Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Several owners of shoreline properties along Lake Austin challenged a 2019 ordinance enacted by the City of Austin. The ordinance declared that their properties had always been within Austin’s full-purpose jurisdiction, repealed a 1986 ordinance that had previously classified the properties as limited-purpose (which restricted taxation until city services were provided), and subjected the properties to full taxation. The plaintiffs alleged that Austin taxed their properties as if they were full-purpose residents but provided fewer municipal services than other full-purpose residents, raising federal and state law claims.Initially, the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed all claims under the Tax Injunction Act. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of all but two claims and remanded the case. Upon remand, the City reasserted several grounds for dismissal, including the political-question doctrine, Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, and failure to state a claim. The magistrate judge recommended Pullman abstention, which the district court adopted, dismissing the claims without prejudice and entering final judgment. The plaintiffs appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and held that the case was not moot, as recent state legislation neither refunded taxes nor automatically disannexed the properties. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Pullman abstention was inappropriate because the plaintiffs’ federal equal protection claim did not hinge on any uncertain or disputed question of Texas law. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the City’s remaining grounds for dismissal, expressly declining to reach those grounds itself. View "Harward v. City of Austin" on Justia Law

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A group of associations representing infusion centers, cancer patients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the constitutionality of a program created by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to negotiate prices for high-expenditure prescription drugs under Medicare Parts B and D. The program allows HHS to select drugs based on certain criteria, negotiate a “maximum fair price” with manufacturers, and impose an excise tax on manufacturers who refuse to negotiate. The tax is calculated as a high percentage of sales reimbursed by Medicare. Manufacturers may avoid the program by withdrawing from Medicare and Medicaid participation. The statutory scheme also limits administrative and judicial review of key program decisions and allows HHS to implement early cycles of the program through guidance rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that at least one plaintiff had standing and venue was proper. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the program did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest to support their due process claim.Upon further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the statute provided an “intelligible principle” sufficient to withstand a nondelegation challenge, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim but the excise tax did not constitute a punitive fine, and that neither manufacturers, providers, nor patients possessed a protected property or liberty interest implicated by the program. The government’s summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Natl Infusion Center v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

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A partnership claimed a charitable deduction after donating a conservation servitude on real property. The Internal Revenue Service audited the partnership’s tax filing and, in 2025, issued a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment, disallowing the deduction and imposing both a civil fraud penalty and several valuation-related penalties for negligence, substantial understatement, and gross-valuation misstatements. The partnership responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, seeking a pre-payment jury trial to contest the penalties and requesting both injunctive and declaratory relief. The partnership also filed a parallel petition with the U.S. Tax Court for a downward adjustment of the IRS’s determination.In the district court, both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the IRS’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The district court reasoned that the penalties imposed by the IRS constitute “tax” within the meaning of relevant statutes, thereby stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to hear pre-payment challenges to such assessments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether accuracy-related penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6662 are treated as “tax” for purposes of the AIA and DJA. The Fifth Circuit held that these penalties are indeed treated as “tax,” and thus, both the AIA and DJA bar federal court jurisdiction over the partnership’s pre-payment challenge. The court further determined that Tax Court provides an alternative forum for such disputes. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Norcave Properties v. IRS" on Justia Law

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An elderly businesswoman, after being diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, had her great-nephew act as her agent pursuant to a power of attorney. As her condition deteriorated, the agent managed her finances and addressed two instances of financial elder abuse. In the final months of her life, following further health declines, her agent—on the advice of attorneys—created a limited partnership and transferred nearly $17 million of her assets into it. The businesswoman died within weeks of these transfers, leaving her with only about $2.15 million outside the partnership.When the executor filed the estate tax return, he reported only the value of the partnership interest—appraised at approximately $11 million—rather than the value of the assets transferred into the partnership. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the estate’s tax liability. The Internal Revenue Service audited the return, determined that the gross estate should include the full value of the transferred assets under I.R.C. § 2036(a), and assessed a 20% penalty for underpayment. The executor disputed these findings before the United States Tax Court.The United States Tax Court upheld the IRS’s deficiency notice and penalty. It found that the transfers were not made pursuant to a bona fide sale for a legitimate non-tax purpose, and that the estate had been negligent in its reporting. The executor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision. It held that the estate failed to demonstrate any substantial non-tax reason for the asset transfers, so the bona fide sale exception to § 2036(a) did not apply. The court also upheld the 20% penalty, finding no clear error in the Tax Court’s determination that the estate lacked reasonable cause and did not act in good faith. View "Fields v. CIR" on Justia Law

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Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. is a limited liability limited partnership organized under Delaware law, operating as a business-consulting firm. The partnership consisted of both limited partners and a general partner, Sirius Solutions GP, L.L.C. For the tax years 2014, 2015, and 2016, Sirius reported all ordinary business income as allocated to its limited partners and excluded those distributive shares from net earnings from self-employment, claiming an exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(13) for limited partners. This resulted in Sirius reporting zero net earnings from self-employment in each year.The Internal Revenue Service audited Sirius’s returns and, through Notices of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, determined that Sirius’s limited partners did not qualify as “limited partners” for purposes of the statutory exception. Therefore, the IRS reclassified the distributive shares of income as subject to self-employment tax, substantially increasing Sirius’s net earnings from self-employment for the years at issue. Sirius petitioned the United States Tax Court for readjustment, and the cases for all three years were consolidated. The Tax Court, relying on its decision in Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, 161 T.C. 310 (2023), held that only passive investors qualify as “limited partners” under § 1402(a)(13), and thus upheld the IRS’s adjustments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the meaning of “limited partner” under § 1402(a)(13). The Fifth Circuit held that a “limited partner” is a partner in a state-law limited partnership who has limited liability, rejecting the narrower “passive investor” test applied by the Tax Court and IRS. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, instructing that the distributive shares of limited partners with limited liability should be excluded from self-employment earnings for tax purposes. View "Sirius Solutions v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

