Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a clerical error by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that resulted in a taxpayer, Jeffrey Page, receiving a tax refund check significantly larger than he was entitled to. Page returned only a portion of the excess refund, prompting the United States government to sue under 26 U.S.C. § 7405 to recover the outstanding balance. Page did not respond to the lawsuit, leading the government to move for default judgment. However, the district court denied the motion and dismissed the complaint as untimely, arguing that the two-year limitations period began when Page received the refund check.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of when the two-year limitations period began. The appellate court held that the limitations period to sue to recover an erroneous refund starts on the date the erroneous refund check clears the Federal Reserve and payment to the taxpayer is authorized by the Treasury. As Page's refund check cleared less than two years before the government sued, the appellate court held that the complaint was timely and that the district court erred by dismissing it. The appellate court also noted that the district court had improperly shifted the burden to the government to prove at the pleading stage that its claim against Page was timely. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Page" on Justia Law

Orthofix, Inc. and KCI USA, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal places of business outside South Carolina, sold durable medical equipment (DME) in South Carolina and remitted the 6% sales tax without protest. However, they later requested refunds for the sales tax paid during certain periods, arguing that they should qualify for a sales tax exemption for DME paid for by Medicaid or Medicare funds. This exemption, however, was only available to sellers whose principal place of business was in South Carolina. The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) denied the refund claims, stating that the companies did not meet the statutory requirements for the exemption.The companies appealed the decisions within the DOR, arguing that the exemption's limitation to in-state businesses violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The DOR issued determinations finding that the companies were not entitled to a refund of sales tax paid for DME. The companies then filed actions in the circuit court challenging the constitutionality of the exemption under the dormant Commerce Clause. The circuit court granted summary judgment to each company, finding the exemption's discrimination against interstate commerce unconstitutional and severing the "principal place of business in South Carolina" requirement from the remainder of the exemption.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision as modified. The court agreed that the exemption unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and that the ordered refunds were appropriate. However, the court found that the companies had not satisfied their burden of proof to show the legislature would have passed the remainder of the exemption absent the unconstitutional language. Therefore, the court declined to sever only the offending language and instead declared the entire exemption void going forward. The court invited the legislature to reenact the exemption, excluding the unconstitutional limitation on a seller's principal place of business. View "Orthofix v. South Carolina Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The case involves United Therapeutics Corporation (UTC), a biotechnology company, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The dispute centers on the interpretation of a tax provision that coordinates two tax credits: the research credit and the orphan drug credit. The Commissioner claimed that UTC disregarded one of the provision’s two commands, improperly reducing its tax liability by over a million dollars. UTC argued that the relevant half of the coordination provision lost effect in 1989 and has been moribund since.The United States Tax Court disagreed with UTC's argument. The court interpreted the statute’s terms by reference to their ordinary meaning, giving effect to the full coordination provision. The court rejected UTC's argument that changes to the tax law since its enactment rendered part of the coordination provision ineffective. The court also disagreed with UTC's interpretation of two regulations it relied on for support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the tax court's interpretation of the coordination provision according to its ordinary meaning. The court also found that the tax court correctly rejected UTC's arguments based on the interpretation of predecessor statutes and regulations. The court concluded that the tax court correctly resolved the case in favor of the Commissioner. View "United Therapeutics Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The case involves the Iowaska Church of Healing (the "Church"), an organization whose religious practices involve the consumption of Ayahuasca, a tea containing the hallucinogenic drug dimethyltryptamine (DMT), which is regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Church had applied for tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) but was denied by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the grounds that the Church's religious use of Ayahuasca was illegal. The Church challenged this decision in the District Court, arguing that the IRS's determination was based on an incorrect assumption of illegality and that the denial of tax-exempt status violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).The District Court denied the Church's motion and granted the Government's motion for summary judgment. The court held that the Church lacked standing to assert its RFRA claim and that the lack of standing also undermined its tax-exemption claim. The court found that the Church's religious use of Ayahuasca was illegal without a CSA exemption, and the IRS had no authority to assess whether the Church's proposed Ayahuasca use warranted a religious exemption from the CSA.