Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The classification of real property for tax purposes is based on the actual use of the property, and an injunction prohibiting agricultural use of a residentially-zoned property, which is based on a restrictive covenant, does not control the property’s tax assessment classification. However, the record before the Board in this case contained no evidence that the property was used agriculturally within the meaning of Wisconsin tax law.Donald Thoma and Polk Properties LLC (collectively, Thoma) challenged the Village of Slinger’s 2014 property tax assessment for land Thoma attempted to develop into a residential subdivision. The property previously operated as a farm and received an agricultural classification for tax assessment purposes. Thoma and the Village later entered into an agreement that contained a restrictive covenant prohibiting Thoma from using the land for agriculture. The Village then obtained an injunction prohibiting any agricultural use on the property. The Board voted to uphold the assessor’s assessment, which the assessor reached by changing the use classification from agricultural to residential. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s decision upholding the tax assessment was lawful and supported by a reasonable view of the evidence; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Thoma’s request to vacate the original order. View "Thoma v. Village of Slinger" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States for unpaid federal income taxes, late penalties, and interest accrued. The Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed but then later granted rehearing en banc and overruled Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1985). On remand to the original panel, the parties raised arguments that no longer resemble the arguments they had made to the district court. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded to the district court to consider the new arguments in the first instance. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Income earned by Americans typically is taxed in the U.S., regardless of where it is earned. European countries only tax income earned within their borders. To address possible “double taxation” the U.S. generally provides credits for taxes paid to foreign governments; European systems typically exempt from taxation income earned abroad. Congress, believing that the exemption method puts American companies at a trade disadvantage, has enacted various tax regimes, then received push-back from its European trading partners, who claimed each was an effective export subsidy.The 2000 ETI Act, intended to ease the burden of the tax revisions on domestic producers, was rejected in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Congress responded with the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA), 118 Stat. 1418. Section 101 repeals the ETI provision that excluded extraterritorial income from taxation, effective for “transactions after December 31, 2004.” Section 101(d), provides: In the case of transactions during 2005 or 2006, the amount includible in gross income by reason of the amendments made by this section shall not exceed the applicable percentage of the amount which would have been so included but for this subsection. In 2005, WTO found that the ACJA improperly maintained prohibited ETI subsidies through transitional and grandfathering measures. Congress repealed section 101(f), effective for “taxable years beginning after” May 17, 2006. It did not repeal or revise section 101(d).Pursuant to a 2006 Agreement, DWA recognized qualifying extraterritorial income for 2006, invoked section 101(d), and excluded 60% from gross income. The IRS allowed the exclusion. DWA subsequently sought refunds for 2007-2009, claiming the section 101(d) exclusion. The Federal Circuit, disagreeing with the IRS and the Claims Court, held that section 101(d) unambiguously provides transitional relief for all extraterritorial income received from transactions entered into in 2005 and 2006, even income received in later years. View "DWA Holdings LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint against Weber County claiming that the County had violated Utah Code 59-22-103 and 59-2-103.5, which establish the tax exemption for primary residential property.Plaintiffs paid taxes on their primary residence but later learned that the County had not given them the residential exemption. The district court entered a judgment on the pleadings dismissing Plaintiffs’ causes of action, concluding, inter alia, that the assessor acted within the scope of his authority in reclassifying Plaintiffs’ property as “non-primary residential.” In affirming, the Supreme Court held that Plaintiffs’ challenges to the taxes they paid must fall under Utah Code 59-2-1321, which requires taxpayers to point an “error or illegality that is readily apparent from county records.” Because Plaintiffs did not challenge this requirement or show that the alleged errors or illegalities were readily apparent, the district court did not err in its judgment. View "Hammons v. Weber County" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Government's motion to dismiss taxpayers' action seeking a refund for an overpayment because it was time-barred. The court agreed with the district court and the government that the claim was filed after the general limitations period in I.R.C. 6511(a) and that the special limitations period in I.R.C. 6511(d)(3)(A) did not apply as the overpayment was not attributable to foreign taxes for which credit was allowed. View "Schaeffler v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Plaintiffs, a group of taxpayers in the Town of Portsmouth, were required to base their tax appeals on the fair market value of their properties as of December 31 in the year of the last update or revaluation.The value of Plaintiffs’ properties decreased in 2008 and 2009. The trial justice found that Plaintiffs could challenge the Portsmouth tax assessor’s (Defendant) tax assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010 using the fair market values of their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009, respectively, thus concluding that Plaintiffs were not confined to December 31, 2007 valuations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were authorized under chapter 5 of title 44 of the Rhode Island General Laws to challenge Defendant’s assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010 by employing the fair market values of their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009, respectively. View "Balmuth v. Dolce" on Justia Law

