Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 13, the statutory 90-day window to appeal a Tax Court decision to this court runs from either: 1) the entry of the Tax Court decision being appealed or 2) if a party moves to vacate or revise the Tax Court's decision, from the entry of the Tax Court's ruling on that motion to vacate or revise the decision. At issue was whether a party may file successive motions to vacate or revise with the effect of extending the time to appeal into perpetuity. The Fifth Circuit held that successive motions to vacate or revise a Tax Court decision, raising substantially the same grounds as the first motion, will not affect the time period in which a party may appeal a Tax Court decision. The court explained that, where successive post-decision motions are filed in the Tax Court, the statutory 90-day window to appeal the Tax Court decision runs from the Tax Court's ruling on the first motion to vacate or revise filed. In this case, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the notice was filed more than 90 days after the Tax Court disposed of the first motion to vacate. View "Annamalai v. CIR" on Justia Law

This direct cross-appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court involved the scope of the authority the Department of Revenue (DOR) to enforce various provisions of state law relating to the imposition of a transportation penny tax by Richland County (County) and the County's expenditure of the funds generated by the tax. After DOR conducted an audit and informed the County that DOR intended to cease future remittances to the County based on purported misuse of funds, the County filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court, arguing DOR lacked the authority to stop payments and seeking a writ of mandamus compelling DOR to continue remitting revenues. DOR counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the County's expenditures were unlawful, an injunction to prohibit future unlawful expenditures, and alternatively, the appointment of a receiver to administer the County's tax revenues. Following a hearing, the circuit court issued a writ of mandamus compelling DOR to remit the tax revenues, denied injunctive relief, and refused to appoint a receiver. Both the County and DOR appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in all respects except it reversed the circuit court's denial of DOR's request for injunctive relief. DOR was entitled to an injunction requiring the County to expend the funds generated by the tax solely on transportation-related projects in accordance with the law. View "Richland County v. So. Carolina Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

CDLA filed suit against the DMV, alleging that the DMV conducts administrative hearings to determine whether automatic suspension of a driver's license was warranted after the driver has been arrested for driving under the influence. CDLA claimed that at these hearings, the hearing officers simultaneously act as advocates for DMV and as triers of fact. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of DMV's motion for summary judgment, holding that taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a was appropriate under the circumstances of this case, in which a group of taxpayers has alleged that a government entity was engaging in "waste" by implementing and maintaining a hearing system that violated drivers' procedural due process rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "California DUI Lawyers Assoc. v. California Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

CDLA filed suit against the DMV, alleging that the DMV conducts administrative hearings to determine whether automatic suspension of a driver's license was warranted after the driver has been arrested for driving under the influence. CDLA claimed that at these hearings, the hearing officers simultaneously act as advocates for DMV and as triers of fact. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of DMV's motion for summary judgment, holding that taxpayer standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a was appropriate under the circumstances of this case, in which a group of taxpayers has alleged that a government entity was engaging in "waste" by implementing and maintaining a hearing system that violated drivers' procedural due process rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "California DUI Lawyers Assoc. v. California Department of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

Galveston County failed to rebut the presumed constitutionality of a statutory formula determining the taxable value of leased natural-gas compressors located in its jurisdiction. Further, Washington County was the taxable situs for the compressors.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which held that the parties failed to produce summary judgment evidence demonstrating, as a matter of law, that the statutory formula was either a reasonable or an unreasonable method of calculating the compressors’ reasonable market value. The court of appeals also held that Galveston County was the taxable situs of the compressors. The Supreme Court held (1) the court of appeals erred by not rendering judgment that the County failed to rebut the presumed constitutionality of the valuation statutes; and (2) the legislature’s statutory taxation scheme sets situs in the county where the dealer does business, and therefore, Washington County was the proper taxable situs for the compressors. View "EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants’ petitions for judicial review challenging a 2007 decision by the Nevada Tax Commission regarding a tax refund request, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petitions for judicial review because they were untimely.In 2008, Appellants filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for judicial review (Case 3). The ALJ affirmed the Commission’s 2007 decision. In 2014, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Appellants then filed a second petition for judicial review (Case 4) challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision. The district court consolidated the Case 3 and Case 4 petitions for judicial review and affirmed the Commission’s 2007 and 2014 decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ Case 3 petition for judicial review and thus lacked the authority to consider the merits of Appellants’ Case 4 petition. View "K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

Deng defaulted on special assessments on Las Vegas residential real property, which entered delinquency and underwent a duly noticed and authorized sale (NRS Chapter 271). On January 27, 2014, Pawlik purchased the property at the sale and was issued a sales certificate. Under NRS 271.595(1), Deng had a two-year redemption period from that date. On January 7, 2016, Pawlik began attempting to serve Deng with notice of the upcoming expiration of the redemption period and Pawlik's intent to apply for a deed pursuant to NRS 271.595(3). NRS 271.595 creates a clear redemption period of two years and also creates an ambiguous 60-day redemption window after notice that the certificate holder will demand a deed. On March 14, 2016, 47 days after the Dengs' two-year redemption period expired and 67 days after Pawlik began attempting service, Pawlik applied for a deed. The treasurer denied the request. Deng redeemed on April 6, 2016, with full payment to the city. Pawlik sought to quiet title and applied for a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the deed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that the 60-day period does not overlap with the two-year period. NRS 271.595 requires that the 60-day notice and additional redemption period begin after the end of the two-year redemption period. Pawlik attempted service on Deng before the end of the two-year redemption period, which provided Deng with less than two years and 60 days of redemption. View "Pawlik v. Deng" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) concluding that Taxpayer’s challenge to the taxable value assigned to its property for tax year 2012 was barred because taxpayer waited too long to notify the Board of Revision (BOR) that it wished to pursue a continuing complaint for tax year 2012. Taxpayer did not file a new complaint for the 2012 tax year but, rather, relied upon the continuing-complaint jurisdiction provided for in Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D). The Supreme Court held that the time limitation imposed by the BTA was contrary to the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(D) and that, under the statute, the BOR had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to consider Taxpayer’s request for tax year 2012. View "MDM Holdings, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order granting Burger King’s motion for summary judgment in an action seeking relief from a tax assessment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 26-18-406, holding that the circuit court erred in construing the relevant statutes and promulgated rules to find that Burger King was required to pay taxes only on the wholesale value of the food ingredients removed from stock, as opposed to the retail value of the meals. The Supreme Court held (1) because the parties did not raise in the proceedings below the issue of sovereign immunity, it was not properly addressed further in this case; and (2) as to the merits of the case, the tax of the manager meals is assessed on the retail value of the meal, rather than the wholesale value of the individual ingredients withdrawn from stock. View "Walther v. Flis Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law