Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants’ petitions for judicial review challenging a 2007 decision by the Nevada Tax Commission regarding a tax refund request, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petitions for judicial review because they were untimely.In 2008, Appellants filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for judicial review (Case 3). The ALJ affirmed the Commission’s 2007 decision. In 2014, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Appellants then filed a second petition for judicial review (Case 4) challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision. The district court consolidated the Case 3 and Case 4 petitions for judicial review and affirmed the Commission’s 2007 and 2014 decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ Case 3 petition for judicial review and thus lacked the authority to consider the merits of Appellants’ Case 4 petition. View "K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

Deng defaulted on special assessments on Las Vegas residential real property, which entered delinquency and underwent a duly noticed and authorized sale (NRS Chapter 271). On January 27, 2014, Pawlik purchased the property at the sale and was issued a sales certificate. Under NRS 271.595(1), Deng had a two-year redemption period from that date. On January 7, 2016, Pawlik began attempting to serve Deng with notice of the upcoming expiration of the redemption period and Pawlik's intent to apply for a deed pursuant to NRS 271.595(3). NRS 271.595 creates a clear redemption period of two years and also creates an ambiguous 60-day redemption window after notice that the certificate holder will demand a deed. On March 14, 2016, 47 days after the Dengs' two-year redemption period expired and 67 days after Pawlik began attempting service, Pawlik applied for a deed. The treasurer denied the request. Deng redeemed on April 6, 2016, with full payment to the city. Pawlik sought to quiet title and applied for a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the deed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that the 60-day period does not overlap with the two-year period. NRS 271.595 requires that the 60-day notice and additional redemption period begin after the end of the two-year redemption period. Pawlik attempted service on Deng before the end of the two-year redemption period, which provided Deng with less than two years and 60 days of redemption. View "Pawlik v. Deng" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluding that Taxpayer’s challenge to the taxable value assigned to its property for tax year 2012 was barred because taxpayer waited too long to notify the Board of Revision (BOR) that it wished to pursue a continuing complaint for tax year 2012. Taxpayer did not file a new complaint for the 2012 tax year but, rather, relied upon the continuing-complaint jurisdiction provided for in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D). The Supreme Court held that the time limitation imposed by the BTA was contrary to the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D) and that, under the statute, the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to consider Taxpayer’s request for tax year 2012. View "MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting Burger King’s motion for summary judgment in an action seeking relief from a tax assessment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 26-18-406, holding that the circuit court erred in construing the relevant statutes and promulgated rules to find that Burger King was required to pay taxes only on the wholesale value of the food ingredients removed from stock, as opposed to the retail value of the meals. The Supreme Court held (1) because the parties did not raise in the proceedings below the issue of sovereign immunity, it was not properly addressed further in this case; and (2) as to the merits of the case, the tax of the manager meals is assessed on the retail value of the meal, rather than the wholesale value of the individual ingredients withdrawn from stock. View "Walther v. Flis Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Vermont Department of Taxes appeals from trial court orders in favor of defendants in consolidated tax-collection cases. Defendants Thomas Tatro, Kenneth Montani, and Tyre Duvernay failed to file personal income tax returns for various years and the Department sent a First Notice of Audit Assessment to each that provided the amount of taxes due along with interest and penalties. These notices were issued more than three years after the date that the tax returns should have been filed. Defendants did not appeal the assessments to the Commissioner pursuant to 32 V.S.A. 5883. The issue before the superior court in each case arose in the context of a collection action brought by the Department. Defendants did not appear or participate in the collection cases or in these appeals. The Department moved for default judgment. The superior court sua sponte raised a statute-of-limitations challenge to the underlying tax assessments. The court concluded that the underlying tax debts were invalid because the Department issued its notices of deficiencies or assessments of penalty or interest to defendants more than three years after defendants’ tax returns were originally due. The Department argued on appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of the underlying debts in these collection actions, and that, in any event, it erred in concluding that a three-year limitation period applied. The Supreme Court agreed with the Department on both points. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in the Department’s favor for the years covered in these cases. View "Vermont Department of Taxes v. Montani et al." on Justia Law

