Articles Posted in Louisiana Supreme Court

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In connection with its operation of a land-based casino in New Orleans, Jazz Casino Company, L.L.C. (Jazz) entered into contracts with various hotels for rooms made available to casino patrons on a complimentary or discounted basis. Jazz was required to pay for a specific number of rooms for the duration of the contract even if the rooms were not used by Jazz patrons. As a result of these hotel room rentals, hotel occupancy taxes were remitted to the Louisiana Department of Revenue (Department). The taxes consisted of state general sales taxes and sales tax collected on behalf of the following three entities: Louisiana Tourism Promotion District, the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, and the New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority. In August 2004, Jazz filed three claims for refund with the Department, alleging that Jazz overpaid hotel occupancy taxes for various hotel room rentals from October 1999, and June 2004. Following the denial of its claims by the Department, Jazz filed suit with the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals, seeking a determination of overpaid taxes in accordance with La. R.S. 47:1621. Finding that these statutory duties were ministerial, the district court issued a writ of mandamus to the tax collector to compel payment of the tax refund judgment. The court of appeal reversed and recalled the writ due to the lack of evidence needed to obtain a writ of mandamus. Based on the ministerial nature of the constitutional and statutory duties owed by the tax collector in connection with the taxpayer’s refund judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court, and reinstated the district court’s judgment. View "Jazz Casino Co, LLC v. Bridges" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was a tax exclusion, La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), which provided exclusions from state and local sales tax of charges for repairs on certain property that was delivered to customers out of state. At the local tax level, the 2013 version of this tax exclusion was mandatory for tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish and optional for all other parishes, municipalities and school boards. The question presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was, when the legislature enacted a tax exclusion, whether La. Const. art. VI, section 29(D)(1) required the legislature to treat tax authorities in all parishes the same or to make tax authorities in all parishes act the same. The Supreme Court held that the uniformity provision of the constitution, based on its plain and unambiguous meaning, required that a legislative tax exclusion treat tax authorities in all parishes the same. The Court found La. R.S. 47:301(14)(g)(i)(bb), as amended in 2013, to be unconstitutional because tax authorities in all parishes are not required to apply the tax exclusion in the same form, manner, or degree. "However, the portion of this statutory provision-mandating tax authorities in East Feliciana Parish apply the exclusion-is severable from the rest." Therefore, the Court severed this portion, leaving the balance of the statutory provision unchanged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court ruling and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arrow Aviation Co., LLC. v. St. Martin Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

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This matter involved the interpretation and application of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. (Yesterdays) and Cowboy’s Nightlife, Inc. (Cowboy’s) were cash-based bars or nightclubs located adjacent to each other in Calcasieu Parish. The clubs were audited in 2009, by the Calcasieu Parish School System Sales and Use Tax Department ("Collector) for years 2005 through 2008, on the basis that the clubs had violated their duties as tax collection agents for the Calcasieu Parish School System. The trial court found ambiguity in the language of the ULSTC requiring the plaintiff nightclubs to “keep and preserve suitable records” of all sales and expenditures. The trial court then found the tax collector had failed to show that the records actually kept by the clubs, in this case, bank statements and deposit slips, were not "suitable records" within the meaning of the ULSTC. The trial court further found the tax collector’s assessment was arbitrary and that the tax collector had failed to establish that its methodology for auditing the taxpayer was proper. Accordingly, the trial court: (1) ordered the tax collector to refund amounts paid under protest by the clubs; (2) determined that prescription had run on the sales taxes for the years 2005 and 2006 for one of the clubs, aside from those taxes admittedly withheld by the clubs; and (3) denied the tax collector’s motion for new trial and awarded attorney fees to the clubs. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment ordering a refund of the taxes and interest paid under protest by the clubs. Furthermore, the Court reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Yesterdays of Lake Charles, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sales & Use Tax Dept." on Justia Law

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Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) was in the business of generating electric power in Lake Charles. In order to comply with state and federal environmental regulations, NISCO introduces limestone into its power generation process; the limestone acts as a “scrubbing agent.” The limestone chemically reacts with sulfur to make ash, which NISCO then sells to LA Ash, for a profit of roughly $6.8 million annually. LA Ash sells the ash to its customers for varying commercial purposes, including roads, construction projects, environmental remediation, etc. NISCO appealed when taxes were collected on its purchase of limestone over four tax periods. NISCO claimed its purchase of limestone was subject to the “further processing exclusion” of La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), which narrowed the scope of taxable sales. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted NISCO’s writ application to determine the taxability of the limestone. The trial court ruled in the Tax Collectors' favor. After its review, the Supreme Court found that NISCO’s by-product of ash was the appropriate end product to analyze for purposes of determining the “further processing exclusion’s” applicability to the purchase of limestone. Moreover, under a proper “purpose” test, the third prong of the three-part inquiry enunciated in "International Paper v. Bridges," (972 So.2d 1121(2008)) was satisfied, "as evidenced by NISCO’s choice of manufacturing process and technology, its contractual language utilized in its purchasing of the limestone, and its subsequent marketing and sale of the ash." Therefore the Court reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of NISCO. View "Bridges v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law

