Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

In this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York (the Tribunal) rationally determined that the information services receipts at issue in this case were not excluded from the sales tax imposed by N.Y. Tax Law 1105(c)(1).Tax law 1105(c)(1) imposes sales tax on certain information services but excludes the furnishing of information that is personal or individual in nature. The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (the Department) conducted an audit of the sales and use tax liability of Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., a regional supermarket chain, and determined that Wegmans's purchases of competitive price audits (CPAs) of its competitors and corresponding reports from RetailData, LLC were taxable receipts under Tax Law 1105(c)(1). Accordingly, the Department imposed additional sales tax. Wegmans petitioned the Division of Tax Appeals, arguing that RetailData's services qualified as an exempt information service that was personal and individual in nature. An ALJ denied the petition. The Tribunal affirmed. The Appellate Division annulled the Tribunal's determination, concluding that the tax exclusion applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the information RetailData furnished to Wegmans was not personal or individual in nature. View "In re Wegmans Food Markets, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of State of New York" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order upholding the bankruptcy court's decision to deny an exemption to pension money and certain tax-exempt funds or accounts, including IRAs under Fla. Stat. 222.21. The court held that debtor forfeited his exemption when he engaged in self-dealing transactions prohibited by the IRA's governing instruments. In this case, debtor conceded that he incurred over one hundred thousand dollars in tax penalties for abusing his IRA, but nonetheless sought to shield the IRA from distribution to his creditors. View "Yerian v. Webber" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the United States in a tax refund action. On appeal, taxpayer argued that the penalties were wrongly imposed because it did not actually participate in a listed transaction and thus had nothing to disclose, and that its due process rights were violated because it was not afforded an opportunity for pre-collection judicial review.The court found neither contention meritorious, holding that taxpayer was required to disclose its participation in the transaction at issue because it was similar to the listed transaction identified in Notice 2007-83. The court held that taxpayer could not evade a finding of substantial similarity solely by claiming a deduction on a different basis or by using a different intermediary to complete the transaction. The court also held that taxpayer received all the process it was due where the combination of pre-collection administrative review plus post-collection judicial review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. View "Interior Glass Systems, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the administrative hearing commission (AHC) reversing the denial of the director of the department of revenue of David and Jill Kehlenbrinks' application for a sales tax refund, holding that the AHC erroneously decided that the Kehlenbrinks were entitled to a refund of all the sales tax they paid after their purchase of a new vehicle.On appeal, the director claimed that, in calculating the sales tax owed on the Kehlenbrinks' newly purchased vehicle, Mo. Rev. Stat. 144.025.1 allowed the Kehlenbrinks to credit the sale proceeds of only one vehicle against the purchase price of the new vehicle. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the AHC erroneously decided that the Kehlenbrinks were entitled to a refund of all the sales tax they paid because it mistakenly allowed credit for four vehicles the Kehlenbrinks sold within 180 days of their purchase of a new vehicle. View "Kehlenbrink v. Director of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division reversing the judgment of Supreme Court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, individual tenants of rented apartments owned by Defendants, on their complaint seeking a declaration that their apartments were subject to rent stabilization, holding that apartments in buildings receiving tax benefits pursuant to N.Y. Real Prop. Tax law (RPTL) 421-g are not subject to luxury deregulation.Plaintiffs' apartments were located in building receiving tax benefits subject to RPTL 421-g. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' apartments were exempt from rent regulation under the luxury deregulation provisions added to the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL), Administrative Code of City of New York 26-504.1, as part of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993. The Appellate Division agreed and granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment to the extent of declaring that Plaintiffs' apartments were properly deregulated and were not subject to rent stabilization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' apartments were not subject to the luxury deregulation provisions of the RSL. View "Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