The court of appeals erred in ruling that a taxpayer avoided in Iowa inheritance tax through a private postmortem family settlement agreement (FSA).Here, the decedent, before his death, signed a beneficiary form listing the taxpayer as a contingent beneficiary of his brokerage account. That account transferred to the taxpayer upon the decedent's death. The Iowa Department of Revenue (IDOR) determined that the estate owed the inheritance tax on the full account value. The decedent’s grandchildren sued the taxpayer claiming that they were entitled to the brokerage account under the decedent’s will because the decedent lacked the mental capacity to execute an enforceable beneficiary designation for the account. The taxpayer settled the suit by transferring half the account value to the plaintiffs under an FSA. The taxpayer then sought a refund of part of the inheritance tax already paid. The IDOR denied a refund, determining that the taxpayer failed to establish incapacity. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the FSA controlled the tax issue. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court judgment, holding that, without an adjudication of incapacity, the FSA was not binding on the IDOR and could not avoid the inheritance tax. View "Nance v. Iowa Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

This litigation began when purchasers of computer service contracts filed a putative class action against the sellers. The sellers successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the computer services contracts. The sellers, in the meantime, had applied for tax abatements from the Commissioner of Revenue. The Commissioner denied the applications, and the sellers petitioned the Appellate Tax Board. Appellant, one of the consumers who purchased these service contracts, moved to intervene in the proceedings, which petition the Board allowed. The Board reversed the Commissioner’s decision and allowed the abatements. Taxes were imposed on the service contracts purchased by Appellant. After final judgment was entered in the sellers’ favor in the class action litigation, the sellers withdrew their tax abatement petitions with prejudice. The Board denied Appellant’s motion to strike the withdrawals and terminated the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the Board did not err as a matter of law in allowing the Sellers’ withdrawals; but (2) the Board’s termination of the proceedings in their entirety, after permitting Appellant to intervene and allowing the abatements, was an error of law. Rather, Appellant should have been allowed to proceed as an intervener on its claim to recover the taxes imposed on the service contracts it purchased. View "WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

This litigation began when purchasers of computer service contracts filed a putative class action against the sellers. The sellers successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the computer services contracts. The sellers, in the meantime, had applied for tax abatements from the Commissioner of Revenue. The Commissioner denied the applications, and the sellers petitioned the Appellate Tax Board. Appellant, one of the consumers who purchased these service contracts, moved to intervene in the proceedings, which petition the Board allowed. The Board reversed the Commissioner’s decision and allowed the abatements. Taxes were imposed on the service contracts purchased by Appellant. After final judgment was entered in the sellers’ favor in the class action litigation, the sellers withdrew their tax abatement petitions with prejudice. The Board denied Appellant’s motion to strike the withdrawals and terminated the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) the Board did not err as a matter of law in allowing the Sellers’ withdrawals; but (2) the Board’s termination of the proceedings in their entirety, after permitting Appellant to intervene and allowing the abatements, was an error of law. Rather, Appellant should have been allowed to proceed as an intervener on its claim to recover the taxes imposed on the service contracts it purchased. View "WorldWide TechServices, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The legislature has not enacted any statute that exempts fraternal benefit societies from paying sales and use tax.Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, a Nebraska fraternal benefit society, requested an exemption from sales and use taxes from the Nebraska Department of Revenue (NDOR) and sought a refund of more than $2 million in sales and use taxes previously paid. NDOR denied Woodmen’s application. The Tax Commissioner upheld the determination. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) neither Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2704.12(1) nor Neb. Rev. Stat. 44-1095 exempted Woodmen from sales and use tax; (2) Woodmen was not denied due process before the Tax Commissioner; and (3) the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in excluding certain expert testimony. View "Woodmen of the World v. Nebraska Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

A taxpayer that contracts to sell property used in its trade or business is not entitled to treat as capital gain an advance deposit that it rightfully retains when its would-be buyer defaults and cancels the deal. In this partnership tax case, CRI-Leslie filed a petition for readjustment in the tax court, asserting that the Internal Revenue Code was meant to prescribe the same tax treatment for gains related to the disposition of "trade or business" property regardless of whether the property was successfully sold or the sale agreement was canceled. The Eleventh Circuit held that I.R.C. 1234A provides for capital-gains treatment of income resulting from canceled sales only where the underlying property constitutes a "capital asset," and I.R.C. 1221 defines "capital asset" in a way that all agree excludes the property at issue here. Therefore, CRI-Leslie was not entitled to treat its $9.7 million deposit as capital gain. View "Cri-Leslie, LLC v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law