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Dr. Bernard T. Swift and his wife, Kathy L. Swift, took tax deductions for insurance premium payments made by Swift’s medical practice to captive insurance companies. The IRS issued notices of deficiency, disallowing the deductions and imposing penalties. The tax court upheld the IRS’s determination, finding that the payments were not genuinely for insurance.The Swifts challenged the IRS’s determination in the tax court, which sustained both the deficiencies and penalties. The tax court found that the arrangement with the captive insurance companies did not constitute insurance because it did not achieve risk distribution and did not resemble commonly accepted notions of insurance. The Swifts then appealed the tax court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the tax court’s decision, agreeing that the arrangement did not achieve risk distribution, which is essential for insurance. The court found that the number of risks insured by the captives was insufficient and that the reinsurance pools did not constitute bona fide insurance arrangements. The court also upheld the penalties, rejecting the Swifts’ arguments that the IRS failed to obtain timely supervisory approval and that they had reasonable cause or substantial authority for their tax treatment. The court concluded that the Swifts could not reasonably rely on advice from a promoter of the transaction and that the IRS letter rulings cited by the Swifts were materially distinguishable. View "Swift v. CIR" on Justia Law

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Adam Earnest, Christopher Randell, and James Klish were involved in preparing and filing fraudulent tax returns through Sunbelt Tax Services, a company owned by Earnest. They falsely claimed millions of dollars in education credits for their clients. Previously, Earnest and Randell had worked at American Tax Service, where they engaged in similar fraudulent activities. Despite being audited and penalized by the IRS for these activities, they continued their fraudulent practices at Sunbelt. The IRS discovered that Sunbelt filed 4,509 tax returns claiming $4,899,653 in education credits without proper documentation.The defendants were charged in February 2022 with conspiracy to defraud the United States and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns. After a seven-day trial, a jury found Earnest, Randell, and Klish guilty of conspiracy, and Earnest and Randell were also found guilty of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns. The government estimated a total tax loss of $10,078,767, which included returns filed at both American and Sunbelt. The district court overruled objections to this calculation but conservatively estimated the loss to be between $3.5 million and $9.5 million. Earnest was sentenced to 100 months, Klish to 50 months, and Randell to 70 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting the defendants' arguments regarding the admission of evidence from their time at American, the summary chart exhibit, and claims of constructive amendment of the indictment. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Earnest's conviction for aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return and upheld the district court's tax loss calculation and denial of a mitigating role reduction for Klish. View "United States v. Earnest" on Justia Law

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These consolidated tax refund actions stem from faulty AMCOR investments. Taxpayers were partners in AMCOR partnerships that the IRS investigated as shams. After taxpayers settled with the IRS and paid the amounts assessed, they sought refunds claiming that the IRS’s assessments were untimely and that the IRS failed to issue notices of deficiency. The court concluded, however, that its decision in Irvine v. United States forecloses taxpayers' arguments. Like in Irvine, the district courts in this case lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear these refund claims. Additionally, the variance doctrine forecloses taxpayers’ argument that the IRS failed to issue notices of deficiency because taxpayers did not make such an argument in their claims for refund before the IRS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district courts' grant of summary judgment in favor of the IRS. View "Rodgers v. United States" on Justia Law

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Bombardier operated a fractional-aircraft-ownership program called “Flexjet.” In this appeal, Bombardier claims it is not required to remit federal excise tax on fees collected from participants in Flexjet. The court concluded that the district court's interpretation of 26 U.S.C. 6415(a) is consistent with the statute’s plain language and with authority from this and other circuits; this outcome does place an additional burden on entities already saddled with the responsibility of collecting the tax, but it also prevents unjust enrichment; and it was proper for the district court to dismiss Bombardier’s refund claim. The court also concluded that Bombardier is in possession, command, and control of the means of transportation, and is therefore required to submit section 4261 tax on fees collected from Flexjet participants. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that the fees collected by Bombardier, including the monthly management fees, are subject to section 4261 excise tax. Finally, the IRS did not violate any duty of clarity it owed to Bombardier, and the unfair competitive disadvantage principle has no application in this case. The district court did not err in denying Bombardier's motion to supplement the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in the Government's favor. View "Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

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In a prior appeal of this tax case, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to disregard the partnership form of Chemtech Royalty Associates, L.P. (Chemtech I), and Chemtech II, L.P. (Chemtech II), for tax purposes but vacated and remanded as to the penalty award. On remand, the district court reinstated the vacated penalty award and further held that a tax penalty for gross-valuation misstatement applied to Chemtech II. Real party in interest Dow now appeals the penalty award solely as to Chemtech I. The court rejected Dow’s theory that the court's mandate required the district court to consider whether Dow had a reasonable basis and substantial authority for its sham-partnership position; the district court did not err in failing to justify the negligence and substantial-understatement penalties on the basis of the court's sham-partnership holding, but it could have done so; and the court affirmed the applicability of the negligence and substantial-understatement penalties on the ground that the district court would have been correct to do so. The court also concluded that Dow lacked substantial authority for its position that Chemtech I was a valid partnership. For substantially the same reasons, Dow fails to meet the lesser reasonable-basis standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chemtech Royalty Ass'n, LP v. United States" on Justia Law