippi (the Board), ordered an ad valorem tax levy for fiscal year 2014-15 and increased the millage rate from the previous year. After entering the order, the Board advertised a public hearing of the proposed ad valorem tax levy in the Tunica Times. The hearing took place and various taxpayers appeared to voice objections and concerns. Aggrieved by the actions of the Board, one taxpayer, HWCC-Tunica, LLC (HWCC), which owned and operates Hollywood Casino-Tunica, filed a bill of exceptions with the Circuit Court of Tunica County and paid the taxes under protest. The trial court, finding that the failure of the Board to comply with statutory notice and public hearing requirements rendered the tax levy unlawful, ordered a refund. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tunica County Board of Supervisors v. HWCC-Tunica, LLC" on Justia Law

Where an income tax return has not been filed by the return date on a writ of fieri facias, any potential income tax refunds for the applicable tax year are not “in possession of or under the control of the debtor” so as to be reachable by the lien under Va. Code 8.01-501 and -507.Creditors obtained separate judgments against Debtors and issued to Debtors writs of fieri facias. The general district court entered transfer orders in favor of Creditors requiring Debtors to turn over their 2015 income tax refunds to Creditors. Debtors appealed the transfer orders to the circuit court, arguing that the general district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the transfer orders because Debtors had not filed their 2015 income tax returns as of the return date of the writ. The circuit court ruled in favor of Creditors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, for purposes of Va. Code 8.01-507, Debtors were not entitled to, nor did they have a fixed property interest in, the 2015 income tax refunds at the time of the return date on the writ of fieri facias. View "Shifflett v. Latitude Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States charged Hall with unlawful gambling and money laundering and obtained a preliminary criminal forfeiture order for 18 parcels in Knox County. The County determined that Hall owed substantial delinquent real property taxes, giving it a first lien under Tennessee law. Under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(2), a party asserting an interest in property that is subject to criminal forfeiture may seek a hearing on his alleged interest within 30 days. Knox County filed an untimely claim. The court amended the preliminary forfeiture order to cover three more Knox County properties. Knox County filed a timely second claim and requested an interlocutory sale and delay of forfeiture. The United States stated that accrued taxes and interest would be paid, regardless of whether the taxing authority filed a claim, but argued that Knox County would have no legal interest in accruing taxes once title passes, citing the Supremacy Clause, and objected to delaying a final forfeiture order. The Sixth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order. Knox County has a legal interest in the property (tax lien), so the district court erred in dismissing its claim for lack of standing but it is not necessarily entitled to a hearing. The court may ascertain the scope of Knox County’s interest on summary judgment but must account for that interest before entering a final forfeiture order. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knox County’s motion for an interlocutory sale. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

Here, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that direct production involves a process that includes those steps essential and integral to transforming tangible personal property into a distinct marketable good.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tax Court affirming the decision of the Department of State Revenue partially denying refund claims submitted by Petitioner for sales tax paid on blast freezing equipment and the electricity used in operating that equipment. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that it qualified for exemptions under the relevant statutes because it engages in “direct production” when it blast freezes another company’s food product and that it engages in its own production process in producing the new, distinct marketable goods. In reversing, the Supreme Court held (1) Petitioner’s blast freezing process constitutes direct production because it represents the crucial final step in creating a distinct marketable good; and (2) the relevant statutes and regulations do not impose a requirement that Petitioner’s blast-freezing procedure be its own, separate production process. View "Merchandise Warehouse Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue" on Justia Law