Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, husband and wife, sought review of a judgment of the Tax Court sustaining the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency, an accuracy-related penalty, and a penalty for filing a delinquent tax return. Husband worked for IBM and acquired IBM stock by exercising his employee stock options. Husband subsequently participated in a program operated by Derivium, whereby it would "lend" a client ninety percent of the value of securities that the client pledged to it as collateral. The court concluded that a combination of factors pointed decidedly to the conclusion that husband disposed of his stock by signing a Master Agreement and addenda and retained no real interest in his collateral or the "loan" after Derivium had transferred the proceeds to him. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith when they declared their income from the sale of IBM shares to Derivium. Consequently, the court affirmed the Tax Court's imposition of an accuracy-related penalty. Further, plaintiffs have not carried their burden of establishing reasonable cause for failing to timely file their return and therefore, the Commissioner's assessment of a late-filing penalty was appropriate. View "Calloway v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

The narrow question presented to the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether a Tax Court petition that challenged a notice of deficiency as invalid, "was a proceeding in respect of the deficiency" so as to suspend the limitations period. The IRS selected Petitioner-Appellant Shockley Communications Corporation's (SCC) return for audit. SCC was closely held, and Petitioners-Appellants Terry Shockley, Sandra Shockley and Shockley Holdings, LP were shareholders in SCC. The IRS began the statutory procedures required prior to formal "assessment" of SCC's tax. If a proceeding regarding the taxpayer's deficiency is placed on the Tax Court docket, the IRS must wait to assess until the Tax Court decision becomes final, plus 60 days thereafter. Receipt of the notices was the issue before the Tax Court. After review and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit held that the petition at issue here suspended the running of the statute of limitations, and reversed. View "Shockley v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint contending that the Department of Treasury lacked statutory authority to promulgate regulations imposing a user fee. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the Department's regulation's requirement that compensated tax return preparers obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) and its imposition of an annual fee for that number. Because in exchange for the user fee the Department assigned a PTIN and conferred a special benefit upon tax return preparers, the court held that the Department's user fee complied with 31 U.S.C. 9701. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. View "Brannen, III, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the decision of the Tax Court allowing taxpayers to apply the parsonage allowance income exclusion of Internal Revenue Code 107(2) to multiple houses. A divided Tax Court held that taxpayers were entitled to exclude from their income the parsonage allowance allocated to their second house under section 107(2). The court concluded that "a" maintained a singular connotation, especially when the context indicated a singular meaning as here, "a home." The Supreme Court stated that income exclusions should be "narrowly construed." In light of this directive, the court believed that it should construe any ambiguity in section 107(2) to favor a more expansive reading of the parsonage allowance income exclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Commissioner of IRS v. Driscoll, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its tax refund suit for mootness. Shortly after the litigation began, the IRS refunded the disputed taxes in full. Plaintiff claimed, however, that a live controversy still existed because it also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in order to obtain a favorable determination of its tax-exempt status. Plaintiff claimed that the failure of the IRS to recognize plaintiff as a tax-exempt organization had collateral consequences that prevented the tax refund from rendering the case moot. The court held that filing a claim for a tax refund suit was not simply a procedural hurdle that, once leapt over, allowed a party to seek other forward-looking relief against the IRS after the refund had been granted. Without a live refund claim, there was no way to distinguish the case from the kind of pre-enforcement suits that Congress had expressly forbidden taxpayers from bringing. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case stemmed from a property dispute between the parties. White Springs appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Glawson, challenging the grant of attorneys' fees, expert fees, and prejudgment interest and sought to vacate or modify the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10, 11. The court held that the arbitration panel had the power to decide Glawson's claims for attorneys' fees and that Glawson properly submitted the issue to the panel. The court was unable to grant White Springs' request that the court review the legality of the award of expert fees and prejudgment interest on the ad valorem taxes, as the FAA did not permit it to do so. Therefore, the court found no basis to overturn any portion of the panel's final arbitration award.

Taxpayer was awarded and received a net $5.25 million qui tam payment from the government as a "relator" in two lawsuits settled against a government contractor under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. Taxpayer asserted that the award was not taxable. The court held that the Tax Court correctly concluded that the entire qui tam payment award to taxpayer under the FCA was includable in gross income and that taxpayer was liable for the I.R.C. 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.

Defendant appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States when the government brought an action against him to recover a tax refund of over $300,000 that it contended was erroneously refunded. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment where defendant filed an amended tax refund in 2000 asserting that he did not realize income in 2000 from the restricted shares he received as a partner at Ernst & Young. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment where defendant realized income at the time the restricted shares were transferred into his account in 2000 when he constructively received the shares in 2000, he bore the risk of share appreciation or depreciation, and he possessed indicia of control over the shares.