Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the City of Milwaukee complied with Wis. Stat. 70.32(1) in its tax assessment of property owned by Metropolitan Associates. Also on appeal, Metropolitan asked the Supreme Court to substitute the court’s judgment for the circuit court’s judgment regarding the credibility of witnesses and the relative weights to assign to various pieces of evidence. The Supreme Court held (1) the City’s assessment of Metropolitan’s property complied with the statute; (2) the circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the reliability of respective appraisals were not clearly erroneous; and (3) the circuit court’s findings were sufficient to support its determination regardless of whether the presumption of correctness was employed. View "Metropolitan Associates v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

The 36-unit North Canton apartment complex went into foreclosure.The lender obtained a judgment of $1,700,000. There were no bids at a sheriff’s sale with a minimum bid of $1,400,000. The receiver marketed the property through a national brojkerage firm, which, in a mass-mailing flyer showed a price of $1,325,000. The marketing materials did not mention the sheriff’s sale. There were 17 inquiries and at least six offers to purchase, ranging from $820,000 to $1,200,000, from LFG. There was no relationship between LFG and the receiver or the former owner. The court approved a sale as “commercially reasonable.” Title transferred to LFG in 2011. LFG sought to reduce the property’s tax-year-2012 valuation from $1,841,300 to $1,200,000. The Board of Education filed a counter-complaint. The board relied on “strong testimony” by LFG and “good evidence” that the property was marketed over time and that the price represented fair market value. The Board of Tax Appeals reinstated the auditor’s valuation. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, with the instruction that the $1,200,000 sale price be used as the property’s true value for tax purposes. Under the “forced sale” provision of R.C. 5713.04, a forced sale gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the sale price is not the true value. In this case, the presumption was rebutted by ncontradicted evidence that the transaction at issue was at arms length. View "North Canton City School District Board of Education v. Stark County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Notestine, a nonprofit corporation with 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) status as a charitable institution, owns the 11-unit residential rental property developed as low-income housing under 12 U.S.C. 1701q. Construction costs were $1.5 million. The federal capital advance was $1.3 million. The “project rental assistance” contract requires tenants to be at least 62 years old and have income under 50 percent of the area median. Rent is tied to tenant income at $407 per month, including utilities, with any overage payable to HUD. Tenants pay up to 30 percent of their adjusted gross income on rent, with HUD subsidizing any difference. Capital Advance Program Use and Regulatory Agreements were recorded on title, in effect at least 40 years from 2013, unless released by HUD. An auditor valued the property at $811,120 for 2013, a Logan County reappraisal year. Notestine sought a reduction, arguing that the building's value was $165,000, based on actual rent and expenses. The Board of Tax Appeals adopted the opinion of Notestine’s appraiser, who valued the property at $75,000. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed. Although market rents and expenses constitute a “rule” when valuing low-income government housing generally, that rule is presumptive, not conclusive. In this case, the rents are minimal, and federal subsidization is strictly controlled by HUD-imposed restrictions on the accumulation of surpluses. There is no evidence that any adjustment from contract rent to market rent would eliminate the “affirmative value” of government subsidies. View "Notestine Manor, Inc. v. Logan County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In a memorandum opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the Stock Purchase Agreement allowed Vestcom to claim the full amount of the transaction tax deductions (TTDs) pre-closing. The TTDs in this case arose from the sale of a manufacturer of retail shelving labels between sophisticated financial actors. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court held that the Agreement allowed only one objectively reasonable meaning, namely that Vestcom was free to claim 100% of the TTDs to reduce pre-closing taxable income, but VPH would have to remit 50% of the value of any post-closing refunds or reductions in taxable income to LSVC. View "LSVC Holdings, LLC v. Vestcom Parent Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

In an appeal of a Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) summary decision granting a compensating use tax refund to BHCMC, L.L.C., doing business as Boot Hill Casino & Resort, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed whether such a tax could be imposed on Boot Hill for electronic gaming machines it did not (and, under the law and its management agreement with Kansas Lottery, could not) own. Boot Hill challenged its payment of $801,588.95 in compensating use tax for the years 2009 through 2011. The amount assessed was based on the sale price for electronic gaming machines (EGMs) that Boot Hill purchased out of state for use at the casino it manages in Dodge City. The Court held that Boot Hill did not exercise a right or power incident to ownership of personal property in order to be subject to a compensating use tax for that property. Because Boot Hill has not exercised such a power or right, the Supreme Court affirmed BOTA's refund and the Court of Appeals panel decision that upheld it. View "In re Tax Appeal of BHCMC video" on Justia Law