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the Church lacked standing to assert its RFRA claim because the economic injury it claimed was neither an injury-in-fact nor redressable. Without a cognizable RFRA claim, the Church's tax-exemption claim also failed. The Court of Appeals found that the Church could not proffer evidence of a CSA exemption to show it passed the organizational and operational tests for tax-exempt status. View "Iowaska Church of Healing v. Werfel" on Justia Law

In two consolidated property tax disputes, Oncor Electric Delivery Company NTU, LLC sought a multimillion-dollar reduction in the total values of certain electric transmission lines in the 2019 certified appraisal rolls for the Wilbarger County Appraisal District and Mills Central Appraisal District. Oncor’s predecessor had agreed to the lines’ value in each county to settle its protests of the Districts’ initial appraised values, but Oncor now contends that these agreements are void due to mutual mistake.Previously, Oncor filed unsuccessful motions for correction of the appraisal rolls with each County Appraisal Review Board (ARB) and then sued in district court in Wilbarger and Mills Counties. The trial and appellate courts below provided conflicting answers on whether questions regarding the effect of a Section 1.111(e) agreement—such as its validity and scope—are relevant to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit for judicial review under Section 42.01 of the Tax Code.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the resolution of such questions does not implicate jurisdiction and remanded the cases to the trial courts for further proceedings. The court did not reach the merits of the parties’ disputes about whether Oncor has identified errors eligible for correction under Sections 25.25(c) or (d) of the Tax Code, whether any such errors fall within the scope of the parties’ Section 1.111(e) settlement agreements, and whether the doctrine of mutual mistake is an available defense to such agreements. View "MILLS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT v. ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY COMPANY NTU LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a tax appraisal dispute involving Texas Disposal Systems Landfill, Inc. (the Landfill) and Travis Central Appraisal District (the District). The Landfill owns 344 acres of land in Travis County, which it operates as a landfill. In 2019, the District appraised the market value of the landfill at $21,714,939. The Landfill protested this amount under the Tax Code provision requiring equal and uniform taxation but did not claim that the District’s appraised value was higher than the market value of the property. The appraisal review board reduced the appraised value of the subject property by nearly ninety percent. The District appealed to the trial court, claiming that the board erred in concluding that the District’s appraised value was not equal and uniform when compared with similarly situated properties. The District also claimed that the board’s appraised value was lower than the subject property’s true market value.The trial court granted the Landfill’s plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the challenge it made before the appraisal review board was an equal-and-uniform challenge, not one based on market value. Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider market value. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that a trial court’s review of an appraisal review board’s decision is not confined to the grounds the taxpayer asserted before the board.The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. The court concluded that the Tax Code limits judicial review to conducting a de novo trial of the taxpayer’s protest. In deciding the taxpayer’s protest in this case, the trial court is to determine the equal and uniform appraised value for the property subject to taxation. This limit, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "TEXAS DISPOSAL SYSTEMS LANDFILL, INC. v. TRAVIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California ruled that the Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act (TPA), a proposed initiative measure, could not be placed on the November 2024 general election ballot. The TPA sought to revise the California Constitution by requiring voter approval for any new or increased state or local tax, and by expanding the definition of "tax" to include a wider range of government charges. The petitioners, the Legislature of the State of California, Governor Gavin Newsom, and former Senate President Pro Tempore John Burton, argued that the TPA was invalid because it attempted to revise the California Constitution via citizen initiative, and because it would seriously impair essential government functions.The court agreed with the petitioners, finding that the TPA would substantially alter the basic governmental framework set forth in the California Constitution. The court noted that the TPA would eliminate the Legislature's ability to levy taxes without prior voter approval, shift power between the executive and legislative branches, and transform local revenue-raising by requiring that exempt charges go through legislative rather than administrative processes. The court concluded that these changes were so significant that they amounted to a revision of the Constitution, which could not be enacted by initiative. The court therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the Secretary of State to refrain from placing the TPA on the November 2024 election ballot. View "Legislature of the State of California v. Weber" on Justia Law