In this case’s previous appearance before the Georgia Supreme Court, the primary issue involved taxation of alcoholic beverages at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Clayton County appealed the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment to the City of College Park on claims the City was not receiving its statutorily mandated share of taxes collected on alcoholic beverages. When the parties could not resolve their dispute, the City filed a complaint naming as defendants the County and two businesses that operated within the Airport, Mack II, Inc. and General Wholesale Company (the “taxpayer defendants”). The complaint sought an interlocutory and permanent injunction against the County (as well as the taxpayer defendants), and a declaratory judgment as to the City’s and County’s division and collection of alcoholic beverage taxes, as well as the taxpayer defendants’ payment of those taxes. The complaint also asserted claims against the County for an accounting, unjust enrichment, attorney fees, and damages. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to the City’s claims or the taxpayer defendants’ cross-claims for indemnity and contribution. The court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA 3-3-1 et seq., permitted the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such a tax only in the unincorporated areas of the County, that neither could impose and collect alcoholic beverage taxes within the other’s taxing jurisdiction, and that the taxpayer defendants had to submit tax monies only to the entity authorized to collect the funds. Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the “threshold question of whether sovereign immunity applies at all in suits between political subdivisions of the same sovereign (like the City and the County).” The Supreme Court disagreed sovereign immunity did not apply to multiple issues raised by this case. The case was remanded for reconsideration. View "City of College Park v. Clayton County et al." on Justia Law

Rice formed a trust for the benefit of his children in his home state, New York, and appointed a New York resident as the trustee. The trustee has “absolute discretion” to distribute the trust’s assets to the beneficiaries. In 1997, Rice’s daughter, Kaestner, moved to North Carolina. The trustee later divided Rice’s initial trust into three subtrusts. North Carolina assessed a tax of $1.3 million for tax years 2005-2008 on the Kaestner Trust under a law authorizing the state to tax any trust income that “is for the benefit of” a state resident. During that period, Kaestner had no right to and did not receive, any distributions. Nor did the Trust have a physical presence, make any direct investments, or hold any real property in North Carolina. The trustee paid the tax under protest and then sued, citing the Due Process Clause. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed state court decisions in favor of the trustee. The presence of in-state beneficiaries alone does not empower a state to tax trust income that has not been distributed to the beneficiaries where the beneficiaries have no right to demand that income and are uncertain to receive it. The Due Process Clause limits the states to imposing only taxes that “bea[r] fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.” When a state seeks to base its tax on the in-state residence of a trust beneficiary, due process demands a pragmatic inquiry into what the beneficiary controls or possesses and how that interest relates to the object of the tax. The residence of the beneficiaries in North Carolina alone does not supply the minimum connection necessary to sustain the tax. View "North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco) can lawfully apply a tax collection requirement, which requires parking lot operators to collect a tax from drivers who park their cars in paid parking lots and remit the proceeds to the city, to state universities that operate paid parking lots in the city, holding that the collection requirement is not unconstitutional.San Francisco, a consolidated city and county that has adopted a charter for its own governance, requires that state universities collect the parking tax at issue with whatever parking fees they charge and remit the proceeds to the city. The trial court concluded that the universities were exempt from compliance with the parking tax ordinance. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the constitutional principles articulated and applied in In re Means, 14 Cal.2d 254 (1939), and Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177 (1956), exempts state agencies from collecting and remitting the parking tax. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that charter cities may require state agencies to assist in the collection and remittance of municipal taxes and that San Francisco's collection requirement is a valid exercise of its power from which state universities are not immune. View "City & County of San Francisco v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s class action complaint alleged that Walgreens violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, by unlawfully collecting a municipal tax imposed by Chicago on purchases of bottled water that were exempt from taxation under the ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the action, citing the voluntary payment doctrine, which provides that money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered on the ground that the claim for payment was illegal. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the complaint pleaded that the unlawful collection of the bottled water tax was a deceptive act under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal, first holding that claims under the Consumer Fraud Act are not categorically exempt from the voluntary payment doctrine. The court rejected an argument that the receipt issued by Walgreens constituted a representation that the tax was required by the ordinance. Misrepresentations or mistakes of law cannot form the basis of a claim for fraud. View "McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in an action brought by plaintiff, seeking to recover taxes she previously paid to the government. The court held that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence supported the conclusion that she satisfied all the elements of 26 U.S.C. 1341, which allows a taxpayer who paid taxes on what she erroneously believed to be her income to recoup those unnecessary tax payments. Under section 1341, plaintiff had just as much of a right to recover the taxes she previously paid on the $300,000 she received and then gave back as did her ex-husband to recover the taxes he paid on his $300,000 that he returned.Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should determine whether any genuine dispute as to any factual issues necessary to resolve the inquiry on each of the section 1341 factors exists and, if so, any dispute should proceed to trial. If there is no such factual dispute, the district court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. View "Mihelick v. United States" on Justia Law