The order of the Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia penalizing Ashland Specialty Company, Inc. (Ashland) $159,398 for unlawfully selling 12,230 packs of cigarettes in West Virginia that were not approved for sale - a penalty equal to 500 percent of the cigarettes’ retail value - was not an abuse of discretion.The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) ordered the Commissioner’s penalty reduced by twenty-five percent, finding the Commissioner’s original penalty to be erroneous, unlawful, void, or otherwise invalid. The circuit court reversed the order of the OTA and reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the OTA when it reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty; (2) the Commissioner’s penalty was not an abuse of the discretion afforded him by W. Va. Code 16-9D-8(a) and need not be cancelled or reduced due to circumstances that allegedly mitigated their unlawful cigarette sales; and (3) the Commissioner’s penalty did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the West Virginia Constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Ashland Specialty Co., Inc. v. Steager, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia" on Justia Law

The order of the Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia penalizing Ashland Specialty Company, Inc. (Ashland) $159,398 for unlawfully selling 12,230 packs of cigarettes in West Virginia that were not approved for sale - a penalty equal to 500 percent of the cigarettes’ retail value - was not an abuse of discretion.The Office of Tax Appeals (OTA) ordered the Commissioner’s penalty reduced by twenty-five percent, finding the Commissioner’s original penalty to be erroneous, unlawful, void, or otherwise invalid. The circuit court reversed the order of the OTA and reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the OTA when it reinstated the Commissioner’s original penalty; (2) the Commissioner’s penalty was not an abuse of the discretion afforded him by W. Va. Code 16-9D-8(a) and need not be cancelled or reduced due to circumstances that allegedly mitigated their unlawful cigarette sales; and (3) the Commissioner’s penalty did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the West Virginia Constitution or the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Ashland Specialty Co., Inc. v. Steager, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia" on Justia Law

In this property-tax dispute regarding ownership of tangible personal property, the Supreme Court held (1) when, as in this case, an ownership correction to an appraisal roll does not increase the amount of property taxes owed for subject property in the year of the correction, an appraisal district’s chief appraiser has statutory authority under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 25.25(b) to make such a correction even when the correction necessarily alters the taxing units’ expectation of who is liable for payment of property taxes; (2) an agreement under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 1.111(e) may be rendered voidable if it is proven that it was induced by fraud; and (3) a purported owner challenging ownership on the appraisal roll is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Tex. Code Ann. Prop. 42.29. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that Willacy County Appraisal District lacked authority to change a property ownership determination under section 25.25(b), without reaching the issue of whether a section 1.111(e) agreement may be voided if it was induced by fraud, and remanding the case for a determination of attorney’s fees consistent with section 42.29. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Willacy County Appraisal District v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd." on Justia Law

Alabama rail carriers pay a 4% sales and use tax on diesel fuel. Motor carriers and water carriers are exempt from that tax but motor carriers pay a Motor Fuels Excise Tax of $0.19 per gallon of diesel. Water carriers pay no tax for diesel fuel. The Eleventh Circuit previously determined that Alabama failed to sufficiently justify the scheme under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, 49 U.S.C. 11501, which forbids states from discriminating against rail carriers in assessing property or imposing taxes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court again ruled that Alabama’s tax scheme does not violate the Act. The Eleventh Circuit then reversed. The excise tax justifies the motor carrier exemption. As to water carriers, their exemption is not “compelled by federal law.” Although imposing the sales and use tax on water carriers transporting freight interstate might “expose” the state to a lawsuit under federal law, compulsion requires more than exposure. The water carrier exemption is “compelled by federal law” only if imposition of the sales and use tax would violate federal law. It would not, so it violates the Act. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue" on Justia Law