A taxpayer that conducts business in multiple states must apportion its business revenue among the states in which it does business. Texas Tax Code section 171.106 provides for such apportionment under a single-factor formula, which compares the taxpayer’s gross receipts derived from its Texas business to its gross receipts everywhere. Section 141.001, however, adopts the Multistate Tax Compact, which sets out a three-factor formula for apportioning“business income” for an“income tax” and provides that a taxpayer subject to a state income tax may elect to apportion its income “in the manner provided by the laws of such state” or may elect to apportion using the Compact’s three-factor formula. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment, holding that apportionment of the Texas franchise tax is exclusively the province of chapter 171. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed. Section 171.106 provides the exclusive formula for apportioning the franchise tax and, by its terms, precludes the taxpayer from using the Compact’s three-factor formula.The Compact is severable and contains no unmistakable language waiving the state’s exercise of the sovereign tax power. Nothing in the Compact expressly prohibits the states from adopting an exclusive apportionment method that overrides the Compact’s formula. View "Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

The J.R. Simplot Foundation appealed a district court’s ruling that the charitable property tax exemption under Idaho Code section 63-602C did not apply to the property known as Jack’s Urban Meeting Place (JUMP) while JUMP was under construction. In 2015, the Foundation applied for a charitable property tax exemption for JUMP. The Ada County Board of Equalization (Ada County) denied the tax exemption because JUMP was under construction and therefore not used exclusively for the Foundation’s charitable purposes. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (IBTA) reversed, finding construction was not a “use” of the property and the only uses at JUMP were in furtherance of the Foundation’s charitable objectives. Accordingly, the IBTA held JUMP was entitled to the property tax exemption. Ada County appealed the decision of the IBTA to the district court. The district court, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment, reversed the decision of the IBTA finding construction was a “use” of the property and that construction is not a charitable use. The Foundation appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Ada Co Bd of Equalization v. J.R. Simplot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissing NASCAR Holdings, Inc.’s notice of appeal solely because it was filed by an attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio.The Department of Taxation issued an assessment against NASCAR for $549,520. The Tax Commissioner affirmed the assessment. NASCAR filed a notice of appeal to the BTA. The notice was signed by a Florida-based attorney who was not licensed to practice law in Ohio. The BTA dismissed the appeal, finding that the attorney had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he prepared and filed the notice of appeal on NASCAR’s behalf and that this rendered the notice of appeal void ab initio, thereby depriving the Board of jurisdiction over NASCAR’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred in not applying Jemo Associates, Inc. v. Lindley, 415 N.E.2d 292 (Ohio 1980), to the facts of this case. View "NASCAR Holdings, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs-respondents in this case sued hundreds of defendants, whom the plaintiffs asserted had served them mixed drinks over a period of several years prior to filing the lawsuit. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants had violated a tax statute, 37 O.S.2011, section 576(B)(2), that required a 13.5% tax on the gross receipts the holders of a license by the ABLE Commission for sale of a mixed beverage. They contended that the licensees who failed to combine the retail sale price with the tax in its advertised price had overcharged their customers by 13.5%. The defendants appealed the trial court's interpretation of the statute. The Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded these cases with orders to dismiss: "Although the briefs from the parties skillfully address other permutations of argument on both sides of this cause, we conclude that what we have chosen to address sufficiently resolves the main issue presented. The statute's ambiguities caused sufficient problems in collection of the tax that the Legislature amended the statute. We hold that the statute's purpose does not involve protecting consumers from having a tax separately listed from the price of a drink instead of including it in the price of a drink. Because the complaints of the plaintiffs against the defendants rest on the assumption that 37 O.S.2011, section 576(B)(2) protects consumers, and we have held that it is solely a tax statute." View "Truel v. Aguirre, LLC" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action against the United States under the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, 26 U.S.C. 7433(a). Plaintiff invoked section 7433 to recover damages he claims to have suffered as a result of a mix-up relating to the refund due to him on his 2011 income tax. The court held that section 7433 did not provide a jurisdictional path for plaintiff's action because the statute waives the government's sovereign immunity only for damages suffered in connection with collection of federal taxes, and plaintiff's injury (if any) related to collection of a student loan debt. View "Ivy v. Commissioner" on Justia Law