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At issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court was whether the materials, machinery, and equipment that became part of an inland marine drilling barge during its reconstruction following a fire were exempt from sales and use tax. La. R.S. 47:305.1(A) exempted these materials when vessels were “built in Louisiana.” The Louisiana Department of Revenue promulgated LAC 61:I:4403(A) and (B)(2) to clarify that certain reconstruction projects fell within the scope of the statutory exemption. The lower courts found the regulation exceeded the scope of the statute and declared it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted review to determine the constitutionality of LAC 61:I:4403(A) and (B)(2), and to review its application to the facts at issue. After this review, the Court found the regulation constitutional and applicable to the facts in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the taxpayer. View "Coastal Drilling Company v. Dufrene" on Justia Law

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Louisiana Machinery Company, L.L.C. and Louisiana Machinery Rentals, L.L.C., Louisiana's exclusive Caterpillar franchise dealers, sold, leased, and/or repaired Caterpillar equipment and machinery in parishes throughout the state. Following an audit, the taxing authorities from numerous parishes began tax collection proceedings against the companies, alleging they incorrectly failed to charge and collect sales and use taxes from their customers on their taxable sales, leases, and/or repairs for certain tax periods, and that the companies were liable for these taxes, penalties, and interest under the provisions of the Uniform Local Sales Tax Code (ULSTC). The tax collector for Catahoula Parish obtained partial summary judgments at district court, declaring that the tax assessments it issued to the companies were final, and the executory judgments issued by the court and could not be challenged. The companies appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed the grants of partial summary judgment based on deficiency of the notices of assessment and the lack of sufficient evidence to support the judgments. The tax collector applied for supervisory review to the State Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeal properly reversed the district court's grants of partial summary judgment, and remanded the cases back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Catahoula Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Rentals, LLC" on Justia Law

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The taxpayer in this case, a paper mill, requested a refund on taxes it paid on purchases of caustic soda, arguing that the chemical was used in the production of a product for resale and excluded from local and state taxation. An attorney for the tax collector denied the request, and gave no reason for the denial. The taxpayer made a second request for taxes inadvertently paid on caustic soda and sodium hydrosulfide, chemicals they argued, qualified for the tax exemption. The tax collector did not respond to the second request. The taxpayer then sent a third and fourth refund request, again for the purchase of raw materials. Again, the requests were denied with no grounds for the denial. The taxpayer then filed suit seeking the refunds it felt were due back from the tax collector. The district court found that the claims were untimely filed, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the taxpayer's writ application to clarify the proper procedure and time period for appeals when the tax collector has failed to act on a refund claim for overpayment of taxes after one year, and to determine whether the taxpayer was required to use a "payment under protest" procedure in this case in order to obtain a refund. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts dismissing the tax refund claims, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Tin, Inc. v. Washington Parish Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the court of appeal erred in overturning the rulings of the district courts with regard to certain tax assessments. Questions were raised as to whether review by the Court and the court of appeal was timely. Because the Supreme Court determined that the application in "Caldwell Parish School Board, 12-C-1383," was untimely filed, and the underlying appeal to the court of appeal in "Tensas Parish School Board, 12-C-1762," was also untimely filed, the Court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider the validity of the decision of the court of appeal in "Caldwell Parish School Board," and the district court judgment in "Tensas Parish School Board" was final and definitive. View "Caldwell Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Machinery Company, LLC" on Justia Law

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The issue in this matter was whether a sheriff acted within statutory authority in deducting a commission in connection with the collection of a two-millage assessment that was initially approved by voters in 2003. Upon review of the applicable legislative history of the statute in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the change in the method of funding eliminated the prior percentage commission-based funding of the sheriff’s office from ad valorem taxes under former La. R.S. 33:1423(B) and (C) and replaced it with revenue generated by the newly-created special taxing districts known as law enforcement districts. Thus, sheriffs are no longer authorized to deduct a commission on ad valorem taxes collected by them on behalf of other taxing authorities, as the costs associated with the collection of those taxes is now satisfied by the millage levied by the law enforcement districts. The decision of the court of appeal was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Livingston Parish Council on Aging v. Graves " on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment. That judgment confirmed and quieted title to a tax purchaser on the basis that the former property owner failed to file a separate action or reconventional demand to institute a proceeding to annul the tax sale within six months from the date of service of the petition and citation to quiet title. Upon review, the Court concluded the former property owner's claim that the tax sale was null and void was timely made and the former property owner had sufficiently established that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the sheriff provided notice of the tax delinquencies and the tax sale to the record property owner as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (failure of which would have rendered the tax sales entirely null and void). Accordingly, the Court found summary judgment to quiet tax titles in favor of the tax purchaser was not warranted in this case. View "Smithko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc." on Justia Law