Justia Tax Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether Hamilton Township, a limited-home-rule township, was authorized under Ohio law to impose its system of impact fees upon applicants for zoning certificates for new construction or redevelopment within its unincorporated areas. Appellants, several development companies, brought this action against Appellees, the Township and its trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, alleging that the impact fees were contrary to Ohio law and were unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the impact fees charged by the Township in this case constituted taxes; and (2) since those taxes were not authorized by general law, the Township was unauthorized to impose them pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 504.04(A)(1). View "Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp." on Justia Law

Appellee, AT&T Communications of Ohio, applied to the City of Cleveland for an income-tax refund for 1999 through 2002. Appellant, the City's income-tax administrator, denied AT&T's appeal in all respects, (1) dismissing AT&T's application for the refund for 1999 after finding that the statute of limitations on the request for a refund had expired, and (2) determining that any refund AT&T was claiming for 2000 through 2002 was offset in part by its other tax obligations. The board of income tax review reversed in part, determining that AT&T should receive the entire refund requested for the tax years 2000 through 2002. AT&T appealed. The court of common pleas reversed and entered judgment in favor of the administrator regarding AT&T's refund for 2000 through 2002. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court's judgment, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error because the administrator did not file a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the administrator failed to perfect a separate appeal in the court of common pleas, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error. View "AT&T Commc'ns of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch" on Justia Law

This personal-property-tax case came to the Supreme Court for the second time on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). For tax year 2002, HealthSouth Corporation claimed that as a result of massive accounting fraud, it reported fictitious personal-property assets at its facilities in various Ohio taxing districts. HealthSouth subsequently filed an application for final assessment for 2002 in order to obtain from the tax commissioner a new assessment that would reduce the taxable value in various taxing districts by removing fictitious assets. The BTA reversed the commissioner's refusal to grant a reassessment, and the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the BTA to complete its fact-finding. On remand, the BTA found that HealthSouth established that the denial of its refund request was improper and remanded to the commissioner for a determination of a reduced tax assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in its determination. View "HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

A property owner, Sheldon Road Associates, filed a valuation complaint in December 2008 that challenged the auditor's June 2008 correction of a clerical error relating to the 2007 tax year. The county Board of Revision (BOR) issued a decision that treated the complaint as pertaining to the tax year 2008. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) decided that, because Sheldon's complaint was untimely as to the 2007 tax year, the BOR lacked jurisdiction. The BTA remanded with the instruction that the BOR dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding that the BOR did have jurisdiction under the particular facts of this case. Remanded. View "Sheldon Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Ohio State University filed an application to exempt a two-story building to which it had title, predicating the exemption claim on Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17, which provides that state-university property is exempt for real property taxation if it is "used for the support of such university." The tax commissioner granted tax-exempt status, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property, which generated rental income from a first-floor commercial tenant and second-floor residential tenants, qualified for exemption to the extent that the income generated by the property was devoted to university purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of exemption, holding that income-producing property may not be exempted under section 3345.17 unless the activity conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities.

A family partnership purchased 749-acres for use as a farm. The entire farm enjoyed current-agricultural-use-valuation (CAUV) status until a seventy-acre parcel was transferred to Maralgate, LLC, after which the county auditor denied the CAUV application. Maralgate filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision, which also denied the application. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and granted CAUV status. At issue on appeal was whether the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.30(A)(1) because almost sixty percent of the parcel had trees that were not grown for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm because the family partnership owned Maralgate; (2) the statute does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop; and (3) a land survey showing how much of the parcel is devoted to different uses is required only if there is a commercial use of part of a parcel that is not an agricultural use, and, in this instance, those portions of the parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose.

This case involved a determination of the value of real property owned by Huntington National Bank. The County Board of Revision (BOR) determined the true value of the property to be $2,000,000, thereby reducing the value from the $2,650,000 originally assigned by the auditor. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Plain Local Schools Board of Education appealed, arguing that the BOR and BTA erred by (1) determining the value of real property based in part on factual material set forth in a written appraisal report when the appraiser who prepared the report did not testify, and (2) considering evidence contained in an appraisal report that offered an opinion of value as of a date other than the tax-lien date. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the school board did not object below to the alleged violation of appraisal-practice standards, the school board's claim that the violation made proferred evidence inadmissible was waived; and (2) the appraisal did furnish evidence relevant to determining the value as of the tax-lien date, even though the report itself used that data to arrive at an opinion of value for a different date.

WCI Steel appealed a final assessment of its personal property valuation for tax purposes to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA dismissed WCI's appeal on the authority of Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Levin because its notice of appeal failed to specify error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that (1) a notice of appeal from an assessment in which the tax commissioner has determined the value of personal property invokes the jurisdiction of the BTA to review that determination if the notice states the appellant's objection to the commissioner's actions in valuing property and identifies the treatment that the commissioner should have applied; (2) BTA's jurisdiction in the appeal permitted it to consider evidence in addition to that considered by the tax commissioner; and (3) the BTA misapplied Ohio Bell to this situation. Remanded.

Property owner Riser Foods Company appealed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) in which the BTA determined the true value of Riser's real estate to be $450,000 for tax year 2005 rather than $73,700 as determined by the county auditor and the County Board of Revision (BOR). The BTA's determination of value was predicated on the price paid for the property in 2005 in accordance with a buy-out option agreed to by the parties in a ground lease. The ground lease was entered into in 1998, and ownership was transferred in 2005. The BTA regarded the buy-out-option price as a recent, arm's-length sale price that furnished the criterion of value for the property as of 2005 pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) Riser had the initial burden to show that the 2005 sale was either not recent or not at arm's length; (2) Riser failed to negate the recency of the sale; and (3) Riser did not show that the long-standing contractual obligation to purchase made the sale involuntary or that a lack of open-market elements was significant.

The German Village Society (GVS) filed an application for exemption of real property. Pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5715.27(C), the school board became a party to the proceedings before the tax commission and to any appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). After the tax commissioner denied GVS's application, GVS appealed to the BTA but did not serve the school board with its notice of appeal. BTA reversed the decision of the tax commissioner and granted the exemption but did not transmit its decision to the school board. The tax commissioner then issued a determination giving effect to the BTA's decision. The school board filed a notice of appeal from the tax commissioner's order, asserting that the BTA's decision was void ab initio because the school board was not named or notified as to the existence of the appeal. The BTA held that because the period for appeal from its decision had expired, it did not have jurisdiction to address the validity of its earlier decision. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA's holding that it had no jurisdiction to grant relief to the school board, vacated the BTA's decision along with the tax commissioner's related order, and remanded.