Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing this case asserting that the city of Houston's house mayor and city council members acted ultra vires in spending tax revenue in Fiscal Year 2020 on anything other than the drainage fund, holding that the taxpayers had standing to assert their claims and sufficiently pleaded ultra vires acts.Plaintiffs, two Houston taxpayers, brought this case alleging that City officials misallocated tax revenue because the City Charter requires a certain amount of tax revenue to be allocated to a fund exclusively for drainage and street maintenance and that the officials acted ultra vires in spending the revenue on anything else. The officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the taxpayers lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs alleged an illegal expenditure sufficient to support taxpayer standing; and (2) the City officials were not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs' ultra vires claim on governmental immunity grounds at this time. View "Jones v. Turner" on Justia Law

In this tax exemption case concerning privately owned real property in Galveston County the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Galveston Central Appraisal District, holding that Odyssey 2020 Academy was not entitled to an exemption from the ad valorem tax.The property at issue was subleased by Odyssey, which used the property to operate a public charter school. Odyssey contractually agreed to pay the property owners' ad valorem taxes and requested that the Galveston Central Appraisal District exempt the property from taxation as "property owned by this state" under section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code. The District denied the exemption request. On review, the district court granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, on these facts, the Constitution does not merit an exemption for Odyssey. View "Odyssey 2020 Academy, Inc. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District" on Justia Law

In this ad valorem tax dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and the trial court declining to dismiss a tax appeal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 27.001-.011, holding that the motion to dismiss was timely filed.Certain taxing units sought judicial review of a tax appraisal review board order declining to reappraise the value of mineral-interest property claimed to be undervalued on the tax rolls. The trial court and court of appeals refused to dismiss the tax appeal under the TCPA. The affected taxpayer appealed, arguing that, contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, the TCPA dismissal motion was timely and the trial court had jurisdiction over the tax appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was no jurisdictional impediment to reaching the merits of this appeal; and (2) the TCPA motion to dismiss was timely filed. View "Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP v. Scurry County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Lockheed Martin Corporation's receipts from the sales of F-16 fighter jets to the U.S. government were improperly sourced to Texas for purposes of calculating its Texas franchise tax, holding that Lockheed Martin demonstrated its entitlement to a refund of franchise taxes.The fighter jets at issue were manufactured in Fort Worth and destined for foreign-government buyers. In accordance with federal law, the foreign buyers contracted with the U.S. government to purchase the jets, and the U.S. government contracted with Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin filed for a refund of the portion of its franchise taxes for the tax years 2005 through 2007 attributable to the sales of the F-16 aircraft. The Comptroller denied the claim, and Lockheed Martin brought this suit. The trial court rendered judgment for the Comptroller, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Lockheed Martin's "sale" of each F-16 was to the respective foreign-government "buyer" for whom the aircraft was manufactured, and the government's involvement had no bearing on whether to apportion the receipts from that sale to Texas; and (2) the F-16s were delivered to the "buyers" outside of Texas, and therefore, the receipts from the sales of those aircraft were not properly sourced to Texas. View "Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the amount of franchise tax owed by a taxpayer the Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing in part the trial court's judgment for the taxpayer, holding that, with respect to the taxpayer's inclusion of certain costs in its "cost of goods sold" (COGS) subtraction, the calculation method accepted by the trial court was improper, and the taxpayer was not entitled to include the costs in calculating its COGS subtraction.The Comptroller concluded that Gulf Copper and Manufacturing Corporation paid an insufficient amount of franchise taxes for the 2009 year. At issue was whether Gulf Copper could exclude certain payments from its revenue under Texas Tax Code 171.1011(g)(3) and include certain costs in its COGS subtraction under Texas Tax Code 171.1012. Gulf Copper paid additional taxes and sued to recover the disputed amount. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gulf Copper. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the Comptroller incorrectly disallowed the revenue exclusion; (2) with regard to the COGS subtraction, the calculation method accepted by the trial court was improper; and (3) the taxpayer was not entitled to include costs under subsection 171.1012(i) in calculating its COGS subtraction. View "Hegar v. Gulf Copper & Manufacturing Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court concluding that Tex. Tax Code 171.1012 permitted a movie theater to subtract exhibition costs as cost of goods sold, holding that film exhibitions are not tangible personal property that is sold, and therefore, the theater was not entitled to include exhibition-related costs in its cost of goods sold.The Comptroller disallowed the movie theater's subtraction of exhibition costs in calculating its franchise tax liability for 2008 and 2009. The theater paid the additional franchise taxes requested by the Comptroller and sued to recover the disputed amount, arguing that its exhibition costs were property subtracted as cost of goods sold (COGS). The trial court concluded that the theater's film exhibitions were tangible personal property and thus goods for sale in the ordinary course of the theater's business under section 171.1012. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 171.1012 did not permit the movie theater to subtract is exhibition costs as COGS because no tangible personal property was transferred through the film exhibitions. View "Hegar v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the Texas Comptroller's audit of Sunstate Equipment, a heavy construction equipment renal company, on the grounds that Sunstate was not entitled to subtract certain delivery and pick-up costs as cost of goods sold (COGS) under Tex. Tax Code 171.1012, holding that Sunstate was not entitled to the subtraction it claimed under either section 171.1012(k-1) nor section 171.1012(i).After the Comptroller assessed deficiencies, penalties and interest totaling $140,495 Sunstate brought suit for a refund. The district court ordered a full refund of the amount paid, including interest. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Sunstate was not entitled to subtract costs under section 171.1012(k-1) and that section 171.1012(i) did not independently authorize the cost subtractions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither statutory provision authorized Sunstate to subtract its delivery and pick-up costs as COGS. View "Sunstate Equipment Co. v. Hegar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals holding that the federal Foreign-Trade Zones Act's exemption of goods imported from outside the United States and held within a zone for certain purposes from state and local ad valorem taxation did not apply to Petitioner's imported crude oil and refinery products, holding that the exemption did apply in this case.The Act provides for the designation of duty-free areas of operation in or near the United States ports of entry. The court of appeals concluded that the Act's exemption at issue in this case did not apply to Petitioner's products because the zone involved was not activated at the time. Harris County petitioned the appraisal review board for a determination that Petitioner's operations in Subzone 84-N were not tax-exempt. The appraisal board denied relief, and Harris County brought this action for judicial review. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioner. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Petitioner's inventory was not entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Subzone 84-R was activated during the tax years at issue, and therefore, the ad valorem tax exemption applied to Petitioner's inventory. View "PRSI Trading, LLC v. Harris County, Texas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this petition for relief seeking to direct Nueces County and the Nueces County Appraisal District to withdraw and cease from issuing tax assessments to Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC (CCL), holding that under the circumstances of this case, the Texas Constitution does not permit the Court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by Tex. Loc. Gov't Code 72.010.For several years, both Nueces County and San Patricio County have taxed structures that are built on land in San Patricio County and extend over the water into Nueces County. In 2017, the Legislature enacted section 72.010, allowing taxpayers who have paid taxes on the same property to each county to sue in the Supreme Court for relief. In this petition, CCL asserted that it was being taxed in both counties on the same property. The Nueces parties, however, argued that three disputed fact issues precluded the Supreme Court's exercise of section 72.010 jurisdiction in this case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that the parties' disputes over the nature of CCL's facility in relation to the counties' boundary were significant and required resolution. View "In re Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality does not have the discretion to deny an ad valorem tax exemption for heat recovery steam generators (HRSGs), devices the Legislature considers "pollution control property," holding that the Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in exempting pollution control property from taxation.Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. filed for an exemption seeking a positive use determination for the HRSG used in two of its facilities. The Commission's Executive Director issued negative use determinations for the applications on the grounds that HRSGs are not eligible for a positive use determination. The Commission eventually affirmed the determinations as to both facilities. The trial court affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Texas Tax Code 11.31, property that qualifies as pollution control property, is entitled to a tax exemption, and HRSGs qualify, at least in part, as pollution control property; and (2) thus, assuming the applicant otherwise complies with the statute's requirements, the Executive Director may not issue a negative use determination for HRSGs. View "Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality" on Justia Law