The case involves Charles and Kathleen Moore, who invested in an American-controlled foreign corporation, KisanKraft. From 2006 to 2017, KisanKraft generated substantial income but did not distribute it to its American shareholders. At the end of the 2017 tax year, the application of the new Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) resulted in a tax bill of $14,729 on the Moores’ pro rata share of KisanKraft’s accumulated income from 2006 to 2017. The Moores paid the tax and then sued for a refund, claiming that the MRT violated the Direct Tax Clause of the Constitution because it was an unapportioned direct tax on their shares of KisanKraft stock. The District Court dismissed the suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the MRT, which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity’s American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income, does not exceed Congress’s constitutional authority. The Court's decision was based on the broad power of Congress to lay and collect taxes, which includes direct taxes—those imposed on persons or property—and indirect taxes—those imposed on activities or transactions. The Court also noted that taxes on income are indirect taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment confirms that taxes on income need not be apportioned. The Court's holding is narrow and limited to entities treated as pass-throughs. View "Moore v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company (Santa Fe), a New Mexico corporation that sells branded tobacco products to wholesalers, who then sell to retailers in Oregon. The primary issue is whether a federal statutory limit on a state’s ability to impose income tax on out-of-state corporations, 15 USC section 381, precludes Oregon from taxing Santa Fe because its business in Oregon is limited. The Oregon Department of Revenue concluded that Santa Fe’s various actions in Oregon had taken it outside the safe harbor of Section 381, thus rendering Santa Fe liable to pay Oregon tax. The Tax Court agreed with the department that Santa Fe’s actions had made it subject to taxation in this state.The Tax Court agreed with the Oregon Department of Revenue that Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company's actions in Oregon had made it subject to taxation in the state. The court found that Santa Fe's representatives had exceeded the scope of "solicitation of orders" when they obtained "prebook orders" from Oregon retailers. These orders, bolstered by incentive agreements with wholesalers, facilitated sales on behalf of wholesalers, who were effectively committed to accept those sales. This activity went beyond the protections of Section 381(a)(2), which limits a state's ability to impose income tax on out-of-state corporations whose in-state activities are limited to the solicitation of orders.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. The court concluded that Santa Fe's pursuit of prebook orders in Oregon, invoking incentive agreement contractual provisions used by Santa Fe to ensure that wholesalers treated each one of those orders favorably, exceeded the scope of permitted "solicitation of orders" under Section 381(a)(2). The court further agreed that Santa Fe's activities were not de minimis. Accordingly, Santa Fe was subject to Oregon income tax. View "Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The case involves two casino operators, PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership, PNK Development 8 LLC, PNK Development 9 LLC, and Centroplex Centre Convention Hotel, LLC, who incentivize their patrons with rewards, including complimentary hotel stays. The City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge Department of Finance and Linda Hunt, its director, discovered through an audit that the operators had not remitted state and local taxes associated with these complimentary stays for several years. The City argued that the operators needed to pay these taxes, while the operators presented various arguments as to why they did not. The City filed a lawsuit in state court, which the operators removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds.The operators' removal of the case to federal court was challenged by the City, which argued that the tax abstention doctrine (TAD) warranted abstention in this case. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana agreed with the City, finding that all five TAD factors favored abstention: Louisiana's wide regulatory latitude over its taxation structure, the lack of heightened federal court scrutiny required by the operators' due process rights invocation, the potential for the operators to seek an improved competitive position in the federal court system, the greater familiarity of Louisiana courts with the state's tax regime and legislative intent, and the constraints on remedies available in federal court due to the Tax Injunction Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The Appeals Court found that the District Court had correctly applied the TAD and had not abused its discretion in deciding to abstain. The Appeals Court agreed that all five TAD factors favored abstention and that any doubt about the propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand. View "City of Baton Rouge v. PNK" on Justia Law